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Abstract
Increasingly, political action committees and special interest groups dominate the 
national policy-making process. Critics charge that campaign contributions buy access to 
and influence with policy makers, and that the differential ability to make such 
contributions results in disproportional representation. The question then becomes: how 
do ordinary citizens who are unable to use substantial financial contributions to 
“purchase” access to power mobilize people to influence public policy. To state the 
question another way: how can people provide leadership when they possess neither 
positional power nor the means commonly used to influence those with positional power?
This historical study examines these questions via oral history data gathered from 
a group of military wives who had a significant impact in both the national and 
international policy arenas after their husbands became prisoners of war (POWs) or were 
declared missing in action (MIA) in North Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. Data from 
documents and letters retained by the wives also were employed to extend and triangulate 
interview data.
In addition, the study entailed interviewing former governmental officials, 
including high-ranking officials of the Nixon administration, and analyzing presidential 
papers held by the National Archives and accessed through the Freedom of Information 
Act. The major purpose of this second round of data collection and analysis was to 
explore linkages between the wives’ actions, on the one hand, and governmental policy 
shifts, on the other.
The data demonstrate that the wives had a significant impact on reversing the 
State Department’s policy of “Quiet Diplomacy” and on keeping the POW and MIA
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
issue front-and-center during the Nixon Administration’s peace negotiations with the 
North Vietnamese. The study also reveals a number of strategies that the wives used to 
influence public officials and that others who wish to provide leadership in the absence of 
formal power might employ heuristically. These strategies can be characterized as seven 
“lessons learned”: (a) do your homework; (b) resist the organizational urge to be big; (c) 
tell a compelling story; (d) nothing is more important than a personal visit; (e) stay 
focused and remain non-partisan; (f) form partnerships, but keep partners at arms-length; 
and, (g) don’t get “slick”/avoid public relations professionals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter One: Leadership in the Absence of Power: The Stories of American Wives of 
Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in Vietnam, 1965-1973
Background to the Study/Statement o f  the Problem 
Leadership Studies scholars increasingly suggest that leadership should not be 
equated with positional power or formal authority derived from an organizational 
structure. Nor should it be viewed as a set of personal characteristics. For example, in his 
seminal work, Leadership without Easy Answers, Ronald Heifetz writes, "We ought to 
focus on leadership as an activity— the activity of a citizen from any walk of life
mobilizing people to do something."' Heifetz warns that "by restraining the exercise of 
leadership to legitimate authority, we also leave no room for leadership that challenges
the legitimacy of authority or the system of authorization itself. . . . [yet] social progress
2
may require that someone push the system to its limit."
Except for Ronald Heifetz, most leadership scholars focus on organizational 
issues rather than large-scale policy issues. The result of this is a limited amount of work 
in the leadership studies field that systematically explores how individuals without formal 
positional power and who lack the resources to literally buy access to power can exercise 
leadership in a national policymaking context. Even in the field of political science, 
studies of the policy making process tend to focus on well established interest groups that 
normally are represented by formal organizations and professional lobbyists.
There is a need, therefore, to begin to examine the exercise of leadership in the 
public policy domain by individuals and groups that have neither formal positional power
i
Heifetz, L eadersh ip  W ithout E asy A n sw ers, 20 .
1
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Chapter One
nor the sorts of resources that normally are used to influence those with formal policy 
making authority. This study responded to this need.
Purpose o f  the Study
The purpose of this study was to increase understanding of how citizens without 
formal positional power can provide leadership in the national policymaking context and, 
in fact, influence the policies that get adopted and implemented. Specifically, this study 
focused on how a group of military wives became significant players in the national and 
international policy contexts after their husbands became prisoners of war (POW) or were 
declared missing in action (MIA). This group was especially appropriate to study since, 
as this study documents, the wives had a significant impact on policy within both the 
national and international policy arenas, even though they entered these arenas with 
neither formal positional power nor the sorts or resources that traditionally are associated 
with influencing those with positional power.
To accomplish its more general goals, the study focused on three more specific 
interrelated goals: (a) gather and configure life history data from POW and MIA wives, 
with a particular focus on their individual and collective activities on the POW and MIA 
issue; (b) triangulate the women’s stories with documents such as letters, newsletters, and 
newspaper accounts that focused on the women and the organization they eventually 
formed, the National League of Families; and (c) document the impact that the women 
and their organization had on public policy through interviews with former high-ranking 
officials and a review of documents held by the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) and accessed through the Freedom of Information Act.
2 Ibid., 21.
2
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Leadership in the Absence Of Power 
Research Questions
The purposes that were articulated in the prior section can be distilled into the 
following three research questions:
• What triangulated stories do the women tell about their experiences and the 
strategies they employed?
• What do former high ranking government officials and archived government 
documents say about the policy impact of the women and their organization?
• What insights do the interview data and the document analysis provide about 
exercising leadership in the policy arena when one has neither formal 
positional power nor the sorts of resources that normally are used to gain 
access to and influence those with formal policymaking authority?
Overview o f  the Dissertation
The next chapter reviews literature that is relevant to the study being reported 
here. Chapter 3 describes the research methods employed in the study. Chapters 4 
through 8 are findings chapters. The first three of these chapters document the evolution 
of the womens’ political activities; chapter 7 looks at the women’s activities from the 
perspective of government officials and explores the actual impact the women’s actions 
had on policy; and chapter 8 is a kind of postscript about the emotional toll on the 
women. The concluding chapter, Chapter 9, is organized around three tasks: (a) linking 
the findings of this dissertation study with relevant theory; (b) explicating specific 
strategies the women used to influence public policy that could be used heuristically by 
others who wish to exercise leadership in the absence of positional power; and (c) 
discussing implications of this study for further research.
3
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Chapter Two: Review of Related Literature
The literature on leadership has increasingly suggested that leadership should not 
be equated with positional power or legitimate authority derived from a social structure. 
Nor should the concept be limited to a set of personal characteristics that determine the 
qualification or competence of an individual to lead. In his book, Leadership Without 
Easy Answers, in fact, Ronald Heifetz wrote, "Leadership is an activity—the activity of a 
citizen from any walk of life mobilizing people to do something."3 Except for Ronald 
Heifetz, most leadership scholars focus on organizational issues rather than large-scale 
policy issues. Literature on how individuals without formal positional power or 
institutional legitimate authority can exercise leadership in a national policymaking 
context must be gleaned from literature in fields other than Leadership Studies. Even 
much of the literature in these fields has limitations, however.
In the field o f political science, for example, studies o f the policymaking process 
tend to focus on established interest groups that normally are represented by formal 
organizations and professional lobbyists. According to Heifetz, this is problematic: "By 
restraining the exercise o f leadership to legitimate authority we also leave no room for 
leadership that challenges the legitimacy of authority or the system of authorization itself.
4
. . . [SJocial progress may require that someone push the system to its limit." Gary Hart, 
a former politician, made much the same point in his book, Restoration o f the Republic. 
He wrote, "Civil, legal, and political rights are most in jeopardy . .  . when government
3
4  H eifetz, L eadersh ip  W ithout E asy A nsw ers, 20.
Ibid., 21.
4
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Review of the Related Literature 
becomes detached and remote from the citizenry, when elected representatives fall under 
the sway of interests, when the concerns o f the powerful, usually commercial, elites 
outweigh the common good in the halls of power, and when individual citizens lose their
sense o f participation in the public life of the community and nation."5
Part of what Hart grapples with is the perplexing question of how ordinary 
citizens can effectively participate in a democracy. That question, of course, is the 
underlying question of this dissertation. Because this dissertation focused on 
documenting the impact that a specific group of military wives had on the policymaking 
process and surfacing the strategies that they employed to have an influence, it seemed 
prudent to not only review literature produced by or about the wives but also to examine 
other, more general literature about citizen participation in the policymaking process. 
These discussions can provide insight into the policymaking process, in general, and how 
people devoid of legitimate authority or positional power can work to influence the 
system and process, in particular. This sort of insight can serve as a theoretical backdrop 
for the five findings chapters that make up the bulk of this dissertation.
Thus, the first part of this chapter focuses on literature about political 
participation. The second part focuses more directly on literature about the Prisoner of 
War and Missing in Action issue during the Vietnam ear.
Literature Associated with Participation in the Policymaking Process 
Vaclav Havel
In his seminal essay, Power o f  the Powerless, Vaclav Havel examined the 
potential of the powerless under "the dictatorship of a political bureaucracy" in
5
Hart, R estoration  o f  the R epublic, 15.
5
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Chapter Two
Czechoslovakia during the 1970s.6 Havel's work is important because his basic argument 
derives from a philosophical premise about the subtle destructiveness o f citizenry apathy 
and conformity in the face of an institutionalized ideology. Furthermore, Havel raised 
two pivotal questions regarding citizenry involvement in the existing dictatorial political 
system. First, "Is it within the power o f the 'dissidents'—as a category of subcitizen 
outside the power establishment— to have any influence at all on society and the social
7
system?" Second, "can they actually change anything?"
Havel's essay is constructed around a concert example: the greengrocer who 
dutifully exhibits the required political sign, with its governmental sanctioned slogan, in 
his shop's window. The greengrocer's behavior and act of obedience to the power of the 
socio-political hierarchy, as Havel argues, is not done to promote the truth or validity of a 
slogan. For the greengrocer, the words contained in the slogan are not his real opinion. 
Rather, the greengrocer accepts the "prescribed ritual, by accepting appearances as
g
reality, by accepting the given rules of the game." To do otherwise is to be excluded, 
isolated, and alienated from workers and society, loosing peace, tranquility, and security. 
The greengrocer's behavior, therefore, supports and is at least tolerant o f the power based 
socio-political rules. The result, writes Havel, is that the greengrocer "must live within a 
lie."9
Havel goes on to ask what the impetus is for a citizens not to succumb "to a 
profane trivialization of his or her inherent humanity, and to utilitarianism" in a regime
6
7  Havel, P ow er o f  the P ow erless , 24.
8  Ibid., 23.
9  Ibid., 31.
Ibid., 31
6
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Review of the Related Literature 
that is built on coercion and requires conformity o f its citizens?10 Havel answered this 
question by further developing the story. Havel wondered what would happen if the 
greengrocer rebels, rejects his part in the prescribed ritual, and decided to break the rules 
by not placing the slogan in the shop's window? What if he began to state honest thoughts 
at political meetings as well as align himself with those his conscience could support? 
What if  he began to "live within the truth"?11
Havel noted the consequence of such action would be readily dealt with by those 
in powerful political positions. The greengrocer would lose his management position, be 
transferred to a menial job with limited influence, harassed by superiors, experience a pay 
cut and cancellation o f his vacation, and find that his children would not receive a higher 
education. Havel contended that those who enforce the penalties for the greengrocer's
disobedience do so, not out of personal conviction, but under pressure from the regime
12
authorities that are nothing more than agents of the political bureaucracy automatism.
The enforcers also live and act out a lie, in other words. Thus deciding to live within the 
truth, Havel contended, has the potential for "incalculable political power."13
Havel went on to develop the view that powerless people, when living in the truth, 
possess significant amounts of power to influence the system. He noted, for example, that 
ultimately, power is immaterial and resides within an individual. The ultimate 
confrontation between the powerful and the powerless, he wrote, "does not take place on 
the level of real, institutionalized, quantifiable power which relies on the various
instruments of power, but on a different level altogether: the level of human
10
n Ibid., 38.
1 2  Ibid., 39.
13 Ibid., 39 
Ibid., 41.
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consciousness and conscience, the existential level." Based on this understanding,
Havel contrasted observable power with power that is unseen and unexpected.
Ultimately, according to Havel, power does not reside in the strength of definable 
political or social groups, but chiefly in the strength of a potential, which is hidden 
throughout the whole of society, including the official power structures of that society. 
This more subtle form of power does not participate in any direct struggle for power; 
rather it makes its influence felt in the obscure arena of being itself.
Thus, Havel's philosophy for political engagement is rooted in a belief in truth 
and a sort of existential revolution that quicken the hearts, minds, and souls o f citizens. 
Coupled with these beliefs is a vision of a new form of government. According to Havel, 
governmental structures need to be open, relatively small, dynamic, and rooted in shared 
common community feelings; in short, they must be the antithesis of structures that are 
rigidly hierarchical. This new political environment, according to Havel, would lead to
the rehabilitation of "values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, [and] love."
16
Havel also opposed the "strategic agglomeration o f formalized organizations."
He preferred organizations that sprang up ad hoc, because they were more likely to be 
"infused with enthusiasm for a particular purpose and disappearing when that purpose
17
had been achieved." Additionally, Havel believed that organizations should be rooted in 
the shared experiences and personalities of their members.
In many respects, the world Havel inhabited (and which influenced his thinking)
14
1 5  Ibid., 41.
1 6  Ibid., 93.
1 7  Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 93.
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was radically different from the world inhabited by the women who are the focal point of 
this dissertation. Yet there are also intriguing similarities. In the early years, for example, 
the women were forced to live their own version of the lie Havel writes about as they 
acquiesced to a government policy that they increasingly believed was wrong. They also 
formed the sort of personal organization that Havel touts as the best form of government 
and used the power of this personal organization to impact more formal governmental 
structures (a possibility that Havel’s somewhat utopian view of government does not 
really explore). Thus, despite the seemingly different contexts in which Havel and the 
women who were the focal point for this study worked, elements o f Havel’s thinking 
often can be quite comfortably layered on to the wives’ experiences. Readers are 
encouraged to think of Havel’s ideas as they read the women’s story recounted in 
Chapters 4 through 9.
Charles Lindblom and Edward Woodhouse
Like Gary Hart and Vaclav Havel, Charles Lindblom and Edward Woodhouse
appeal for the policy process to be inclusive of all citizens. Indeed, they wrote, "We
suggest that helping ordinary people to think more clearly about social problems and
18
possibilities is the best hope for shaping a better world." In addition, they advocate for 
"rethinking and changing power relations to better promote the intelligence of
19
democracy."
According to Lindblom and Woodhouse, the rethinking process must begin with 
reconsidering terminology. They argue that traditional terminology— terms such as
18
1 9  Lindblom and W oodhouse, P olicy  M aking P rocess, viii. 
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"leader"—unduly limit our thinking about political participation and the policymaking
process in general. “It is misleading to refer to those in positions of authority as 'the
20
policy makers' or 'leaders' or 'decision makers,"' they write, since policy is the product 
of a wide array o f forces operating in often-serendipitous ways. Therefore, what citizens 
have learned about the political process must be unlearned so the focus is not
"excessively on government officials," who all too often makes citizens dependent and
21
confined to an institutional structure.
In order to bring about greater citizen participation, Lindblom and Woodhouse 
prefer the use o f the term functionary for those performing an official function in relation 
to the policy process. Altering the language we use to discuss the policymaking process, 
they believe, will facilitate a needed perspective change that promotes and endorses 
citizenry involvement in the policymaking process.
Lindblom and Woodhouse go on to argue that elections provide exceedingly 
limited opportunities for citizen participation and that these opportunities do not 
necessarily translate the needs and convictions of voters into policy that is consistent with 
citizen’s needs and wishes. Forms of participation other than voting are required for 
government officials to respond adequately to citizens’ needs and concerns.
Lindblom and Woodhouse, however, are not nai've; they acknowledge that power, 
position, elitism, economic status, as well as other inequitable influences often mitigate 
citizenry advocacy. Nonetheless, they are convinced that problematic societal issues are 
best dealt with by improving the thinking of ordinary citizens, and they argue that the
20
2 1  Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 4.
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development of critical thinking by the public is contingent on policy professionals 
allowing for the articulation of competing ideas and diverse recommendations for 
addressing social problems.
A major criticism of the Lindblom and Woodhouse book is that it is exceedingly 
short on specifics about what ordinary citizens can actually do to influence the political 
process. Even the claim that the public’s thinking ability can be improved if policy 
professionals encourage the articulation of competing ideas can seem like wishful 
thinking, especially in this age of mass-media manipulation. Thus, this dissertation has 
the potential to add a degree of concreteness to the good intentions on display in The 
Policy Making Process by describing the strategies a group o f citizens actually used to 
introduce ideas that were not initially sanctioned by government officials into the public 
discourse. This topic will be revisited in the final chapter o f this dissertation, after the 
findings from the study have been presented.
John Kingdon
John Kingdon's Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies outlines a theoretical 
framework that brings a degree of rationality and order to a process that can often seem 
disjointed and chaotic. Even as he did this, however, Kingdon acknowledged the
limitations of his work due to the fact that the area of policy development is "particularly
22
untidy."
Despite the untidiness of the phenomena— or, arguably, because of it—Kingdon 
considers precision in the use of terms and concepts essential for developing 
understanding. Thus, he defines one of his key terms, agenda, as follows: "The agenda,
22
Kingdon, Agendas, A lternatives, a n d  P ublic P o lic ies , 2.
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as I conceive of it, is the lists of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, 
and people outside o f government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention at any given time. So, the agenda-setting process narrows this set
23
of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus o f attention."
In order to unpack the public policy process, Kingdon identified two categories 
that potentially influence the agenda and its alternatives: the participants and the 
processes that lead to an issue receiving attention. He divides participants into two broad 
categories: those within government and those outside o f government. This distinction, of 
course, is relevant to this dissertation. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8 focus on a small group of 
women who clearly belong to the latter group; chapter 7 focuses on the former group, 
including the President o f the United States and his senior officials. More specifically, the 
dissertation focuses on how the latter group managed to make its agenda a part of the 
agenda of government officials, including the President.
According to Kingdon's research, a government official such as the President 
"may be able to dominate and even determine the policy agenda, but is unable to
24
dominate the alternatives." In spite o f this, top government officials such as the 
President still have means to influence the agenda setting process through such things as 
Presidential vetoes and the ability to hire and fire staff to maintain organizational unity. 
Additionally, high-ranking government officials such as the President have a significant 
ability to command the attention of the public, especially if they maintain their 
popularity.
23
2 4  Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 23.
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Outside the government, Kingdon considers "interest groups, researchers, 
academics, consultants, media, parties and other elections-related actors, and the mass
25
public" to be key actors in the agenda setting process. The single most important 
distinction between those inside the government and those outside is that offormal 
authority. Those within the government have it; those on the outside do not.
Despite their lack of formal power, however, Kingdon observed that, at times, 
"interest group pressure does have a positive impact on the government's agenda, and 
does so with considerable frequency. A group that mobilizes support, writes letters, sends
delegations, and stimulates its allies to do the same can get government officials to pay
26
attention to its issues." The problem for interest groups, according to Kingdon, is that 
they lose the ability to completely control the discussion, agenda, and alternatives as the 
process proceeds. What interest groups do have in their favor, however, are the resources 
they bring to bear on the issue. Some groups with geographical dispersion have the 
"ability to mobilize their members and sympathizers: and their numbers, status, or
27
wealth—are thought to have an ability to affect election outcomes." Furthermore, if  a 
group convinces governmental insiders that their organization speaks with one voice, 
there is a greater likelihood that it will influence the policymaking process.
Furthermore, Kingdon argues that problems help establish an agenda. Problems, 
however, are not always apparent to the whole of society or to governmental officials.
But problems are often thrust into the forefront as a result of one of the three elements: 
when a crisis or disaster of some proportion occurs; when an issue becomes defined by a
H Ibid., 45.
2 7  Ibid., 49.
Ibid., 51.
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powerful symbol that has mass appeal; or when a policy maker utilizes his or her
28
personal experience. Kingdon does not discuss which of these has the greatest impact 
on the groups he studied. However, he emphasized the ability of a symbol to focus 
attention and capture reality because it provides visual understanding and comprehension 
to the masses.
A significant element of Kingdon's research is his discussions about "policy
29
entrepreneurs." Policy entrepreneurs have one defining characteristic: "[a] willingness 
to invest their resources— time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money— in the hope
30 . .
of a future return." These entrepreneurs, Kingdon surmised, have the ability to sense 
problems and advocate for a solution to solve that problem. They "attempt to 'soften up' 
policy communities, which tend to be inertia-bound and resistant to major changes, and
larger publics, getting them used to new ideas and building acceptance for their
31
proposals." Furthermore, this softening up specifically educates the public on problems 
that influence policy issues and initiatives. Additionally, those entrepreneurs, whether 
inside or outside of the government, educate the populace via the means at their disposal: 
speeches, congressional hearings, studies, reports, or other papers that will garner 
attention.
Why are entrepreneurs influential? Kingdon argued that they have some claim to 
a hearing, and that this claim is normally rooted in one of three things: expertise, ability
32
to speak for others, or an authoritative decision-making position. Also, the entrepreneur
Ibid., 93-94.
3 0  Ibid., 122.
3 1  Ibid., 122.
3 2  Ibid., 128.
Ibid., 180.
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is known for his or her political connections or negotiating skill. Finally, successful 
entrepreneurs are persistent. Entrepreneurs, in fact, spend a great deal o f time giving 
talks, writing position papers, sending letters to important people, drafting bills, testifying 
before congressional committees and executive branch commissions, and having lunch, 
all with the aim o f pushing their ideas in whatever way and forum might further the
34
cause.
Clearly, the women who are the focal point for this dissertation possess many of 
the characteristics of Kingdon’s entrepreneurs. But they also represent a special category 
o f entrepreneurs, a category that does not surface in Kingdon’s own research. There will 
be more about this uniqueness in the dissertation’s final chapter.
Margaret Placier, Peter Hall, Sherron McKendall, and Karen Cockrell
Margaret Placier, Peter Hall, Sherron McKendall, and Karen Cockrell, in Policy 
as the Transformation o f  Intentions, ” argued that focusing on intentions is central to 
understanding the policy process. "Policies convey intentions, and policy making cannot
35
be understood without understanding actor's intentions," the authors wrote. Essentially, 
from these authors’ perspective, the policymaking process becomes an arena where actors 
with multiple purposes, goals, and interests— i.e. differing intentions— seek to influence 
and motivate other actors through various means to achieve their desired objective.
Placier and her co-authors developed their intentions-based view of policymaking 
in a study that was qualitative iu design and examined the development of a multicultural 
education policy. Key actors included school board members, administrators,
3 4  Ibid., 181.
3 5  Ibid., 181.
Placier, et al, “P o licy  as the Transform ation o f  In tentions,” 259-260 .
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participants from the community, and parents. The study revealed that a group’s 
intentions were often ambiguous. Intentions also were tranformed, at least somewhat, by 
a political process that is multifaceted and a highly interactive.
The notion of intentions, of course, could be seen as a reasonable facsimile for 
Kingdon’s concept of agendas. What the Placier, et. al. study adds is a sense of the 
dynamic nature of intentions/agenda. Although the women in this study essentially 
followed the Kingdon dictum to both stay focused and stay on message, doing this was 
not always easy and did not happen simply by accident. Among other things the book by 
Placier, et. al. sensitizes us to the fact that organizations are not individuals and that even 
individuals can change their minds over time. Thus, getting an organization to speak with 
one consistent voice is not something that happens automatically.
Heifetz and Linsky
In Ronald Heifetz's most recent book, Leadership on the Line, he, and co-author 
Marty Linsky provide a pragmatic approach to exercising leadership in the policymaking 
process. Like the other authors, Heifetz and Linsky emphasize the importance of 
identifying, conceptualizing, formulating, and articulating problems. Problem framing is 
important because the frames selected constrain and guide the search for solutions. 
Heifetz and Linsky’s unique contribution is their emphasis on the complexity of the 
problem framing task and the resulting need for leadership.
In Leadership on the Line, as in Heifetz’s earlier book entitled Leadership 
Without Easy Answers, problems are classified as either technical or adaptive. Technical
36
problems are those for which people "have the necessary know-how and procedures" to
36
H eifetz and Linsky, Leadersh ip  on the Line, 13.
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solve. Adaptive problems, on the other hand, are those that "require experiments, new
37
discoveries, and adjustments from numerous places in the organization or community." 
Appeals to higher authority or authoritative expertise and a reliance on standard operating 
and well-established procedures do not solve adaptive problems—these are technical 
responses that are inappropriate for dealing with adaptive challenges.
Because adaptive problems are not solved by technical responses, Heifetz and 
Linsky emphasize the importance of leadership. They note, for example, that, 
characteristically, people look to authorities for solutions to all sorts of problems, yet they 
do not want authorities to disrupt their world and "confront them with disturbing
38
questions and difficult choices." This is because the disruption "challenges habits,
39
beliefs, and values." Yet, leadership focused on resolving adaptive problems requires 
this essential unpleasantness, and leaders who confront adaptive problems must expect to 
encounter resistance.
Heifetz and Linsky identify four dangerous responses that leaders encounter from 
others when the leaders confront adaptive challenge: marginalization, diversion, attacks, 
or seduction. Marginalization, overt or covert, subtle or obvious, removes the leader from 
being able to make any significant contribution to the process of the adaptive challenge. 
Diversion is a tactic that brings about a loss of focus on the problem at hand. Attacks 
refocus the group’s attention on the person leading the group rather than the problem or 
issue being addressed. Seduction is the process by which an individual or a group loses 
their sense of purpose. The result o f the aforementioned dynamics is the reduction of
38 Ibid., 13.
3 9  Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 30.
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disequilibrium, which Heifetz and Linsky believe is necessary for people to address 
issues and problems. The primary purpose of these responses, according to Heifetz and 
Linsky, is to "maintain the familiar, restore order, and protect people from the pains of
40
adaptive work."
To adequately respond to any or all o f the tactics outlined above, a leader must 
engage in the simple yet also very difficult activity of gaining perspective in the midst of 
whirling action. The author uses the metaphor o f the balcony and dance floor that Heifetz 
employed in his earlier book to conceptualize this activity. They contend, "Seeing the 
whole picture requires standing back and watching even as you take part in the action
41
being observed." By gaining the balcony perspective, there is a clearer view of what is 
really taking place; consequently, it is less likely that the leader will "misperceive the
42
situation and make the wrong diagnosis, leading to misguided decisions." However, in 
order for the leader to affect events, he or she must return to the dance floor to make 
interventions and remain engaged in the process to observe what is also happening in real 
time. Being involved in the balcony-dance floor process enables leaders to distinguish 
technical from adaptive challenges, as well as to discover where others are at in the 
process. This latter characteristic, o f knowing where others are at, is indicative of placing 
a high priority on the establishment of personal relationships and valuing their 
perspective in the process.
In working within the political process, Heifetz and Linsky emphasize that 
creating, developing, and nurturing networks is crucial for addressing problems. Heifetz
40
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and Linsky acknowledge, however, that in exercising leadership in the political arena 
there must be an ability to think politically, which involves learning to work and deal 
with all sorts of people, i.e., people who support one’s issue, those who oppose it, and 
those who are uncommitted. This latter group, according to Heifetz and Linsky, are "the
43
people you are trying to move."
Heifetz and Linsky are not naive and do not assume that participants in the 
adaptive process will automatically support a proposed agenda or course of action. They 
acknowledge, therefore, that conflict is inevitable. What is the best way to deal with 
conflict? Heifetz and Linsky contend that conflict must be orchestrated and managed. 
When generating "adaptive change [the challenge] is to work with differences, passions, 
and conflict in a way that diminishes their destructive potential and constructively
44
harnesses their energy." Differences, passions, and conflict will challenge deeply held 
convictions and experiences, which can also be sources of personal transformation. To 
lead people through the processes o f the adaptive challenge, however, Heifetz and Linsky 
noted that leaders cannot become the embodiment of the conflict. The objective is to 
permit the generation of enough heat by those involved in the process in order for the 
work to be done that only they can do.
Heifetz and Linsky acknowledge that focusing attention on a problem is not 
without inherent difficulty. Those in positions of authority can more readily direct and 
redirect attention to a problem through various means at their disposal. Unfortunately, the 
effort to bring attention to a problem without positional authority involves risks and is a
" ib id ., 75.
Ibid., 102.
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greater challenge. This may include forming alliances with those in authority positions 
greater than one's own because of their ability to bring attention to those issues deemed 
critical. Additionally, it may mean the "need to escalate [personal] behavior or rhetoric"
45
to heighten or force attention to a specific problem. Engaging in such action, however, 
requires people to operate beyond their authority. Furthermore, as Heifetz and Linsky
note, they "tread a thin line between acting out a role such that people will notice, and
46being so extreme that your issue (and perhaps you) will be dismissed."
The Heifetz/Linsky view of leadership and their discussion o f the adaptive nature 
of problems figure prominently in the story that is recounted in Chapters 4 through 8. 
What this story adds is a level of specificity about exercising leadership and influencing 
national policy that is not generally evident in the Heifetz and Linsky book. There will be 
more on this in the final chapter of this dissertation.
Literature About Vietnam POW and MIA Wives 
Between February 12, and April 1, 1973, 591 American POWs in North and 
South Vietnam were repatriated during Operation Homecoming. This term came from 
Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, who sensed that the long-awaited repatriation of the 
Americans captured in Southeast Asia deserved a more meaningful, more humanly 
engaging title than the one assigned years earlier by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Egress 
Recap.47
In the months and years that followed the prisoners’ release, voluminous 
collections o f personal accounts were produced: books, articles, interviews, papers, and
"  Ibid., 157.
4 7  Ibid., 158.
Davis, L ong R o a d  H om e, 491.
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text of speeches. Researchers, historians, graduate students, and journalists have also 
contributed to an immense repository of material related to the POW experience and 
government policy. The Historical Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense holds 
the most extensive collection of classified and unclassified archival material on the 
experience of American POWs in Southeast Asia.
Inconspicuous and often overlooked, however, is material written by or about the 
experiences of the wives and other family members of the POWs and MIAs. During the 
imprisonment of their husbands, many of the wives and family members wrote letters to 
editors, gave speeches, testified before congressional hearings, were featured in 
newspapers and magazines, and on television and radio. After repatriation, their letter 
writing campaigns and public speaking engagements on behalf of POWs and MIAs 
essentially ended as the women once again played the role of military wife (or, in some 
cases, military widows).
There were some exceptions, however. From the period immediately before 
repatriation of the men until today, the women have written nine books. Five books are 
memoirs; three of these were co-authored with husbands. The other four are fictional 
presentations, three o f which were written under pseudonyms.
There is also a tenth account that was written neither by the wives nor by their 
husbands: It is a masters' thesis that examines the work and influence of one of the wives.
Two of the fictional books, Safekeeping by Jonellen Heckler and To Have and To 
Hold by Fern Michaels, could not be located or obtained through professional search 
services and therefore were not reviewed. This section o f the chapter reviews the other
21
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works alluded in the previous paragraphs. The first part of the review describes the 
individual works; the second part focuses on themes that cut across all of the works.
A Review o f  the Individual Works
Silver and Gottlieb’s, Limbo. Before the end of the Vietnam War and Operation 
Homecoming, Joan Silver and Linda Gottlieb wrote the fictional work Limbo. The novel 
was crafted from interviews with POW and MIA families and a review of their personal 
and official correspondence. It is an account that takes the reader into the very personal 
and turbulent experiences of three wives who lived with the knowledge that their 
husbands were listed as either a POW or an MIA. This fictionalized account focuses on 
how the book’s protagonists coped with family responsibilities, personal turmoil, 
governmental and military bureaucracy, civil unrest, and the growing frustration fueled 
by not whether the war would end and their husbands would return.
The Rutledges In The Presence o f  Mine Enemies. The first collaborative effort 
between husband and wife came in 1973 with the publication of In The Presence o f  Mine 
Enemies by Phyllis Rutledge and Howard Rutledge. The book is divided into two parts.
In the first part, Howard Rutledge wrote about his experience as a POW. Phyllis Rutledge 
wrote about her own experiences in the second part o f the book.
There is a fundamental imbalance in the book reflective o f the literature on the 
POW and MIA issue in general. The Rutledges’ book has 111 pages; Phyllis’ account, 
however, is only nineteen pages long.
In her nineteen pages, Phyllis Rutledge wrote about her strong religious 
convictions and described their sustaining power during the seven-year ordeal while her 
husband was imprisoned. She indicated that, like many other POW and MIA wives, she
22
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did not know whether she was a wife or widow for the first five years. This uncertainty 
contributed to mental anguish and incomprehensible stress while Phyllis attempted to rear 
four children and deal with two significant family tragedies.
As noted, in her section of the book, Phyllis conveys a message of faith in divine 
providence during arduous and trying circumstances and the resiliency of the human 
spirit not to succumb to fear or despondency. She did acknowledge the following, 
however: "I have to admit that I wasn’t aware that God was working in my life during 
those first years o f waiting.” Then she quickly added: “But as I look back, it is plain to 
see that God was working, even then. He was working through people who cared enough
48
to reach out and lift us up."
The Stockdales In Love and War. The second collaborative effort between a 
husband and a wife came in 1984 with the publication of In Love and War: The Story o f  a 
Family's Ordeal and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years by Sybil Stockdale and James 
B. Stockdale. This is the most definitive work o f the eight personal accounts written to 
date due to its detailed references, careful documentation, and concise chronological 
presentation of events. Sybil and Jim Stockdale alternate writing chapters with parallel 
chronological accounts of events in Vietnam (in James Stockdale’s chapters) and on the 
home front (in Sybil Stockdale’s chapters).
Sybil Stockdale’s chapters reveal that initially, like most of the women, she 
trusted the wisdom and guidance of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
the President of the United States. However, Mrs. Stockdale indicates that the wisdom of 
the trust approach soon came into question, especially after government and military
48
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officials who were unable to provide consistent information and, in fact, often provided 
contradictory responses. At that point, Mrs. Stockdale indicates that she and some of the 
other wives immersed themselves in a self-education process about the war, Vietnam, and 
the Geneva Convention provisions related to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Mrs. 
Stockdale indicates in her chapters that the knowledge she acquired emboldened her to 
approach and confront leaders at the highest levels within the government and military. 
Her sustaining motivation throughout the many years of her husband’s captivity, 
however, came from an internal compulsion to find something that she could do to help 
her husband.
In the chapters she authored, Mrs. Stockdale indicates that a primary irritation for 
her and others the government's Keep Quiet policy. (The terminology is hers and the 
other wives with whom she interacted; officially, the Department o f State policy was 
characterized as "Quiet Diplomacy.") The Department of State's, Quiet Diplomacy/Keep 
Quiet policy, meant that the United States government would not criticize North Vietnam 
for violations of the Geneva Convention provisions about the humane treatment of 
prisoners of war, as well as, referring to a strategy o f using diplomatic pressure on North 
Vietnam to handle and/or address POW and MIA matters. For family members, this 
policy translated into directives to refrain from publicly discussing the status o f their 
husbands or, in the case o f parents, their sons. Sybil's frustration and anger with this 
policy led to activist activity that resulted in the eventual formation o f the National 
League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. This 
organization designed itself to become a potent force within the Department o f Defense, 
Department of State, Congress, presidential administrations, and with the North
24
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Vietnamese delegation in Paris. Simultaneously, the members o f the organization were 
highly influential in acquiring the support of the American public and the private 
business sector once they went public with the truth about the treatment and violations of 
the Geneva Convention. In both arenas, Sybil was able to utilize her influence, the 
influence o f other wives, and the power o f the League to force the POW issue into the 
forefront of American policy and the American consciousness.
In some respects, the findings that follow cover much o f the same ground that 
Sybil Stockdale covers in the chapters she wrote for In Love and War. This is hardly 
surprising since Sybil Stockdale was a key informant— and, arguably, the key informant 
for the study being presented here.
This dissertation study, however, also tells the stories o f other women who 
aligned themselves with Sybil and her work, and it tells even Sybil’s now-triangulated 
story in considerably more detail than the story she, herself, told in her chapters in the 
book she wrote with her husband. More importantly, the dissertation study also examined 
events from the government perspective through the analysis o f Presidential papers and 
interviews with key government officials of the era. This latter component is especially 
important since, until the information that was uncovered in the review of documents and 
interviews with government officials was shared with Sybil and her compatriots, they 
doubted the influence they had had. This dissertation documents this influence and makes 
it part of the historical record.
Keenan’s, Every Effort. The first single-authored historical account was written in 
1986 by Barbara Mullen Keenan and titled Every Effort: One Woman's Courageous 
Search For Her Missing Husband—A True Story. Keenan’s story begins much like the
25
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others: recalling marital happiness, family togetherness, family trips to exotic places, and 
an unabashed pride in her husband's profession and commitment to serve his country. She 
also tells of her life before her marriage. During that period, she championed American 
ideals by venturing to Bangkok, Thailand, to work for the Voice of America. Patriotism, 
the American Dream, and stopping the spread of Communism were rallying cries that 
she, personally, had responded to much as military men like her Marine husband had 
done when they marched off to battle.
Much like Sybil Stockdale's part of In Love and War, Keenan recounted in Every 
Effort her early years as a dutiful Marine wife obeying the dictates of the government 
policy for wives o f POWs and MIAs. She also chronicled her growing anger at the futile 
attempts by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and United States Marine 
Corps to locate her husband. Like many other wives, she immersed herself in the 
activities of the National League that Sybil Stockdale and her compatriots had founded, 
but she indicated that she soon was at odds with the League's direction and refusal to 
question national policy regarding the war in Vietnam.
Her personal commitment to challenge the government’s policies related to the 
war— and not just focus on the treatment o f the POWs— took her into the halls of 
Congress to meet with and support the Vietnam policy measures of Senators Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA), George McGovern (D-SD) and Congressmen Pete McCloskey (R-CA) 
and Robert Leggett (D-CA). Even though she remained out o f sync with the official 
stance of the National League of Families, Keenan remained a member to influence the 
direction of the organization from within.
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Eventually, she wrote that she and others parted with the League because of its 
unwillingness to criticize President Nixon's policies and her belief that the League was 
solidly pro-Nixon administration. This split resulted in the formation of "The Families for 
Immediate Release." She did not cease criticizing the National League of Families, 
however, and, in fact, in her book, she reveals her cynicism and utter contempt for what 
she believed the League had evolved into: a pawn and propaganda tool of the Nixon 
administration. In her book, Keenan also wrote, with surprising candor, about the 
divisions between POW and MIA wives within the National League and The Families for 
Immediate Release, which were aired privately, publicly, and in congressional hearing 
rooms.
Keenan, whose husband was shot down in Laos and listed as an MIA, detailed 
how she anxiously awaited for the official release list to be presented in January 1973. 
Much to her horror, dismay, and disbelief she realized that nothing in the Paris Peace 
Accords addressed the POWs held in Laos. In spite of her efforts to appeal to the 
President, the Department o f State, Department of Defense, and United States Marine 
Corps— nothing happened because too many Americans thought the war was over.
Keenan’s Every Effort is an important compendium text for this dissertation 
because it focuses on people and activities that this dissertation study did not cover. Until 
someone writes a more systematic history of the anti-Vietnam group within the 
“community” of POW/MIA wives and family members and the organization this group 
formed after breaking with the National League, Keenan’s highly personal account will 
continue to be a valuable resource. It certainly provides an alternative perspective on the 
events described in the findings chapters of this dissertation.
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Taylor’s, Honorbound. Laura Taylor book, Honorbound, is another fictionalized 
account of the experiences of a wife of a POW. The book also tells about the character’s 
husband. The book’s structure, in fact, is highly reminiscent of the Stockdales’ nonfiction 
book, In Love and War. Here, too, alternating chapters depict the experiences of a POW 
in North Vietnam— in this case named Matt— and his wife, Eden, back home. Of course, 
despite the structural similarities between the two books, there is a highly significant 
difference: Taylor’s Eden and Matt are fictional characters, though, fictional characters 
that, undoubtedly, bear more than a family resemblance to Taylor and her husband.
Taylor’s novel conveys a simple but meaningful story of love, tragedy, hardship, 
personal growth, and love renewed. Interestingly, Taylor does not develop her female 
protagonist, Eden, as someone who courageously adjusts to the news of a missing 
husband. Rather, the story Taylor tells is of a young woman experiencing ceaseless inner 
turmoil who must cope with the death of her infant son; subsequent depression and 
alcoholism; emotional and physical loneliness; and a sexual interlude. All the while, she 
does not know if she was a wife or a widow.
In time, Eden, matures beyond the level of her peers and develops an inner 
intuitive spirit. The story is not a moralistic judgment on a woman's behavior; nor is it a 
psychological profile of a young woman caught in an emotional struggle to cope and find 
meaning in life. The value in the book, regardless o f it being a novel, is that it focused on 
the emotional toll the POW/MIA wife experience took on the women who were forced 
into that role. This aspect is alluded to in Chapter 8 o f this dissertation; the dissertation, 
however, focuses on other things. Thus, Taylor’s fiction can be viewed as yet another
28
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important supplement to the work presented here. It tells in fictionalized form, the 
emotional piece of the story that, arguably, can best be told in novel form.
McDaniel’s, After the H ero’s Welcome. In After the Hero's Welcome: A POW  
Wife's Story o f  the Battle Against a New Enemy, Dorothy McDaniel not only traced her 
experiences from 1967 to 1973 when her husband was classified as Missing in Action. 
She also described what happened after Operation Homecoming in 1973 when her 
husband did not come home and she had to confront the possibility that American 
military personnel— including her husband—were left behind in Vietnam and Laos.
Like so many other wives, McDaniel experienced the harsh reality of the 
continuous lack of information from the Department of State and Department o f Defense. 
What she did know came from the official Navy telegram, which not only informed her 
of her husband being shot down but also indicated that to ensure his safety and well 
being, she could only tell immediate family members about his disappearance. After a 
few months, other messages arrived that contained admonitions and assurances from the 
White House and the Department of State about official efforts on behalf of the men. 
Soon these messages began to have a familiar ring: They talked about secret negotiations, 
maintaining trust in the government, and contained the standard punch line: "We're doing
49
everything we can."
Like Sybil Stockdale, McDaniel refused to be quiet and began making trips to 
Washington DC for answers. She sought out and made appointments with both elected 
and appointed governmental officials. These meetings led McDaniel to conclude that the
49
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status and treatment o f the men was not a preeminent concern of people in governmental 
positions.
Like most of the other wives who turned into activists, McDaniel’s passion and 
commitment were fueled by a desire to do something for her husband. This commitment 
took her back to Washington DC again and again to confront those in positions of 
authority who had the power to make policy. After joining the National League, she 
along with other wives in the Virginia Beach area where she lived, became committed to 
informing the public—through whatever means—about the plight of the prisoners. By 
doing this, McDaniel and the other Virginia Beach wives believed they would put 
pressure on the American government to do something that would embarrass Hanoi into 
abiding by the Geneva Convention.
In time, the National League, POW and MIA families, and the prisoners 
themselves were front-page news. McDaniel recalled the development o f the National 
League from a loosely organized group into one that was highly organized with 
coordinators in every state. Between 1971 and 1972, McDaniel was aware that the 
relentless pace of keeping the prisoners front-page news, maintaining the pressure on 
Washington, and focusing public attention on Hanoi had become exasperating. Candidly, 
she writes briefly about the 1972 meeting of the National League, which she considered a 
melee of accusations fueled by years of frustration.
Like many of the other works discussed here, McDaniel’s book is an important 
compendium to this dissertation study. Among other things, it focused on activities on the 
East coast, while this dissertation could be thought of as West Coast centric, even though 
six of the thirteen wives were from the Midwest or east coast. In short, the McDaniel
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book reminds us that, although the idea of National League was “hatched” by the women 
who gathered around Sybil Stockdale’s table in Coronado, California, there was other 
activity happening elsewhere. These other activities are discussed all-too-briefly in this 
dissertation. The work of the Virginia Beach chapter that McDaniel describes is, most 
certainly, underplayed due to space and focus considerations here.
The McDaniel book is also a valuable compendium to what is being presented 
here for one other reasons: Like Keenan’s Every Effort, this book reminds us that some 
women’s ordeals did not end with Operation Homecoming. Operation Homecoming 
brought some semblance of closure for ten o f the thirteen women interviewed for this 
study. The McDaniel book reminds us that this was not the case with everyone.
The Purcells’, Love and Duty. The last book published by a POW wife was a 
book that Anne Purcell published with her husband, Ben Purcell, in 1992: Love and Duty. 
The Purcell's appear to have written their book to inspire others, to demonstrate courage 
and commitment to each other in the face of extreme adversity and to acknowledge their 
faith in Providence. The Purcell’s compelling story also demonstrates that, even nearly 
twenty years after Operation Homecoming, the experience o f being a POW wife 
remained highly significant.
Ann Purcell was a woman with five children when confronted with the first 
official message of her husband's MIA status. Like other MIA wives, this news meant 
dealing with the haunting question: Am I a wife, or am I a widow? Twenty-two months 
after her husband's disappearance, Purcell and her children joined 147 other family 
members of POWs and MIAs for a trip to Paris to meet the North Vietnamese delegation 
at the Paris Peace Talks. For Purcell, this trip (and her involvement with the National
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League) strengthened her resolve to make public the inhumane actions o f the North 
Vietnamese. Her goal was to turn public opinion against the North Vietnamese and force 
American support for the POWs by having the government embrace a policy that would 
ensure their humane treatment.
Purcell recounted the activities of the League in summary fashion but detailed 
certain events in order to acknowledge the significant influence they had made on the 
public and political arena. Unlike the authors o f other historical memoirs, her 
involvement was limited to her state o f Georgia, though she did travel to Washington DC 
for National League meetings. Her arena, however, was the Columbus, Georgia area 
where she dutifully carried out the request of the League to make the plight of the 
prisoners known. Thus, the Purcell book provides a case in point of how the League’s use 
o f regional coordinators played out at the local level. In this respect, at least, it, too, can 
be considered a compliment to the findings that are being reported in this dissertation.
Garrett’s, The Power o f  One. In addition to the works written by the wives 
themselves, there is also one master's thesis that focuses on one o f the POW/MIA wives: 
David Garrett’s The Power o f  One: Bonnie Singleton and American Prisoners o f  War in 
Vietnam. In his thesis, Garrett describes the events that lead up to Bonnie Singleton's 
activities with other wives and mothers on behalf of the prisoners. Bonnie Singleton's 
husband, Jerry, was officially designated as MIA for five years before Bonnie learned 
that he was, in fact, a POW. Like the other wives, Singleton wrote that she knew about 
the government's policy requiring wives to “keep quiet” about their husbands’ situation.
Garrett’s thesis traces Singleton's transformation from an obedient military wife 
to an activist. The transformation, according to Garrett, began when the wife of the
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Commanding Officer of the USS PUEBLO (Navy ship captured by North Korea in 1968) 
spoke out against the government and used news conferences to discuss the plight of the 
men in captivity in North Korea. This led Singleton, along with other wives in the Dallas- 
Fort Worth area, to organize in order to gain information from the government about their 
husbands and, possibly, provide aid to them.
Garrett portrays Singleton as a tireless public activist who spearheads the POW 
and MIA issue before the American public, politicians, and North Vietnamese diplomats 
in Hanoi and Paris. Though other wives are mentioned in the thesis, they appear in 
supporting roles and their activities are framed as support for Singleton's goals and 
objectives.
Garrett attempted, without thorough documentation, to connect Singleton’s 
activities with governmental policy shifts. Among other things, he detailed Singleton's 
meeting and subsequent follow-up conversations with Tricia Nixon (daughter of 
President Richard Nixon) during a campaign stop she made with her father in Dallas, 
Texas. Their conversation, he wrote, resulted in Tricia Nixon telling her father about 
Bonnie and her story about being the wife o f a POW. Garrett inferred that this directly 
and single-handedly led to President Nixon releasing a statement about how he would 
handle the POW issue as President, though the evidence to support this claim is 
circumstantial, at best.
Although Garrett's work focused on one person and, almost certainly, overstated 
the impact of a single individual, his thesis does provide a valuable supplement to this 
dissertation. Bonnie Singleton was also one o f the wives interviewed in this study, and 
her activities in the Dallas area are alluded in this dissertation. There was not space,
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however, to provide the sort of detail about Singleton’s work in Dallas that can be found 
in Garrett’s work. On the other hand, this dissertation puts Singleton’s considerable 
achievements into a larger context and, consequently, tells a story of collective leadership 
rather than reinforcing a great person or lone ranger view of the leadership process.
Cross-Cutting Themes in the Literature About POW and MIA Wives
The previous section briefly examined each of the individual works about the 
POW/MIA wives in isolation. Here the focus is on themes that cut across all of the works 
reviewed.
The literature that was reviewed as part of this dissertation study is, in fact, 
amazingly consistent. Presumably some of this consistency is attributable to the fact that 
many of the authors interacted with each other and, consequently, constructed social 
reality in similar ways. It is also possible— and even likely—that those who wrote their 
books later rather than sooner had read and were influenced by earlier publications. For 
whatever reason(s), all the publications— even the fictional ones and ones written by 
those with somewhat different political agendas— emphasize the same sort of events: the 
official notification by military personnel; receiving assurances from the government 
about their husbands’ well-being; being informed about the government's Keep Quiet 
policy: and a growing discontent and frustration with the government.
Notification
All the authors began their stories by recalling, in vivid detail, the experience of 
being notified that their husbands had been shot down and were, consequently, classified 
as either POWs or MIAs. The richness of each author’s narrative revealed how this 
episode has been permanently etched into the wives’ consciousness. Emotional trauma,
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disbelief, mental anguish, and confusion were common experiences. In each account, the 
process of notification was depicted as a formal and highly ritualized event with two or 
more uniformed officers, one usually being a chaplain, arriving in a black car to deliver 
the official message from the Department of Defense or a branch o f the military. The 
opening verbiage was somewhat routine and included expressions o f regret.
Not surprisingly, the news always came as a shock. The authors described a 
multitude of psychological and physiological reactions: feeling numb, walking about in a 
daze, attempting to find some direction, burying oneself with efforts to make plans on 
how to proceed, feeling concern for the children (if the couple had children), and feeling 
grave concern and interest in the status and well being of their spouse.
Government Assurances
Once the wives had been officially notified, they were given assurances that the 
government was taking appropriate action on behalf of their husbands. The actions 
specified differed somewhat depending on the context. Wives were assured either that the 
military was attempting to locate their husbands, that search and rescue efforts would be 
undertaken, or that there was an effort to determine their husbands’ status: killed in action 
(KIA), MIA, or POW. Frequently, government officials assured the women that 
everything possible was being done to ensure the men were being well treated—and even 
that they had no reason to doubt that the North Vietnamese would treat their husbands 
humanely. In each of the accounts, however, the wives, in time, understood they had 
many reasons to doubt the government’s claims about humane treatment.
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Keep Quiet
Every book referred to the wives requirement to comply with established 
governmental guidelines. According to Keenan, these guidelines had five elements:
• Refrain from furnishing any persons outside of your immediate family 
with any background data regarding your husband's personal history and 
military service.
• Do not speak with the media.
• Refrain from providing any information that could be used to adversely 
affect your husband.
• The Department of Defense, governmental or private organizations will 
not be of help to assist with additional information.
50
• Do not write to communist leaders or heads o f state.
Collectively, the books reviewed suggest that, often, these guidelines were
articulated during the official notification. On other occasions, the guidelines were 
contained in a follow-up telegram, or included in a letter from the Department of Defense 
or the relevant branch of the military. The guidelines normally were accompanied by a 
warning: Any violation might result in harm to a wife’s husband.
For McDaniel, Stockdale, Keenan, and Singleton, at least, the Keep Quiet policy 
quickly was perceived as a ruse to keep the pressure off politicians and disguise the fact 
that they were not really doing much to help. All the wives, in both the fictionalized and 
the nonfiction accounts, eventually came to believe that the politicians and military 
officials possessed information that would not be disseminated to wives and that they
50
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were attempting to cover up the fact that the government officials were pursuing a flawed 
policy.
In a visit to Washington DC in June 1967, Stockdale wrote that she requested 
from Ambassador Harriman that a representative from the Department of State travel to 
San Diego to speak with the wives about the government's efforts to ensure humane 
treatment for the men. This request reflected her conviction that the "government should
51
be doing something besides keeping quiet."
Discontentment and Frustration
In addition to discussing the government’s directive not to talk publicly and its 
perfunctory assurances of the men's well-being, the women wove into their narrative 
accounts of the growing discontent and frustration with their lack o f information 
regarding their husbands. Oftentimes the information that they did receive was 
inconsistent with previous disclosures. Stockdale, for instance, said that she was
52
"completely disappointed by the incompetence o f the system." Keenan wrote that the
53
"words that trickled in from Southeast Asia and Washington confused us."
Six weeks after learning that her husband had been shot down, McDaniel still had 
not heard or received any additional information from the Department o f State, 
Department of Defense, the United States Navy, or her husband's squadron. "Six weeks
54
of screaming silence" she wrote. Purcell was somewhat more fortunate. She indicated 
that she received her first piece of official information from her husband's commanding
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officer a month after she had been notified. She indicated, however, that she "felt he
should have written sooner."55
Self-Education
Three women, Stockdale, Keenan, and McDaniel, made numerous references to 
their obsession with obtaining as much knowledge and information they could about 
Vietnam, North Vietnam, the war, the Washington DC bureaucracy and power brokers, 
and the Geneva Convention. Their writings indicated that they used a wide array of 
resources: books, newspapers, magazines, television, government documents, 
conversation with political and military officials, and through written inquires.
In the fall of 1965, Sybil Stockdale requested a reading list from the Department 
of State. She received it six months later.
Motivation
Half of the wives claimed that their motivation for being persistent— even 
relentless—with the Department o f State, Department of Defense, Congress, and the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations— came from a commitment to their husbands. 
"Somehow, some way, I had to find something I could do to help Jim," wrote 
Stockdale.56 McDaniel wrote of "choos[ing] a course of action, not for reasons of
57
expedience or convenience, but because it is the right thing to do." Even though she 
wrote very little of her experience, Rutledge nonetheless, wrote of her efforts "to keep
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our men remembered." Keenan recalled that, on sleepless nights, she would plot 
searches to uncover information about her husband.
McDaniel noted that, in 1970, the Virginia Press Women awarded the 
"Newsmakers o f the Year" to the POW wives. The citation read in part: "Armed with
59
love, they are fighting the battle for their husbands."
Networking
As the number of POWs and MI As increased, the number of wives and family 
members increased, especially in certain geographical locations where there were major 
military installations. Since deployments to Vietnam were in the form of squadrons or 
similar sorts of units, wives were able to ascertain, through various means, the names of 
other wives who had been notified of their husbands being listed as a POW or MIA. 
Unfortunately, the Keep Quiet policy continued to influence a number o f wives. For 
instance, when attempting to organize a wives get-together on October 7, 1966, Stockdale 
discovered a number of women who were fearful to talk to her on the phone because it 
violated one of the guidelines. In spite of the policy, there was a growing interest among 
most of the wives to get-together and talk about their situation, find out who had been 
told what and by whom, share other sorts o f information, and provide moral support.
Initially a network of wives sprung up in San Diego, California, through the 
efforts of Stockdale; in Virginia Beach, Virginia, through the efforts of Louise Mulligan; 
and in Dallas, Texas, through the efforts of Bonnie Singleton. As the networking became 
more organized within geographical locations, Stockdale led the effort from her home in
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Coronado, California, to disseminate information, via telephone and form letters, to other 
wives or family members o f POWs or MIAs. The result was an expanding network of 
wives, mothers or fathers who, at least in one respect, had a shared identity: a loved one 
was either missing in action or a prisoner of war. Keenan echoed a common sentiment 
among the wives about discovering and talking with others in the same situation. "You 
can't image how alone I've felt," she told POW wife Louise Mulligan, "No one else, no 
one can understand what it's been like except another woman who's been through it."
As these enclaves were growing and linking up across the nation, McDaniel noted
that the wives who attended the meetings were "slowly becoming an activist group."
62
Yet, she added, "None of us were brave enough—yet—to defy the keep-silent rule." 
Contacting Elected and Appointed Officials
The accounts that were reviewed indicated that, in time, both individually and in 
small groups, the wives began making contact with officials in Congress, the Department 
of State, and the Department o f Defense who they believed could provide answers to 
their questions. Three women, Stockdale, Keenan, and McDaniel, relatively quickly 
began contacting officials in the government and the military. During her trips to 
Washington DC, McDaniel felt that many congressmen seemed uninformed and that she, 
as well as many of the wives, ended up educating them not only on the POW and MIA 
issue, but also about the war itself. Stockdale's connection to Washington DC was 
initially accomplished by phone calls, letters, and telegrams— and then personal visits.
60
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All three women, however, knew that nothing took the place of a personal visit to people 
in positions of authority— especially those in Washington DC.
Going Public
Through the early part of 1968, Stockdale continued to maintain contact with 
various government and military officials. Two men, Ambassador Harriman and Admiral 
Moorer, continually expressed their belief that the prisoners were being treated 
humanely, though Sybil had grave doubts about Harriman and Moorer’s belief. While 
making the rounds in Washington, Sybil Stockdale asked Commander Boroughs, an 
officer in Naval Intelligence division and one of her primary contacts in the Navy, about 
his thoughts on her going to the press. By the end of the summer of 1968, she had 
convinced herself and Commander Boroughs that it was time to go public with her story.
The literature indicated that other wives followed Stockdale’s lead. McDaniel 
recalled her own response: "With no holds barred, I jumped into the public arena that 
Sybil [Stockdale] and Louise [Mulligan] and some o f the other wives and mothers had
63
already entered." The literature revealed that the wives’ public statements focused on 
three more-or-less related tasks: informing the public about the plight of the men, putting 
pressure on the United States Government to address the POW and MIA issue, and 
compelling the government to demand that North Vietnam abide by the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Establishing an Organization
Stockdale’s chapters in In Love and War describe the formation of, first, a 
regional and, then, a national organization. There are two significant dates related to the
63
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formation of these two organizations that Stockdale’s writings addressed. First, on 
October 7, 1967, the League o f Wives was formed in San Diego, California; second, the 
decision to form a national organization was made on June 20, 1969, and was announced 
to the 350 families on the mailing list in that month's newsletter.
In June 1970, an ad hoc committee met to discuss and then vote on officially 
incorporating as a non-profit organization in Washington DC. This same committee 
decided that membership in the incorporated version of the National League would be 
limited to family members of POWs or MIAs.
The formal event signaling the incorporation of the National League occurred on 
June 30, 1970, at the League's offices at 1 Constitution Avenue, Washington DC. Before 
officially incorporating, the League followed used largely informal networking to hold its 
organization together. The Stockdale account indicates that networking continued to be 
an essential component to the more formal— and legally recognized— organization that 
was founded in June of 1970. The difference was more one o f degree than one of kind: 
traditional networking and lobbying activities now occurred on a much grander scale and 
had a far more reaching impact.
All the reviewed literature discussed the wives' knowledge of and involvement 
with the League. For some wives, the League became a centerpiece of their lives while, 
for others, the organization was more a peripheral part o f their day-to-day lives. Of 
course, as noted previously, one wife, Keenan, eventually left the National League and 
formed her own organization that was critical o f the administration’s war effort.
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Publicizing the POW/MIA Issue on a National Scale
The literature revealed that the League utilized a broad range o f strategies to 
publicize its concerns. The strategies included: massive letter writing campaigns to 
politicians and major newspaper editors; newspaper advertisements; petition drives; 
television and radio interviews; public speaking; and adopting the bracelet developed by 
Voices In Vital America (VIVA).
The individual accounts provided specifics about the strategies employed. In 
Virginia Beach, Virginia, for example, McDaniel worked with the Junior Chamber of 
Commerce to get the national Jaycees organization to initiate a POW and MIA awareness 
campaign. The result was the creation of a nationwide campaign that centered on the 
theme, The World is Watching. McDaniel’s account also indicates that her son started the 
Don't Let Them Be Forgotten campaign at his school in Virginia Beach.
The master's thesis about Bonnie Singleton described how she initiated an 
organization with a publicity program to maintain a high profile awareness campaign: 
Youth Cares and Dallas Cares. The purpose was to campaign for the prisoners' cause and 
to enlist non-family members in the effort.
Even those who were not part o f the national organizations insider group 
indicated that they got on the National League’s publicity bandwagon. Purcell, for 
instance, wrote that, though she did not involve herself in the internal politics of the 
League, she did support its goals to educate the world and keep the POWs and MI As 
foremost in the minds of Americans.
Finally, Sybil Stockdale made clear in the book she wrote with her husband that 
she understood the need to keep the plight of the POWs and the truth about the North
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Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Convention in the public’s consciousness, whether 
through local groups, the national organization, public and private citizens, or a variety or 
civic or corporate organizations. She also indicates that during a visit to the New York 
Times, she learned that the media had become the National League’s strongest ally. She 
indicates that she understood that this relationship had to be maintained.
Disagreement Within the League
The accounts of Stockdale, Keenan, McDaniel, and Singleton all describe a major 
schism within the League. Keenan, especially candid about this matter, devoted 
considerable attention to describe the devisive issues. Stockdale, by contrast, wrote very 
little about the League's disagreements. She did write, however, that she did not believe
64
there was any harm in having a "radical fringe group as part o f [the] organization."
McDaniel recalled that the May 1972 meeting of the National League was a 
melee "with families shouting at one another, venting their frustration on people who
were suffering just as they were."65 She recalled that derogatory accusations were tossed 
back and forth among members and that wives who supported President Nixon were
accused of being caught up in the "Rose Garden scene."66 Even though McDaniel was not 
an active participant in the melee, she still felt that the bureaucrats behind the scenes were
saying, "Keep them happy at any cost." Keenan, wrote of that time, she "wanted to be 
concerned again with ordinary things. . . .  I feel all-out sad."68
64
65 Stockdale and Stockdale, In L ove a n d  War, 390.
6 6  M cD aniel, A fter the H ero's W elcom e, 78.
6 7  Ibid., 78.
68 Ibid-> 19 ■
Keenan, E very Effort, 281 and 300.
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Review of the Related Literature
Years o f  Work Take a Toll: Exhaustion
The depressing sentiments and numb feelings that Keenan expressed quite 
eloquently in the last sentence above are reflective o f other women. In five o f the nine 
accounts, there is some mention of the emotional and psychological effects of events. The 
women had endured significant and sustained emotional stress that was exacerbated by 
constant uncertainty over their husband's well-being or status. Coupled with this was the 
plethora o f obstacles they had to work relentlessly to overcome.
Conclusion
This review of the literature has set the stage for the presentation of findings from 
this dissertation study by focusing on two quite different bodies o f literature. One body 
contains largely theoretical discussions of citizen participation; the other body of 
literature contains accounts, some o f them fictionalized, about citizens' attempts to 
participate in the policymaking process at the National Level.
Both bodies o f literature set the stage for what is to follow, but both also has 
inadequacies. The theoretical discussions about citizen participation provide a broad 
outline of what might happen when groups of citizens make an attempt to get involved in 
the policy-making process, but this body of literature is short on details. The second body 
of literature is rich in details but, because it contains autobiographical and even 
fictionalize accounts o f experience, does not provide a more distanced, theoretical 
perspective. The second body of literature also makes no attempt to actually document 
the impact of the tactics the women employed on government officials and “connect the 
dots” between the women’s actions and policy changes.
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The findings that followed, to some extent at least, address the limitations of both 
bodies o f literature that were reviewed in this chapter. Before the findings are presented, 
however, the methods that were employed to generate them must be discussed. This is the 
topic o f the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Research Design and Methodology: An Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine how a group o f military wives during 
the Vietnam War became significant players in the national and international policy 
process after their husbands were listed as POWs or declared MIA. Through life history 
interviews, I collected data from the wives about their experiences as POW or MIA wives 
and their subsequent public activism within the policymaking arena. These data were 
triangulated through document analysis. Documents that were analyzed included letters 
kept by the wives, organizational newsletters, and newspaper accounts o f the women’s 
activities and of the organization they founded.
Additional primary source material came from individuals associated with the 
executive branch and the Department of Defense. Some o f these data were gathered 
through interviews and/or correspondence with former high-ranking government 
officials. Presidential papers accessed through the National Archives and Records 
Administration and the Freedom of Information Act also were used as data in 
reconstructing the government’s response to the wives and their organization and, more 
specifically, in tracing the impact o f the wives’ actions on public policy.
Thus, the research contained in this dissertation presents the stories of thirteen
69
wives of POW or MIA in North Vietnam 1965-1973, the perspectives of five high 
ranking officials during the Presidential administration of Richard M. Nixon, and
69
One w ife  decided, several months after the interview  and her review  o f  the transcript, to 
withdrawal from the study. Since her material w as rich in detail and depth, I requested her perm ission to 
use a pseudonym  along w ith omitting her geographical location. She declined  and 1 rem oved her material 
from the study.
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information gleaned from documents and records taken from governmental or personal 
archival material. Due to the historical nature o f events, participants permitted the use of 
their actual names.
My intent with every interview I conducted was to discover how participants 
would "impose order on the flow of experience to make sense of events and actions in
70
their lives" and "give meaning to their experience o f temporality and personal
71
actions." The analysis of the data, which will be discussed below, was guided by 
Riessman's admonition: "The challenge is to find ways o f working with the texts so the
72
original narrator is not effaced, so she does not loose control over her words." My 
responsibility, therefore, was not to obscure the voices o f the wives o f Prisoners o f War 
or Missing in Action with my own theorizing but to represent the women’s thoughts and 
feelings as they might themselves represent them if they were writing this dissertation.
Fulfilling this responsibility was not easy because what the wives narratives 
continually emphasized was the continuous movement o f ideas, events, actions, 
challenges, frustrations, and accomplishments. Their work was clearly improvisational 
and often characterized by serendipity. Furthermore, the women tended to eschew the use 
of the narrative historian’s standard organizational device, chronology, and tended to tell 
their stories thematically. The thematic organization helped highlight the ad hoc and 
improvisational nature of the work, but it also could be confusing, given that the events 
they were describing did, indeed, unfold over time.
70
7| Riessman, N arrative A nalysis, 2.
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In this retelling and amalgamation of the stories that were told to me, and the 
stories implicit in various documents that were reviewed, I have not totally abandoned the 
use of chronology to bring some semblance of order to complex events. Nevertheless, I 
have leavened the chronological account with a focus on many o f the themes that the 
women used to structure their reconstructions o f their highly personal individual 
histories. Thus, the meta-story that is told here in Chapters 4 through 8 will frequently 
cover the same ground multiple times, albeit from varying perspectives. This is especially 
the case when the focus shifts, in Chapter 7, to the government’s response to the 
women’s attempts to exercise leadership and influence public policy on the POW and 
MIA issue.
Of course, before this history could be written, many other methodological 
decisions had to be made and enacted. The remainder of this chapter describes these 
decisions and the research procedures associated with them.
Specific Research Decisions and Procedures 
Selection o f  Research Participants
The participants in this study were either the wives o f Vietnam-era POWs or 
MIAs or high-ranking government officials who dealt with the POW and MIA issue 
during the Vietnam era. Thirteen wives were interviewed; they were selected because 
they had been actively involved with other POW and MIA wives prior to the 
development of a national organization but had also participated in the development of 
the national organization. Demographically, seven were from west coast and six were 
from the Midwest or east coast. More specifically, interviewees met the following 
criteria:
49
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• The wife’s husband became a POW or was listed as MIA during the Vietnam 
War prior to May, 19, 1969;
• The wife had a substantial involvement with other POW and MIA wives prior 
to the formation of the National League of Families on June 20, 1969;
• The wife was actively involved with the League o f Wives and/or the National 
League of Families.
In addition, an attempt was made to enlist a minimum of six elected or appointed 
officials, as well as a private citizen who had been worked with the POW and MIA issue 
and with the wives. Two o f these individuals declined to participate in the study after a 
lengthy negotiation process with members of their staffs, though, in at least one case, the 
Presidential papers that were reviewed provided considerable evidence of the stance he 
took and the role he played.
The following criteria were used in selecting governmental officials:
• they were knowledgeable about the government's policy concerning the 
POWs and MI As
• they had had direct experience with the POW and MIA wives, as well as 
one or both of the organizations the wives had formed, i.e., the League of 
Wives or the National League of Families
A list of potential participants was drawn from the literature review. James and 
Sybil Stockdale's book, In Love and War, was especially helpful in generating a list of 
potential interviewees. As had happened in some research that I had conducted as a kind 
of trial run for this dissertation, initial interview participants readily recommended other 
wives and governmental officials for participation in the research project. This type of
50
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sampling, known as snowball sampling, is the most common form of purposeful
73sampling in qualitative research.
In the end, more interviewees who met the criteria listed above were suggested 
than could be interviewed. Those who I judged could provide the greatest amount of 
information about the women’s story— and, in the case of government officials, the 
government’s reaction to the Leagues’ agenda— were selected to be interviewees for this 
study.
Selection o f Documents and Records to be Analyzed
Primary source documents and records from wives, officials, White House Files, 
and material from Congressional hearings and the Congressional Record were reviewed 
as part of the data gathering effort. Lincoln and Guba distinguish between two types of 
materials that can be analyzed based on whether or not they were written for a public 
purpose. They characterize materials prepared for a public purpose as records and
74
materials generated for private use as documents. Both types of materials were used in 
this study. The women generously opened their personal files to me; often these files 
contained a treasure trove o f documents. The National Archives contained both records 
and documents from the Nixon Administration.
The review of National Archives documents and records was intentionally open- 
ended. The selection of material began by determining what particular files contained 
POW and MIA material related to the Vietnam War and, more specifically, President 
Nixon. In 2001,1 contacted the National Archives with a specific request to review POW
73
7 4 Merriam, Q ualita tive R esearch, 63.
Hodder, "The interpretation o f  docum ents and material culture," 703.
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and MIA files from 1968 to 1973. The archivist assigned to materials catalogued under 
"Nixon Presidential Materials Staff' sent me a number o f informational papers about 
National Archives procedures that needed to be reviewed before a researcher began to 
utilize materials in the National Archives. The papers I was provided with included:
• Reference Information Paper on POW AND MIA Records
• Documents Relating to POW AND MIA Matters Among the Nixon White 
House Files of the National Security Council
• White House Central Files, Subject Categories, ND 18-3 Prisoners, 
National Security -  Defense
• White House Communications Agency Sound Recordings
These papers were invaluable in mapping a strategy to search specific files and boxes of 
records and documents.
A cursory reading of the listed references belies the magnitude o f material 
available for review, which numbers in tens-of-thousands o f pages, not to mention the 
hundreds of subcategories within each major file. Based on a thorough reading of the 
papers sent to me— and a subsequent meeting with the Nixon archivist— I narrowed my 
focus to materials contained in the following files: White House Central Files—National 
Security Defense (Prisoners) (ND 18-3); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff; White House 
Special Files— Staff Members and Office Files; White House Special Files—Alexander 
P. Butterfield; President's Office Files— Memoranda for the President; President's Office 
Files— President's Handwriting; and National Security Council Files— Henry A.
Kissinger Office Files and POW AND MIA Files Collection. These materials were read 
and detailed notes were taken.
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Interview Procedures
The primary data collection method used in this study was life history interviews. 
Watson and Watson-Franke wrote; "Life history is any retrospective account by the 
individual of his life in whole or part, in written or oral form, that has been elicited or
75
prompted by another person." Furthermore, Tierney notes that "life history is related to 
biography, it is a retrospective account, and it involves some form of narrative
76
statement." In an influential work on narrative research, Donald Polkinghorne wrote: 
Narrative is a scheme by means of which human beings give meaning to their 
experience o f temporality and personal actions. Narrative meaning functions to 
give form to the understanding o f a purpose to life and to join everyday actions 
and events into episodic units. It provides a framework for understanding the past 
events o f one's l ife. . . .  It is the primary scheme by means o f which human
77
existence is rendered meaningful.
The life history methodology was best suited for this study because it permitted 
the participant to develop and recall her story as she remembered it. The interviewing 
process included one or more scheduled interviews (this included telephone and face-to- 
face interviews) with the interview being tape recorded and transcribed by the 
interviewer. Interviews were not formally bounded by time constraints, though 
participates were asked to set aside two to three hours, in part, because o f the distance I 
traveled on some occasions, but also because this length o f time permitted a more 
conversational approach to interviewing that let the interviewees, themselves, rather than
7 6  Tierney, "Undaunted Courage," 539.
7 7  Ibid.
Polkinghorne, N arra tive K now ing, 11.
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a formal interview protocol structure the interview process. The two to three hour time 
frame, in short, represented an attempt to follow Mishler's admonition to "invite... 
[participants] into... [your] work as collaborators, sharing control with them, so that
78
together.. .[you] try to understand what their stories are about." To state this point 
another way: the length of time was "in the interest o f giving greater control to
79
respondents."
Interviews were semi structured. An interview guide was used, largely to initiate 
the interview and to check for coverage at the end of the interview period. (Refer to 
Appendices B and C for survey questions.) During most o f the interview time, however, 
the interviewees normally took the lead in structuring what often seemed to be more a 
conversation than an interview.
In short, throughout the interview process, I attempted to engage in a delicate 
balancing act. On the one hand, I attempted to heed Max Van Manen's caution about 
open ended/conversational interviewing. Van Manen argued that the interviewer must not
initiate the interview "without first carefully considering what interest the interview is to
80
serve." In conjunction with having a clear intent for the purpose of the interview, he
underscored that "the interview process needs to be disciplined by the fundamental
81
question that prompted the need for the interview in the first place." Conversely, I tried
not to lose sight of Fontana and Frey’s argument that "unstructured interviewing can
82
provide a greater breadth of data than the other types, given in qualitative nature." My
78
7 9  Ibid., 164.
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8 2  Ibid., 6 6 .
Fontana and Frey, "The interview," 652.
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challenge throughout the interviewing process, in other words, was to maintain direction 
without interfering in the conversational nature of the interview. Since the purpose of 
every interview in this study was to discover how participants "impose order on the flow
83
of experience to make sense of events and actions in their lives" and "give meaning to
84
their experience o f temporality and personal actions," I tended to lean toward the 
Fontana and Frey side of the tightrope I was continually walking.
Initial interviews began with the following open-ended question: Would you tell 
me what it was like being the wife of a POW or MIA? (Interviews conducted with 
governmental officials or military personnel also began with the open-ended question: 
Would you tell me what you knew about the activities of the wives of POW and MI As 
and the National League of Families?) A preliminary study with three POW wives 
conducted in preparation for doing this larger dissertation study demonstrated that my 
initial question for the women elicited a narrative response lasting from one to two hours.
I intentionally began the interview with an open-ended question to avoid unduly 
framing what respondents told me. Often an interviewee’s (often lengthy) response to the 
initial questions generated additional questions in my mind that were not on the interview 
guide I had developed. When this happened, I asked these interviewee-generated 
questions and only referred to the questions on the interview guide near the end of the 
interview time to be sure that areas that I wanted to cover had, indeed, been covered in 
the more-or-less natural conversation the interviewee and I had been having.
I did insert one other predetermined task into the interview. I asked each
83
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interviewee to construct a timeline of key events that they recalled. The pilot study had 
revealed that the three women interviewed tended to recall their stories chronologically, 
beginning with the date of when their husband was shot down. I wanted to access each of 
the interviewee’s sense of the chronology and the key events they recalled in their 
chronological accounts because, at the time, I had assumed that the history I would write 
would be organized almost entirely chronologically.
For the most part, however, the interviews were more structured by the 
interviewees than the interviewer. To be sure, this somewhat improvisational type of 
interviewing process can and did have a level of frustration associated with it. Rubin and 
Rubin have noted that researchers who employ the interview strategy used in this study 
must "have a high tolerance for uncertainty . .  . because the design will continue to 
change as the researcher hears what is being said.” Rubin and Rubin also write, however, 
that the approach to interviewing used in this study also "generates tremendous 
excitement because you have to do so much thinking on the spot and because there is
85
genuine delight when you discover something new." After nine months of interviewing, 
I found myself agreeing whole-heartedly with both of Rubin and Rubin’s points.
One final point about the interviewing process: After interviews were completed 
and transcribed, all participants were provided a copy of their interview to review, edit, or 
clarify their story via written input or additional conversation with the interviewer. No 
participant made substantive changes to what they had said initially. Changes were either 
grammatical, or they elaborated on or further clarified what had been said initially. After 
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participated in the reseaerch project. Four reviewed all the chapters sent, two reviewed 
portions o f each chapter, and three women, were not able to review the material by the 
deadline required. Overall the recommended changes were were corrections with names, 
for example, Roberts to Robertson and Mae Rose to MaeRose and a clarification of 
location in one instance.
Analysis o f  Data
At the outset, I think it is critically important to recall the admonition written by
Riessman: "The challenge is to find ways of working with the texts so the original
86
narrator is not effaced, so she does not loose control over her words." To achieve this, 
as best as I could, I combined analysis methods suggested by Jerome Bruner, on the one 
hand, and Donald Polkinghorne, on the other.
Though Bruner does not provide a formal analysis methodology with carefully 
articulated sequential steps, he nonetheless addresses specific issues in narrative research 
that are to be taken into account "to show how human minds and lives are reflections of
87
culture and history." These include such key concepts as cultural sensitivity, 
symbolism, ontological belief, constituency, protagonist, framing, and turning points. 
These concepts were very much in the back (and often in the front) of my mind as I 
engaged in the lengthy and complex analysis process. Fortunately, the work of Donald 
Polkinghorne has taken Bruner’s thinking and translated it into somewhat more 
procedural terms.
Donald Polkinghorne's article, Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis,
86
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describes two analysis processes, which he refers to as the analysis o f  narrative and
narrative analysis. The analysis o f narrative process involves subsuming the individual
stories told by the researcher’s participants under coding categories and then reporting the
narrative data thematically rather than as a chronological story. This is the traditional
approach to analysis used in qualitative research within the social sciences.
Because I was writing a history, my plan was to the alternative analysis strategy
Polkinghorne articulated and named narrative analysis. Essentially this process
reconfigures data into a chronological storyline using the literary elements of plot. Or, to
use Polkinghorne’s words, the researchers’ responsibility is to "collect descriptions of
events and happenings and synthesize or configure them by means of a plot into a story 
88
or stories."
Polkinghorne noted that, during the interview process, participants normally tell 
their stories in a variety of ways, only some of which entail chronology. The task of the 
researcher engaged in narrative analysis is, according to Polkinghorne, "to configure the 
data elements into a story that unites and gives meaning to the data as contributions to a
89
goal or purpose." A critical analytical task is for "the researcher to develop or discover a 
plot that displays the linkage among the data elements as parts o f an unfolding temporal
90
development culminating in the denouement." This requires an integrating operation
91
that Polkinghorne refers to as the "emplotment." As a result, when human activities and 
events are "configured or emplotted, they take on narrative meaning [and] are understood
88
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from the perspective of their contribution and influence on a specified outcome." 
Polkinghorne's initial method to achieve this was as follows: (a) list all events from the 
stories, (b) highlight and recognize the contributions of certain events to the outcome, and 
(c) determine how these events gleaned from the second stage are interrelated and
interconnected.
Polkinghorne emphasized that "data does not follow an algorithmic outline, but
94
moves between the original data and the emerging description of the pattern." 
Polkinghorne attempted to choreograph this back and forth movement in his seminal 
article Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis, by articulating a number of 
strategies researchers engaging in narrative analysis could use. These strategies include 
the following:
• Discovering and developing a plot that displays linkage among the data 
elements.
• Relating of events and actions to one another by configuring them as 
contributors to the advancement of a plot.
• Describing events and happenings diachronically.
• Constructing a plot outline.
• Organizing data elements into a coherent development account.




Polkinghorne, N arra tive  K now ing, 177.
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• Searching for pieces of information that contribute to the construction o f a
95
story.
Polkinghorne also emphasizes that data other than interview data "that contribute
96
to the construction of a story" need to be a part of narrative analysis and included in the 
story that narrative analysis yields. In this study, these other data included the records and 
documents alluded to above.
Polkinghorne wrote that "a narrative configuration is not merely a transcription of 
the thoughts and actions of the protagonist; it is a means o f making sense and showing
97
the significance of them in the context o f the denouement." Because of this, 
Polkinghorne endorsed the use o f Dollard's criteria forjudging life history research in 
narrative analysis. These criteria include the following:
• The researcher must include descriptions of the cultural context in which 
the storied case study takes place.
• The researcher needs to attend to the embodied nature of the protagonist.
• The researcher needs to be mindful not only of the general cultural 
environment and the person as embodied, but o f the importance of 
significant other people in affecting the actions and goals of the 
protagonist.
• The researcher needs to concentrate on the choices and actions of the 
central person (the protagonist).
• The researcher needs to consider the historical continuity of the characters.
95
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• The researcher must mark the beginning point o f the story and the point of 
denouement (bounded temporal period).
• The researcher needs to provide a story line or plot that serves to configure 
or compose the disparate data elements into a meaningful explanation of
98
the protagonist's responses and actions.
As noted, I had planned to use the narrative analysis procedures outlined by 
Polkinghorne and articulated above (along with the considerably more general constructs 
articulated by Bruner) to analyze the data in this study. To a large extend, I did this. 
Dollard's criteria were especially helpful as formative evaluation tools as the historical 
account was being constructed.
I discovered, however, that, with the sort of data set employed in this study, the 
process of narrative analysis was considerably more complex than Polkinghorne’s 
procedural description suggests. To state this another way: there were multiple subplots 
in this story. Furthermore, as was noted previously, the women, themselves, often 
organized their stories more thematically than chronologically.
In part to adequately represent the women’s voices— but also to accommodate the 
complexity o f the data—I found myself employing a kind of hybrid of chronological and 
thematic organization. Chronology was the overarching organizational device, but the 
chronological account frequently needed to be interrupted to explore ideas in ways that 
were closer to what Polkinghorne calls the analysis of narrative as opposed to narrative 
analysis. In this study, the women who were interviewed suggested the themes that were
98
Ib id , 15-18.
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addressed. To summarize, in this study, Polkinghorne’s two approaches to analysis were 
more complimentary than distinct.
I also found the need to tell multiple stories and to cover the same ground from a 
different vantage point. As noted above, the most obvious example of this is the findings 
chapter, Chapter 7, which covers the same material covered in earlier findings chapters, 
but this time from the perspective of government officials. Attempting to integrate 
everything into a single, unified story was simply too difficult to do rhetorically. Had I 
tried, I feel sure I would have simply confused the reader.
There is one other analysis decision that should be mentioned. The life history 
data could have been presented either individually (the custom in life history research) or 
collectively. In other words, I could have chosen to present each participant’s individual 
story or reconfigure the individual stories into one composite story.
Each approach had advantages and disadvantages. The individual story approach 
would have made for an easier analysis process and, almost certainly, an easier "read" for 
the consumers o f this research. In the end, however, I opted for the composite approach, 
in part because the individual approach had already been used in much of the literature 
that was reviewed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the composite approach permitted the 
integration of the governmental reaction to what the women and their organization did. 
Integrating this material was essential for answering a question that many of the women 
continued to ask themselves: Did they really influence policy?
Limitations
There is a need to acknowledge the limitations within this study's use o f life 
history methodology. First, the narratives are, in the words of Riessman, "limited
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portraits" that "we are interpreting and creating texts at every juncture, letting symbols 
stand for or take the place of the primary experience, to which we have no direct
99
access." Second, the transcribed narrative text represents a partial reality. Riessman 
wrote that a story, which has been given to the researcher, often comes with additional 
interpretative elements. Third, any attempt to generalize from this study must take into 
account the unique cultural, gender, and generational issues. All the participants were the 
wives o f career military officers and their stories are derived from the mid-1960s. As will 
be suggested in this dissertation’s final chapters, the study can yield heuristics to guide 
thinking; it cannot provide formulas for action.
Beyond the methodological issues described above, a possible limitation was that 
I am a male, which might introduce unknown variables on the way the women responded 
to my questions and the way I framed additional quesetions based on their comments. 
Furthermore, I grew up during the Vietnam War and had acquired a knowledge of the 
POW and MIA issue while in junior high and high school. After after the prisoners were 
repatriated I continued my intereset by reading books and articles written by or about the 
men. Certainly, I bring my situational frame of reference to the research. Bringing this 
frame of reference has benefits but also limitations.
Finally, the sample of women was predominantly taken from Navy wives, which, 
can be argued, tilts the story toward a "Navy" perspective. Furthermore, mothers and 
fathers of single men who were listed as POWs or MI As were not interviewed. This was 
not intentional, but due to the passing of four decades most parents involved with the 
National League of Families are deceased.
99
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Significance o f  the Study 
There is significance to the study for several reasons. First, for historians it 
provides the first known collective body of life histories from women whose husbands 
were listed as POW or MIA in Vietnam. There are ample documents and records 
produced by and about the prisoners while the same regarding the women is regrettably 
insufficient. Second, for political scientists, it provides an account o f the development 
and influence of a minority group of citizens who became public activists to challenge 
governmental policy and policy makers. Third, for those in leadership studies, the 
research focused on citizens, without formal power or legitimate authority, who, while 
adapting to circumstances and situations, exerted influence on policy makers for a policy 
change. Their actions demonstrated that, at least under certain circumstances, citizens can 
mobilize and influence a large spectrum of society and governmental officials to take 
action when a policy is shown to be destructive and detrimental to other citizens. To state 
this another way: It is possible to lead, even in the national and international policy 
arenas, in the absence o f positional power or when one does not have the resources 
normally used to purchase access to power and influence those with formal authority to 
act.
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"I think it's an example of unconditional love. It is what it is.
It isn't altered by some superficial reality."
Karen Butler
Rekindling o f  Support and Remembrance o f  Past Days 
"The bonds formed 35 years earlier had been stretched but not broken."
Jenny Connell Robertson
On a sun-drenched Sunday afternoon in April 2005,1 gathered with a group of ten 
women on backyard porch in Coronado, California. Approximately thirty-five to forty 
years earlier, these women's lives— and the lives of a number o f other women across the 
United States—had been inextricably linked.100 These were young women, some were 
newly married, and some had infants or young children. The experiences that linked them 
together are undeniably unique and without parallel, because, between 1965 and 1973, 
world events thrust these women into the policy arena where they became a potent 
political force that influenced world events and made even the most powerful men in the 
world attend to their collective agenda.
The world event alluded to in the previous paragraph was the Vietnam War. The 
women were wives of military officers, mostly pilots, captured by the North Vietnamese
100
It is important to acknow ledge the work and participation o f  num erous mothers, fathers and 
family members o f  single men w ho w ere held captive in or listed as M IA in South and North Vietnam .
Even though this research project focused  on the w ives o f  PO W s and M IA s, I acknow ledge the importance 
o f  their contribution to the POW  and M IA issue.
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or the Viet Cong and were listed as Prisoner o f War (POW), or if their status was 
unknown, they were classified as Missing in Action (MIA).
All o f this had happened a long time ago, of course. The first prisoner of war, in 
fact, was shot down and captured in 1964 and by March 1973, all known prisoners were 
released.10' For the women who gathered on that sunny Coronado porch thirty-two years 
after the release of the final prisoner— and a number of other women who were not 
physically present but who were present in spirit—the memories o f what had happened, 
were still fresh.
They remembered in visceral detail when they were told that their husbands had 
been captured or were missing. Some remembered the joy o f their husband's return. 
Others, like the vibrant, smiling, and "little package of dynamic" as other wives have 
described her, Jenny Connell Robertson remembered the absence of a happy ending. "For 
those whose husband's came home," Jenny told me, "it was a joyous occasion. For the 
rest of us, our lives had to take a different path."
They also continued, these many years later, to remember what they had 
accomplished together and the support they provided each other during difficult times. 
Sherry Martin, one of the POW wives, referred to the group, during an interview with 
me, as "the reluctant sorority." She quickly added: "Nobody wanted to join."
Three decades later, the "sorority sisters" still look to each other for support. The 
support effort was rekindled in 2002 when Jenny Connell Robertson's second husband 
died of Alzheimer's. Unknown to her, Marie Estocin—a woman considered by others as
101
There has been am ple national debate regarding the possibility  o f  prisoners being left in 
Southeast A sia along with a full accounting o f  M IA s. B etw een 1978 and 1991, the H ouse Com m ittee on 
International Relations, Subcom m ittee on A sian and Pacific Affairs, held hearings on POW  and MIA  
matters. In 1991 and 1992, the Senate Select C om m ittee on POW  and M IA A ffairs held hearings.
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the group's Rock of Gibraltar— contacted other wives to inform them about Jenny's 
husband's death. Jenny said she was "dumbfounded" when she saw friends she had not 
seen in years at her husband's funeral. She said, "It was as if  the safety net had been 
reformed and I felt secure in that support." It was then, as Jenny recalled, that the group 
pledged "not to let that much time pass again" before they get together.
The women now gather every other month. The April 2005 gathering was the 
third gathering in nine months I was able to attend. At each of the gatherings I attended, I 
heard the women talk of past hardships without dwelling on personal pain. I listened as 
they exchange information about other women who had once been part of the group and I 
heard how everyone obviously still cared deeply about these women from the past. Their 
friendship defies definition or adequate description. Their love and admiration for one 
another is unmistakable. The protection of their bond is evident and their passion to 
maintain the rekindled friendship does not dim.
I saw and heard all of this. But, mostly I heard them laugh! Their laughter was 
contagious and exuded warmth. Considering the odyssey of their lives, their sense of 
humor is remarkable and a testimony to the resiliency of their spirit. A few days after the 
gathering on April 2005, Jenny told me, "The level of emotional support and trust 
exhibited in this group of women is unique. Words cannot convey the depth o f that 
bond."
I left the April 2005 gathering with a sense of having been in a holy place— a holy 
place of sacred memories. What follows is a brief glimpse behind the curtain of these 
women's holy place.
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As this chapter and the three that follow it unfold, the reader must understand that 
the story told is not just a personal story. The story is also about a turbulent period in this 
nation's history and the wives' struggle to exercise power and influence in the absence o f 
formal positional authority or the resources normally required to impact policy these 
turbulent times. The story begins with a brief article in the August 6, 1964, issue of the 
New York Times.
Historical Context o f  the Prisoner o f  War and Missing in Action Issue 
"The people and the government of the Democratic Republic o f Viet Nam 
consider the . . .  pilots who have carried out pirate raids, destroying the property and 
massacring the population of the Democratic Republic o f Viet Nam, as major criminals 
caught flagrant delicto [VcJ and liable for judgement f.vzc] in accordance with the laws of 
the Democratic Republic o f Viet Nam, although captured pilots are well treated."
Letter from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), 
provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, June 1965
"I really think the cultural setting is important. I really do.
I think you have to understand the times. The cultural setting explains it a little bit."
Jenny Connell Robertson, Wife o f POW 
"I'm a product o f the '50s."
Sherry Martin, Wife of POW
Emergence o f  the Issue
On August 6, 1964, the New York Times published a short 135-word article that 
reported an incident that would eventually thrust an obscure but influential governmental
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policy into the public arena via a most unlikely group. The event was the shooting down 
of an American Navy pilot, Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTjg) Everett Alvarez Jr. and his 
subsequent capture by the North Vietnamese. As the war in Vietnam escalated during the 
mid to late 1960s, the number of military aircraft shot down over North Vietnam resulted 
in a growing number of American aviators classified as POWs or MIAs.
Eventually, this group of POWs and MIAs became a significant factor in 
negotiations between the United States and the North Vietnamese to end the Vietnam 
War. For example, a National Security Council memorandum, dated February 22, 1971, 
from John Holdridge, Staff Member, National Security Council (1969-1973), to Dr.
Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, discusses a 
comment made by Vitaly Petrochenko, Deputy Editor of the Soviet magazine USA to LA 
Times correspondent Stuart Loory. Holdridge noted in his memo that Mr. Petrochenko 
had indicated that the North Vietnamese "would be willing to ransom the American 
POW's for a billion dollars." Mr. Holdridge commented to Dr. Kissinger "it is highly
improbable that the North Vietnamese would, for any amount o f dollars, sell a bargaining
102
counter as valuable as the American POW's." Whether or not Holdridge's assessment of 
Petrochenko's comments was accurate, what Holdridge wrote to Dr. Kissinger clearly 
demonstrated that the POWs had become a significant factor in the negotiation process.
The POWs and MIAs became a factor—and even a bargaining chip— in large part 
because of the visibility of the POW and MIA issue. This visibility was essentially the 
result of the actions from a tenacious but unlikely group of actors in the policy arena: the 
102
John H oldridge, Member, N ational Security C ouncil, to Dr. Henry Kissinger, A ssistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, W ashington, DC, Feb. 22, 1971; W hite H ouse Central Files; N D  
18-3 Prisoners; 1/1/71 [1972]; N ixon Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege  
Park, M D.
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wives of POWs or MIAs. To achieve such a position of influence, the wives had to 
transcend an array of cultural and personal taboos.
The Cultural Context and Women's Roles
During my interviews with POW and MIA wives and other influential political 
actors at the time, various individuals mentioned the era and its influence on the events, 
which are the focus in this research. Several acknowledged that, at the time, women's 
roles were changing domestically, professionally, and within the military culture. Richard 
Capen, Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Public Affairs during the Nixon 
administration, rightly noted that most of the husbands and wives in the military "were 
career people."103 Wives o f military officers, he observed, thought of themselves and their 
husbands as inseparable from a career standpoint. This career mindedness, he noted, 
established a great sense of patriotism, support of Presidents, and a clear understanding of 
the risks involved with military service.
Jenny Connell Robertson, on the other hand, suggested that Capen's 
characterization of military families was more typical o f the times than a unique 
characteristic of military families. She spoke about the generational expectation for all 
wives, not just military wives, was to stay at home and raise the children while husbands 
went to work.
An unintentional consequence o f such a traditional mindset, however, manifested 
itself when the wives received notification of their husband's imprisonment or missing in 
action status. Richard Capen noted that this dual element o f career and culture made the
103
In 1971, Richard Capen was awarded the Department o f  D efense's D istinguished Service  
M edal, in part, for his work on behalf o f  POW s in Vietnam .
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wives "hesitant to say a lot because they didn't know whether it was going to help get 
information on their husbands or whether it would hurt their lives."
Comments made by Sherry Martin, who was thirty-three years o f age with two 
children when her husband was shot down in 1967, reinforced Capen's point. She recalled 
that, for the most part, the wives cultural mindset toward military or governmental 
officials was based on trust in those assigned to positions of authority. With unabashed 
candor she said, "I'm a product of the 50's. I can't speak for all of us, but a lot o f us never 
question authority. If authority said, 'This is the way you do it' [then] this is the way you 
do it. We weren't challenging. We respected authority figures because they [the people in 
authority] got there somehow."
In short, Sherry indicated that she— and many other military wives— "figured . . . 
[government officials] certainly knew a lot more" than she and the other wives did. After 
all, most government officials were highly educated, which lead Sherry and others to 
other assume that education equated to a sense o f trustworthiness and conferred a sense 
of legitimate authority. In time, however, she and the other wives learned such an 
assumption was not "always the case."
While some aspects o f Navy culture (and, to some extent, the general culture of 
the times) needed to be transcended before the wives could become a potent political 
force, Sherry provided an additional insight about the military culture that turned out to 
be a facilitating factor in the transition process. Sherry noted that, in the military, spouses 
often take on leadership roles and assume positional authority based on their husband's 
rank. Sherry actually seemed a bit conflicted about this cultural norm. At one point, for 
instance, she indicated that she did not support the concept of a wife "wearing her
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husband's rank." At another time, however, she posed a question to me that seemed more 
rhetorical than real: "Don't you defer to the Commanding Officer's wife?" Clearly, the 
military culture had taught Sherry that the answer to this question was, obviously, yes. 
This was made clear in her comments about the role of the Commanding Officer's wife 
when she told me, "I would expect her to take the leadership."
Bonnie Singleton, a relatively inexperienced twenty-three year old when her 
husband was shot down, made a similar point. A couple of years after he husband was 
taken prisoner, she recalled that she took her cue from Sybil Stockdale, the wife of the 
ranking senior officer among the group of captives in Hanoi. Sybil Stockdale, herself, 
during one of my interviews with her, also took note of the Navy tradition o f officer's 
wives exercising leadership to a degree that was commensurate with their husbands' rank. 
Jenny Connell Robertson, as well, spoke o f the Navy tradition of deferring to the senior 
officer's wife. It was her conviction that this element of Navy culture and tradition, along 
with other aspects of the Navy's rigid traditional culture, were enabling factors for the 
wives during their transition from military wives to influential political activists.
For many of the wives, however, Navy traditions also constrained, especially 
when they were reinforced by the prescribed gender roles of the larger culture. On the 
other hand, Karen Butler—who told me that even in the 1960s she "was still a product o f 
the '50s”—suggested that the larger cultural context also inadvertently pushed women 
beyond their traditional roles once their husbands were listed as a POW or MIA. She 
recalled, with laughter, how she was "turned down for a house to rent in La Jolla 
[California] because [she] was a married woman without a man." Sybil Stockdale— who, 
in part because of her positional power but also because of her keen intelligence and
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Rise of the Reluctant Sorority 
personal charisma was the impetus, genius, and mastermind o f the wives political 
activism— had a newspaper article in her personal files that suggested the situation that 
Karen Butler was forced to confront and deal with was hardly unique. The article was 
from the August 8, 1966, edition of the New Haven Register, it described the "legal
104
limbo" a wife was thrust into when her husband's status was POW or MIA. The article 
illustrated the problem with several stories; one o f a woman required to sell the family 
car because she could not obtain her husband's signature for new license plates, another 
of a federal tax bureau that refused to process a joint tax return until the POW wife 
obtained the signature of her husband.
These stories, and others, illustrated the inability of women to conduct basic 
business transactions while living in conformance to societal and military expectations of 
behavior and existing social mores. This inability to conduct business transactions, 
however, forced on many women new roles that prepared them for the more public and 
high-stakes role in the public policy arena they would eventually participate in. Still, even 
with the dress rehearsal opportunities provided by rigid and inflexible bureaucratic 
requirements, it is important to understand how difficult it was for most of the women to 
take on this new role. As Richard Capen said to me:
It wasn't a natural thing for women to be taking a mic and blasting anybody, or, 
going to Paris and demanding to see the Peace Negotiators from North Vietnam. 
It's an era when women were not as deeply involved in leadership roles in 
business or government. The whole issue of women's rights and the comfort of 
women to speak out on issues were very different and limited.
104
Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection.
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During my interview with Jenny Connell Robertson, she reinforced the point 
made by Capen. She noted that the transformation to being a public figure within the 
policy arena contradicted the prevailing societal etiquette of the day and the traditional 
way of rearing women. Consequently, she remembered the transformation process as 
"being painful in some ways. . . .  It might have put you in situations you particularly 
didn't want to be in." Nevertheless, she also recognized the transition "had positive and 
negatives at the same time" because it "forced" the performance of various activities on 
behalf of the men in Hanoi and those who were missing. Additionally, Jenny spoke about 
how the transformation developed into an adventure of self-discovery. It led, she said, to 
"finding out about yourself pretty quickly; what kind of person you're made of and can 
you make it through this." She and the others did not know at the time the immense skill 
and internal fortitude required to deal with such a behemoth bureaucracy as the Untied 
States government. In time, however, they learned this lesson well.
The Government's Prisoner o f  War Policy: Whose Policy Is It, Anyhow?
"Isn't everybody in this government working together?"
Sybil Stockdale
One of the wives internal contacts within the Navy was Commander Robert (Bob) 
Boroughs, Naval Intelligence. Now deceased, Commander Boroughs not only provided a 
sympathetic ear to the wives but also was an individual o f strategic importance in 
mediating between the women and various governmental officials and departments. On 
occasions, he advised and/or recommended courses of action to further the goals of the 
women—as well as help the Navy. Sybil Stockdale, whose husband had been in prison 
since September 1965, recalled that Commander Boroughs broached the subject about
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her engaging in covert communications with her husband as a confined prisoner in Hanoi. 
This act alone was fraught with danger and serious consequences if discovered by prison 
authorities. At the same meeting when the covert communication was discussed, 
Commander Boroughs also asked Sybil to pay a courtesy call on Ambassador Averell 
Harriman, President Johnson's ambassador-at-large for Southeast Asia affairs, at the 
Department of State. Sybil responded by asking why he wanted her to see him. 
Commander Boroughs replied, "I'd like to know what he tells you." Years later, Sybil 
told me her response to Boroughs question, "Isn’t everybody in this government working 
together?"
The dialogue between Sybil and Boroughs was a glimpse behind the 
governmental bureaucracy of two major agencies— the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense— and an indicator of the breakdown in communication between 
these two agencies, and the distrust that often existed between them. Contrary to what 
most wives thought, the Department of Defense was not in charge of POW matters. 
Rather, responsibility for the POW matters had been delegated to the Department of 
State. Primarily, this was due to the prevailing belief that the prisoner matter was a 
diplomatic function requiring Department of State authority and expertise. However, this 
was questioned months before LTjg Alvarez was shot down over North Vietnam by the 
Joint Chiefs of the military. The Joint Chiefs sent a formal memorandum on February 26, 
1964, to Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, expressing their concerns about the 
status of POW matters, the current POW policy, and the limited involvement of the 
Department of Defense in POW matters.
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Defense and Department of State senior officials reviewed the memorandum, 
which was also circulated to other agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. 
The staffing process sought advice and information for an appropriate response to the 
Joint Chiefs. The ensuing communiques between the State and Department o f Defense 
officials, documented in the book, The Long Road Home: U.S. Prisoner o f  War Policy 
and Planning in Southeast Asia  by Vernon E. Davis, revealed the continuing 
disagreement about which governmental agency should be delegated the responsibility 
for dealing with the growing POW issue. The communiques revealed that the Department 
of Defense officials remained skeptical about the resolve and commitment of the 
Department of State to deal with the POW problem in ways that officials in the 
Department of Defense deemed appropriate.
In November 1965, after twenty-two months of study and discussions between 
State, Defense, and the CIA, and after further appeals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary o f Defense, Defense Secretary McNamara replied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
He informed the Joint Chiefs that the Department o f State had completed its review of 
their memo but he decided he would not change the diplomatic approach to the handling 
POW issue. He then indicated that Defense and State were exploring the effectiveness of 
a "demarche" to the Soviet Union. By the time the staffing study concluded, the number 
of United States prisoners in South and North Vietnam numbered over seventy.
Tragically, the North Vietnamese maintained a position that the men held captive 
were not to be accorded humane treatment or given proper care as specified by Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The North Vietnamese 
maintained this position even though they had signed the agreement.
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners o f  War
"It was sort o f a forgone conclusion—we knew they were being maltreated."
Sherry Martin
Over three decades later, the women I interviewed for this study were quite 
familiar with the contents of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, adopted in August 12, 1949. This knowledge had been purposefully 
acquired and effectually used. During one of my interviews with Sybil Stockdale, for 
example, she noted: "I had invested a tremendous amount of my time educating myself 
about the subject." This education process included writing a letter to Vice Admiral B. J. 
Semmes, Jr., Chief of Naval Personnel, requesting "a bibliography which," she wrote, 
"will allow me to learn as much as possible about any and all aspects o f the conditions 
and people with whom my husband may be 'associating.'"105
Although the women had transformed themselves into experts on the Geneva 
Convention, not all of the key government actors possessed such expertise. In preparation 
for our interview, for instance, Phyllis Galanti, who had been a young Navy wife of 
twenty-five and mother of two little boys when her husband was captured, reviewed the 
personal records she had kept. Phyllis discovered in her notes taken from a meeting that 
she and some of the wives had had with Dr. Kissinger that she "registered [her] horror" 
regarding his apparent lack of in-depth knowledge about the Geneva Convention. Until 
she prepared for the interview, she said, it was something she had not remembered.
Though Secretary Kissinger may not have been familiar with the Geneva
105
Sybil Stockdale to V ice Admiral B. J. Sem m es, Jr., C h ief o f  N aval Personnel, Coronado, CA, 
Sept. 17, 1965, unpublished data, private collection.
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Convention agreement on prisoners o f war, the wives knew, and used, specific key 
components from the Geneva Convention (Appendix D). Even though the North 
Vietnamese were signers to the Convention, they refused to abide by the provisions due 
to their opinion that the conflict in Vietnam was not a declared war by the United States 
Congress. This interpretation led to a whole host of abuses on the POWs. For instance, 
many pilots, when captured, did not receive protection from violent acts or insults by the 
local populace; they also were tortured in prison and used as instruments for propaganda 
purposes. In addition, they were not provided with adequate food, health care, sanitary 
conditions. The North Vietnames also did not permit inspections of prisoners and 
facilities by the International Red Cross. All o f these things were required by the Geneva 
Convention agreement.
In spite of such abuses, the American government maintained publicly that the 
men were well treated and in good health. This storyline, which became the official 
position, was repeated to the wives during the notification process about their husbands' 
capture and imprisonment. The wives, however, quickly learned the real story and— as it 
will be shown—when they became activist and told the real story publicly, they invoked 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War to raise public 
awareness about the POW issue. Among other things, they correctly noted that Article 2 
of the Geneva Convention mandated that the Convention apply in cases of declared war 
or armed conflict "even if the state of war is not recognized by one o f them." Therefore, 
they argued, international law dictated that their husbands receive the sort of treatment 
spelled out in the Geneva Convention Articles.
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Changing Status, Stark Realizations, and Requisite Adjustments 
Official Notification o f Husband's Status
"We need to talk to you."
Spoken to Marie Estocin by Official Notification Party 
"If someone had asked me if I would like to be a POW wife;
I probably would not have accepted the job."
Chloe Moore
The first question I asked the wives was a grand tour question-—"Would you tell 
me what it was like being the wife of a POW or MIA?" This question allowed them to 
formulate their own narratives and to recall elements of their stories that left indelible 
impressions on their hearts and minds. All thirteen of the interviewed women began their 
discussions by describing notification process. For some the memories of the notification 
brought forth tears; some looked in a different direction; some had a momentary pause, 
and for most, there was a simple but deep verbal sigh.
All the women invariably recalled the notification process in detail. They 
remembered the type of day, what they were doing, whom they were talking to, the 
"black car" (black was the color of military vehicles conducting official business, 
including notification of a husband's capture or death—in short order the black car 
became a symbol of bad news), the individuals who delivered the news, and the 
bewildering and lingering feelings of numbness.
All of the stories were the same, yet each was also unique. Marie Estocin, a young 
mother of two and one of the wives who endured several status changes of her husband
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during and after the war, had just laid down her daughters for their afternoon nap.'°6 After 
laying the girls down, she had decided that this was a good opportunity to go outside, sit 
in the sun, and read a book. She was just settling down with her book when the doorbell 
rang. When she opened the door, she saw the Commanding Officer o f the base, the 
chaplain, and the squadron skipper's wife. Instantly she knew why they were there. To 
forestall the news, she instinctively slammed the door and ran into the back room. Those 
that had come to speak with her found her huddled by the washer and dryer in the laundry 
room. Graciously they said, "Let's come out into the living room; we need to talk to you."
A mother of just two months, the self described pragmatist o f the group, Karen 
Butler, heard a knock on the door at six thirty in the morning. Because o f the makeup of 
the group on her porch, she "knew exactly what it was." She remembered—both at the 
time and decades later— that the wife o f the casualty officer standing on her porch and 
delivering the bad news had, just two months before, shared a maternity room when their 
children were born.
Like many of the women, both Marie Estocin and Karen went through the 
notification process more than once because of changing reports from commands 
overseas, or later from intelligence reports. For both their husbands were initially listed as 
"presumed dead."
Bonnie Singleton also received multiple notifications, but in her case the 
notification was nor in person. She received telegrams; the first informed her that her 
husband was MIA; then fourteen months later she received a second telegram that
106
Marie E stocin’s husband’s status changed from M IA to POW , to Presum ed Finding o f  Death
(PFOD).
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notified her that her husband was a POW. The first telegram brought shakes, trembling 
and sleeplessness; the second brought confusion because she did not have access to the 
"sufficient evidence" that caused the military to change her husband's official status. All 
she had as a cursory telegram.
After the initial notification, most of the wives developed a mental plan for coping 
and functioning in their new role. Though it would be difficult, Sherry Martin believed 
she could cope with her new role and situation. As a mother, she said, she did not have 
any other choice because her children needed care regardless of the circumstance. For 
Mary Winn, whom Sybil Stockdale considered an "intelligent and persistent lady," the 
new role would be guided by her conviction that it was her responsibility to represent her 
husband "well in all I did and said and in the way I looked— not sad but hopeful and 
solid—cheerful but not silly in the face o f adversity."107 Her operative word was "calm," 
which would ensure her not going "to pieces."
Chloe Moore— a wife who afforded many other wives moments of laughter and 
was known as one who did not seek credit for the work done— responded by mixing a 
blend of humor and pragmatism. She told me she "wasn't given a choice" when it came to 
being a POW wife. She immediately recognized, however, that "it was a matter of having 
a family to take care of and going about. . . [her] business." This business included 
signing a new teaching contract each school year with the thought, "He'll be home by 
then . . . one more year." She signed six contracts before her husband's return but, as she 
said, "You just live and tell yourself, 'I can do another year.'"
107
Sybil Stockdale and Mary W inn w ere close in age and background, w hich contributed to an 
instant friendship. They used each other as a sounding board to vet ideas; especia lly  w ays to bring pressure 
on the governm ents o f  North Vietnam  and Am erica, as w ell as w ays to p ublicize their story to m illions o f  
Americans.
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Overtime, the wives found each other and became, in Sherry Martin's word, "the 
reluctant sorority." The "sorority" was more an informal than formal organization. The 
wives' common experiences and a number of emergent rituals held it together. One of 
these rituals involved remembering the date that each of the others wives' husbands had 
been shot down. Even thirty-two years later, the women I interviewed remembered these 
dates.
An emergent factor that also held the group together was a shared distaste for the 
government's policy that dictated government officials’ response to the POW and MIA 
issue. The government, during the Johnson administration, labeled the policy, "Quiet 
Diplomacy." To the women, however, it was the "Keep Quiet" policy.
A Common Remembrance: The Keep Quiet Policy
"Keep Quiet."
Phrased used by POW and MIA Wives to Describe American 
Governmental Policy for POW and MIA Matters
In some form, all of the wives recall that, as part of the official notification 
process, military representatives also conveyed specific instructions or guiding principles 
intended to govern their conversations and actions. Although the remembered details 
differed somewhat from person to person, more than one o f the wives mentioned 
receiving the following directives as part of the notification process:
• Keep quiet
• Don't talk about husband's status
• Don't tell anybody
• Never talk to the press or give interviews
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• Don't tell anyone about your circumstance
• Show any mail from your husband to the Navy
• Never intercede in any way on behalf o f the prisoner (it might disturb what the
, . .1 0 8
government is doing)
Although I could not locate an official government memorandum specifying that 
the above directives should be part o f notification, one document does substantiate, in
109
part at least, the guidance given to the women when notified of their husbands' fates.
The document was a telegram sent to Sybil Stockdale on September 10, 1965, by Vice 
Admiral B. J. Semmes, Jr., Chief of naval Personnel. The telegram confirmed her 
husband's POW status but also stated the following: "You are again reminded to reveal 
only the name, rank, file number and date of birth o f your husband to inquiries outside 
your immediate family.""0
Another piece o f evidence that documents the government’s directives to the 
wives is a one-page memo, Advice to Potential Prisoner o f  War Families (Appendix E), 
that Sybil Stockdale, in her role as the senior officer’s wife, had prepared and sent to 
those she heard about who shared her situation. The paper articulates the directives she 
had received after being notified of her husband’s status. Other than telegrams, this 
unofficial paper is the earliest documentation o f the policies and procedures articulated
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Later the guidance w as am plified to specify  "without State Department approval" and 
"independent actions could seriously damage negotiations being conducted in behalf o f  the prisoner by the 
State Depgjtment." Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection
V ice Admiral B. J. Sem m es, Jr., C h ief o f  N aval Personnel, telegram dated September 10 and 
11, 1965n{g) Sybil Stockdale. Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection  
Ibid.
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by governmental and military authorities during the notification process.” 1 These policies 
and procedures were reflective of the State Department’s policy of Quiet Diplomacy.
The Department of State's notion of Quiet Diplomacy referred to the strategy of 
using diplomatic pressure on the North Vietnamese through various channels to handle 
and/or address POW and MIA matters. The strategy— which the wives, over time, 
renamed the Keep Quiet policy and which Melvin Laird, President Nixon’s Secretary of 
Defense, in an interview with me, called the “Do Nothing” policy— represented, from the 
wives perspective, an attempt to curtail their access to the media and an effort to keep 
them from acting, in any way, on their husbands’ behalf.
The basis of the Quiet Diplomacy policy came, at least in part, from a conviction 
held by Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense between 1961 and 1968, and Clark 
Clifford, Secretary of Defense, from 1968 to 1969. It was their conviction that any overt 
activity on the POW and MIA issue would, according to Richard Capen "annoy the North 
Vietnamese" to the point that they would "continue to torture and if not kill the men."
Furthermore, Richard Capen indicated other rationale for the policy. He said that 
officials in the Johnson administration were concerned it might jeopardize any resolution 
of the POW and MIA matter, or an ability to "end the war peacefully," or influence the 
"ability to negotiate a settlement in Paris." The overriding concern, Richard Capen said, 
was not to "embarrass the North Vietnamese," which "might back them into a corner 
[and] prolong the war." Therefore, "[the wives] were told to be quiet." Richard Capen,
i n
The government's position w as published in a Fact Sheet issued by the N ational League o f  
Families in January 1973. It stated: "The policy  o f  the U .S. Governm ent w as to keep a low  profile on the 
prisoner o f  war issue, and fam ilies throughout the U .S . had been encouraged not to d iscuss the problem in 
public." The Fact Sheet, republished due to the im m inent return o f  the prisoners, w as an updated copy from  
one the National League distributed in 1970. P hyllis Galanti, unpublished data, private collection.
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Rise of the Reluctant Sorority 
however, also conveyed what he and several governmental officials knew: if the "policy 
had continued there would have been a revolution and [the wives and families] couldn't 
of withstood the pressure of being quiet, and not knowing and feeling nothing was being 
done on behalf of these men."
Initially, however, several of the wives echoed the government’s concern that 
they would do more harm to their husbands if they spoke out on POW and MIA issues. 
Sandy Dennison—known for her loyalty and willingness to take tough and thankless jobs 
as well as for being the wives letter-writer to governmental officials— remarked that the 
wives "were so afraid" since speaking out "would harm [the men] even more." Her 
personal fear was "that something could come back to harm my husband."
Sybil Stockdale remembered being warned, "Any information the press carried 
might be used against [the] men to torment them." Shirley Stark— who was thought of by 
the others as possessing a compassionate sixth sense because she just seemed always to 
know who required special care and attention—recalled, "You were walking on egg 
shells. . . .  I mean you dared not say anything to anybody because it might be . . . they'd 
mistreat the men." One wife, Alice Stratton— considered as one o f the intellects o f the 
group and noted for her unwavering dedication to family and country— vividly 
remembered her neighbors coming to her door after seeing the official military black car 
come and leave from her home, but she never came out of the house. Finally a neighbor 
knocked on the door and asked Alice, "What's going on?" With tears streaming down her 
face she replied, "Oh, nothing." All she could remember was the warning that she could 
not say anything to anyone, a warning that, she said, came from "somebody in
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Washington." Even though no one in Washington knew definitively what might happen, 
the concern— it seemed—was that "the men would get harmed in some way."
Some wives were admonished to keep quiet with the simple, "Don't tell anyone." 
Others recalled several specific guidelines, like those above, which were given either 
verbally or via a telegram. Though she did not receive specific guidelines, Jenny Connell 
Robertson remembered that military officials "gave you that indication" it was best to 
keep quiet, but she did not "recall anyone telling [her], 'You've got to be quiet.'. .  . but it 
certainly was indicated." Overall, she felt, "They were in control."
Bonnie Singleton, on the other hand, remembered receiving a more specific 
directive. She was told she could only talk about her husband in terms o f his "name, rank, 
date of birth and service number." The telegram that notified her o f her husband's status 
also justified her compliance by stating, "This is the same information he must provide 
his possible captors."
When Phyllis Galanti was first told about the need to maintain silence, she also 
was given advice: "Don't even tell anybody he's been shot down. Say he's been 
extended." Phyllis told me that she thought, "That was a little hard to keep up and kind of 
ridiculous." Sandy Dennison, fearful o f reprisals on her husband, admonished her parents 
to abide by the same rules she was told to follow: "Don't say anything. Don't do anything 
because this is what we were told to do." Eventually, however, as she seriously thought 
about the guidelines she concluded, "There was kind of this fear tactic" that kept her in 
line. She also thought: "There wasn't anything more that could hurt [the POWs] anymore 
than they already had been hurt."
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Other wives echoed Sandy's latter sentiments, which had been used as a coercive 
tactic by the government to maintain their silence. Marty Halyburton, for instance, who 
was only twenty-three when her husband was shot down, actually came to the same 
conclusion as Sandy. Marty was informed in February 1967, eighteen months after she 
was told her husband had been killed, that he was a prisoner in Hanoi. Immediately after 
the status change, she began to learn about the keep quiet policy via two other wives; 
Sybil Stockdale and Dot McDaniel. She said that she always "felt that keeping quiet was 
not going to help." With the change in her husband's status to POW, she was now asked 
to remain quiet about his new status. Several weeks later, however, the Navy informed 
her that they were considering a public announcement about his captivity to hold the 
North Vietnamese accountable for him. Shortly thereafter, the Navy went public, which 
was the lead story on NBC’s national evening news, the Huntley-Brinkley Report.
The Navy's actions reinforced Marty Halyburton's immediate instincts about 
problems with the Quiet Diplomacy policy. Marty told me during our interview: "In 
something like this you fail to see it from other points of view . . .  We wanted our 
husbands back. When I look back . . .  I realize how I was looking at it from one 
perspective and it was as a POW wife."
So, for a number of years, the women publicly were well mannered and behaved 
ladies who did what the government told them to do. In part, this adherence to 
governmental instruction occurred because o f the women's geographical isolation from 
each other. Also, some of the wives whose husband had been shot down between 1965 
and 1968 remembered that they had, in fact, been prohibited from knowing the names of 
other military wives or family members in the same circumstance. This policy did not
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appear to be adopted by all branches o f the military services, nor was it clear at what 
level within the government this policy was made. What was clear, however, was that, 
from the wives' perspective, the administration o f Lyndon Johnson treated the women 
and the whole POW and MIA matter with benign neglect. The women also believed that 
the way they were treated, and the POW and MIA matter more generally, changed with 
presidential administrations.
Contrasts o f  Presidential Administrations
"Dark, dark, dark night with the Johnson administration."
Sybil Stockdale
There is some debate about President Johnson's level of concern about the POW 
and MIA issue. In a Washington Post newspaper column, August 8, 1967, syndicated 
writer Jack Anderson, wrote:
Disturbing whispers have leaked out that the Johnson administration has not done 
all it could to arrange better treatment for American prisoners in enemy hands.
One high official complained to this column that prisoner problems have been 
given a low priority at the State Department. He quoted Secretary of State Rusk as 
telling aides that the captured Americans are not prisoners but hostages, that the 
Communists would demand a quid pro quo for treating them decently and that he 
had no intention of granting any concessions.'12 
Richard Capen, who was the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the subsequent 
administration, provided what might be considered a gracious reading on the Johnson 
administration's record on the POWs and MIAs. He noted, for instance, that President
112
Jack Anderson, "U.S. A ccused o f  Prisoner N eglect,"  W ashington P ost, B i t ,  A ugust 8, 1967.
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Johnson was obsessed with trying to end the Vietnam quagmire and did not let himself 
get distracted by details such as the POW and MIA question. In addition, he noted that it 
was customary to address the POW question at the end of a war not during it. On the 
other hand, Capen also told me that military intelligence provided unambiguous evidence 
that the POWs in this situation were being tortured and that the North Vietnamese were 
not living up to international law in terms of their treatment of military prisoners. Thus, a 
case could be made for and against whether it was appropriate to judge President Johnson 
harshly on his approach to the POW and MIA issue.
From the wives' perspective, however, President Johnson and his administration 
were completely uninterested and/or unwilling to openly discuss the POW and MIA 
issue. What is quite clear is that, intentionally or unintentionally, the Johnson 
administration failed to effectively communicate with the wives, thereby irritating and 
disappointing many women like Marie Estocin, who was adamant in her conviction that 
Johnson was not pursuing "how the prisoners were being treated." Equally firm in her 
convictions, Shirley Stark proclaimed that when President Johnson was in power " the 
door was closed" to the wives. She quickly added, "He [President Johnson] had himself 
on his mind—not other people."
President Johnson's decision not to seek reelection in 1968 aroused additional 
anger and frustration among some of the wives. "I think really what made me most 
angry," Sherry Martin said, "was when President Johnson decided he wasn't going to run 
again. He just cut bait and ran. He abandoned us. Instead of solving it [the POW issue 
and the Vietnam War, itself], he cut and ran!"
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In the private archives of Sybil Stockdale, I read the first letter she wrote to the 
POW wives that she had contact information for at the time.1'3 In it, Sybil wrote about her 
conversation with Governor Averell Harriman, Department of State's Ambassador-at- 
Large for POW matters, during a meeting she had with him in July 1966. She told the 
wives that even though she was not "a member o f the political party o f the present 
administration," she felt that their "husband's lives are in the hands of master statesmen 
who will do and are doing everything in their power to assure the safe return of the 
prisoners and bring the conflict to an early close." Governor Harriman told her that if  at 
anytime she or any other wife "did not feel that he was doing his job," then "the best 
person to contact is Bobby Kennedy because Bobby Kennedy is constantly urging [him] 
on to greater effort."
Robert Kennedy, of course, was assassinated in June 1968, on the night of his 
victory in the California primary, and Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee, 
eventually became President. A number of the wives saw the election o f President Nixon 
as a significant turning point on the POW and MIA issue. During their interviews, in fact, 
they spoke about the difference they experienced between the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations. Marty Halyburton, for example, declared unequivocally that "there was a 
move that [the wives] needed" and it came "when Johnson was out." The move that they 
needed, as she recalled, was the ability to openly talk about POW and MIA issues. Sandy 
Dennison said much the same thing: "It was kind of like a one-hundred-eighty degree 
turn from Johnson to Nixon," she told me. She felt the wives began to experience a
113
Sybil Stockdale, to POW  W ives, A ugust 10, 1966. Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private
collection.
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freedom they had not known before— the freedom to talk about their situation and openly 
ask the public for support to bring pressure on Hanoi. Like many other wives, she 
possessed a newfound confidence that governmental officials in Washington DC "knew 
[the wives] were there." The stalwart Sybil Stockdale probably gave the most stark and 
vivid contrast between the Johnson and Nixon administrations. She said, "It was like 
night and day. Night— dark, dark, dark night with the Johnson administration. Bright 
sunny days in the Nixon administration."
What many o f the wives did not appear to understand— even after three 
decades— was that the "bright sunny days" did not just happen with a change in 
administration. Rather, the climate changed because, as the insightful Sandy Dennison 
put it, "pressure had come to bear" on American government officials, both elected and 
appointed. Much of this pressure, of course, had been generated by the wives themselves 
who, by the start of the Nixon administration, had begun not only to form "the reluctant 
sorority" but also to transform the "sorority" into a potent organization with political 
force capable of influencing the Congress and, eventually, the President of the United 
States. The women, who were part of this forming group, organized and entered the 
political arena for a variety of reasons.
Personal Motivation fo r  Involvement with the POW and MIA Issue





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Four
During the interview process, some responses by the women triggered additional 
questions on my part. One of those additional questions dealt with their personal 
motivation for becoming active participants in the POW and MIA matter. The responses 
varied considerably but can be reduced to two general types of motives. Sherry Martin's 
response exemplifies one type o f motive. When asked why she had become active, she 
responded, matter-of-factly: "To get our husbands home, of course." Sybil Stockdale, on 
the other hand, stated assertively that the immediate objective was not for President 
Nixon to bring the men home; rather, that the wives "were working to have them [their 
husbands] accorded humane treatment." As noted earlier, she knew the North Vietnamese 
were not abiding by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, which opened the door for additional maltreatment. Equally important, she was the 
sort of military wife who understood military traditions. One o f these traditions, of 
course, was the tradition that Richard Capen had alluded to: The POW issue was 
normally resolved at the end rather than during a war. Consequently, during one of my 
interviews with Sybil, she stated that the servicemen held captive in North Vietnam 
"were all professionals and. . . .  they knew that it was dishonorable, o f course, to come 
home before the end of the war."
Thus, the wives were motivated by somewhat different goals. Despite their 
different motives, however, the wives, collectively, managed to focus policymakers' 
attention on the POW and MIA issue and to effectively challenge the notion of Quiet 
Diplomacy or, in their words, the keep quiet policy. Doing this required transcending 
traditional ways of thinking and the learning of new roles. The learning process was, 
largely, not systematic or linear. Rather it was one of trial and error. And success was
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certainly not immediate. The wives, in fact, had to quickly learn how to adapt and adjust 
when their initial strategies were less than successful, invent new approaches to get their 
message noticed in the policy arena, and, once they and their message did get noticed, 
find ways to confront and transcend governmental responses that were little more than 
procedural display.
Politicians, Appointees, and the American Public Attitude 
What is the American Government Doing?
"Sybil aptly named it, 'The Washington Road Show.'"
Shirley Stark
"I found out that my husband was alive from the Today show."
Karen Butler 
"We wanted to make this an issue in America."
Richard Capen
For the wives, information about their husbands was difficult to obtain from 
governmental agencies in Washington. They also had little to no information about any 
official plan or objective for resolving the POW and MIA issue. As a result, the wives 
began to question and complain to officials within the Department of Defense,
Department of State, and to elected representatives.
Bonnie Singleton was convinced that what compelled the United States Air Force 
to finally respond to families was directly related to the growing number of aircraft shot 
down over North Vietnam. An ever-increasing number o f families, as Bonnie recalled, 
"were wanting to know what the military was doing about this situation." Finally, in 
1968, three years after Bonnie's husband was shot down, the Air Force Casualty Division
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in San Antonio, Texas, arranged a meeting with families to discuss what the Air Force 
and non-military officials in Washington were doing and, as Bonnie told me, "why the 
policies were what they were."
There was a similar sort of pressure for information on the Navy side. Jenny 
Connell Robertson said, the wives "initially wanted the Navy to tell us what they knew 
about our husbands." She said, however, that the government—for whatever reason— 
"wouldn't tell us what they knew about our husbands." Even after the North Vietnamese 
released a picture of her husband and proclaimed, "We have him," she could still not get 
answers to the most basic questions.
Over time, the women found other ways to get information. As the war 
progressed and the antiwar demonstrations became more intense, certain notable and 
controversial American citizens sympathetic to North Vietnam traveled to Hanoi and met 
with communist officials. Often these individuals returned with information on POWs 
and MIAs or letters from the POWs. It seemed odd, as even the wives felt; that they 
received information via antiwar leaders rather than their government. One of these wives 
was Sandy Dennison; she learned from information provided by Jane Fonda in 1971 that 
her husband had died in the prison camp. Even though this notification was not official, 
Sybil Stockdale advised Sandy to make the rounds on Capital Hill to inform lawmakers 
that she had obtained information about her husband's death from other sources other 
than the American government. For two days, Sybil "prepped" Sandy before she went to 
speak with elected officials on Capital Hill. However, when Sandy went to Capital Hill, 
she discovered the following: "Nobody would see me. Nobody wanted to talk to me.
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Nobody wanted to do anything." After this happened, Sybil advised Sandy, in Sandy's 
words, to go to the "press and tell them that my own government will not talk with me."
Eventually official Washington—undoubtedly prompted, at least in part, by media 
stories of the wives treatment by government officials—began to attend to the women 
and their concerns. From the wives' perspective, however, the response, for some time, 
was, highly formal and even perfunctory. The wives wanted information about their 
husbands and a commitment from government agencies to confront the North 
Vietnamese about their violations of international law as set for in the Geneva 
Convention. Both requests, of course, required reversing the government's official Quiet 
Diplomacy strategy, something the Johnson administration— and even the Nixon 
administration in its first months in power—was unwilling to do.
So, between 1965 and 1968, when the Johnson administration officially embraced 
Quiet Diplomacy as the operative method for dealing with the POW and MIA matter and 
met with the wives and other family members on an ad hoc basis, the substantive 
message was not much different from the message delivered during the official 
notification. Only the form had changed. In Karen Butler's words, the meetings "were 
'dog and pony shows' to just make us feel important and assuage our frustration." Sybil 
Stockdale provided a similar characterization of the wives first meeting with President 
Johnson. She said that nothing o f substance was discussed; rather it was a photo 
opportunity on the tarmac at North Island Naval Air Station, Coronado, California. It 
gave the appearance of concern but failed to convey genuine alarm or interest in the 
plight of the POWs or issues with the MIAs.
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Sherry Martin agreed that, during the Johnson years, the wives were not "privy to 
anything," and Jenny Connell Robertson suggested that the women's growing activism 
and aggressively raising substantive questions was actively discouraged by government 
officials. Jenny also recalled that both military and civilian representatives treated the 
wives with condescension during the Johnson years. In her words, they were told, in 
effect: "If you guys would just be quiet, we will tell you what is going on and we'll give 
you all the information. You don't need to be searching any place else. We've got it and 
we'll give it to you if  we've got it."
Jenny also remembered a very clear warning from American governmental 
officials that the North Vietnamese were "watching what [the wives] were doing." 
According to Jenny, the wives were also told about likely "Vietnamese spies" operating 
in the country, that the North Vietnamese had "dossiers" on the wives and their activities, 
and that North Vietnamese agents were "probably bugging [their] phones." None of this 
turned out to be accurate information, of course, and it was certainly possible— and 
maybe even likely— that those who were making these statements knew, at the time, that 
what they were saying probably was more fiction than fact. The subtext, however, was 
not subtle, according to Jenny. The message sent was that the situation required the 
women to remain silent and compliant!
The manner of addressing POW and MIA matter began to change, however, when 
President Nixon came to power. Even though the Nixon administration had made an 
official statement regarding the POWs and MIAs, high level officials within the 
Department of Defense, abandoned the ad hoc approach to "briefing" the women, and, 
instead, scheduled briefing sessions on a fairly regular basis in different geographical
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locations. What transpired during these now more frequent meetings was not radically 
different, however, at least not at first. Indeed, even though the intentions on the part of 
governmental officials in the Department of Defense were to be helpful, the wives 
referred to these periodic meetings cynically as "The Washington Road Show." Sybil 
Stockdale remembered the Nixon administration's first Washington Road Show, held in 
the spring of 1969 at Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, California, as an "incredibly 
volatile meeting."
Richard Capen was the person who had arranged the meeting that Sybil 
Stockdale, thirty-two years later, called volatile. At the outset of the Nixon 
administration, Richard Capen spoke to Melvin Laird, Nixon's Secretary of Defense, 
about the need to meet with the wives and other family members. Richard Capen was 
well aware that the wives had been told for five years to keep quiet. He also knew that the 
wives had begun to not only question that directive but also to actively challenge it. By 
the start of the Nixon administration, in fact, the women—who initially had refrained 
from publicly discussing their situations because they had been told such discussion 
would hurt their husbands—had become bolder in challenging the government's Quiet 
Diplomacy policy and the thinking that supported it. The wives and some family 
members of POWs and MIAs had also begun to function as an organization.
In an interview with me, Richard Capen indicated he understood all of this and his 
advice to Melvin Laird was based, in part, on a sense of duty to bring the wives “up to 
speed” regarding the Department of Defense's strategy in dealing with the POW and MIA 
issue. He also cited a more political reason for making the recommendation he made to 
Secretary Laid: He was aware of the wives' increased political activism and the likelihood
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that the activism would continue and even increase if  the government did not begin to 
treat them differently.
After Melvin Laird approved Capen's plan to brief the wives, Capen contacted 
Frank Sieverts, Assistant to the Secretary o f State for Prisoner of War Affairs. He did this 
because, as noted earlier, the State Department, not the Department of Defense, was 
assigned responsibility for handling POW and MIA issues. This arrangement continued 
during the early months of the Nixon administration.
Capen recalled that Sieverts' initial response was that the contents of the 
Department of Defense's briefings needed to be cleared by someone at a higher level in 
the Department of State. Capen told Sieverts, "It's easier to get it cleared after it’s been 
said. I want to do the right thing."
Richard Capen and Melvin Laird, by this point, were committed to, in Capen's 
words, "doing the right thing" with the wives and with the POW and MIA issue in 
general. The new leadership in the Department of Defense also had a mindset change; 
they began to see the wives as allies in their efforts on behalf of the POWs and MIAs.
In an effort to do the right thing, Capen recalled he and his team went to over 
forty military bases throughout the country and talked with anyone wanting to meet with 
them. The number of family members that attended these meetings was a surprise, even 
to the family members, themselves, according to Capen. The meetings, in fact, were 
important in transforming the growing activism of a small nucleus of women whose 
husbands had been shot down between 1965 and 1968 into a much more extensive 
political movement. Until these meetings, in many cases, the women across the country 
who attended the meetings did not understand that were not alone in their ordeal. And
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both the indirect and direct messages o f the meetings was new: The wives were now 
encouraged to talk with each other, and there was nothing about keeping quiet with others 
outside the group.
None of this was accidental. Rather, the briefing sessions represented a first step 
in a shift in policy on the POW and MIA question during the Nixon administration. 
Richard Capen indicted to me that it was the desire o f Melvin Laird to initiate a POW and 
MIA policy change. One way this could happen, as he said, was to throw "fuel on the fire 
deliberately. . . . We wanted to make this an issue in America."
Furthermore, this strategy was not entirely a clandestine one within the rest o f the 
administration. In a memo from Brigadier General James D. Hughes, Military Assistant 
to the President, to President Richard Nixon, Hughes informed the President about the 
"last meeting of the Ad Hoc Interagency Coordinating Group on POW and MIA on
114
Friday, 16 April [1969]." At this meeting, he told the President, there "were several 
developments which should be o f interest to you." He reminded the President that earlier 
in the administration, joint Department of Defense, and Department of State briefing 
teams were dispatched around the country to meet with groups of POW and MIA 
families. The purpose, as he informed the President, was to bring them up-to-date on 
current events and to answer questions the wives and families might have at that time. 
These teams, he told the President, were successful in improving the morale of the 
families. (Some wives and families, undoubtedly, would challenge his conclusion.)
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In his memo, Hughes also informed the President of a new round of sessions that, 
he wrote, would "emphasize your interest in the families and in obtaining the early 
release of the prisoners and an accounting for all of the missing." He also informed the 
President that the teams have a more specific objective: "to explain the administration's 
position on the announcement of a firm troop withdrawal date and to reassure the families 
that [the administration's] withdrawal program does not abandon the prisoners." He also 
made the President aware of the teams' departure date, which was scheduled for May, and 
indicated that this date had been chosen "since a large number o f families will be 
traveling until then to Geneva for a meeting o f the International Red Cross, and to 
Budapest, Stockholm and other foreign capitols [.v/c]."" '
Thus, there was a policy shift, of sorts, during the initial months of the new 
administration, and the President was kept informed that the shift was occurring. This 
shift was significant for wives and other family members who had not previously been 
privy to much information about their husbands and who had had little contact with each 
other. Of course, for some wives such as Sandy Dennison—who lived with the POW 
issue on a daily basis and who had kept herself informed about POW and MIA matters 
through direct and, often, indirect means—the briefings represented little that was new.
Twenty-eight years later, in fact, Sandy Dennison, recalled being frustrated by 
with what she and others referred to as "the Washington Road Show." She also was upset 
by the need to "start all over with the new administration." There was clearly 
exasperation in her voice, even twenty-eight years later, as she characterized her 
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through the Washington Road Show again. They'd come out and pat you on the back and 
you'd say, 'You don't have to pat me on the back.' 'I'm not going to cry.' 'I'm not going to 
make you do anything.' 'I just want you to go back there and tell them what we want.'"
Other members of the emerging activist organization were a bit more circumspect 
about the role that the government's efforts played in propelling them forward. Jenny 
Connell Robertson, for instance, remembered that an earlier Washington Road Show 
during the Johnson administration as the catalyst for the POW and MIA wives informal 
gatherings. She recalled Sybil saying, "Why don't we just get together and talk about 
this." The more formal organization that was eventually formed, as Jenny said, had its 
genesis in these "informal gathering . . .  to support each other and talk about what these 
government representatives had said."
It was during their discussions between 1965 and 1968, in fact, that the San Diego 
and Southern California wives became increasingly skeptical o f the information they 
were receiving from Washington. The wives, as Sherry Martin noted, were not 
accustomed to questioning political leaders because, for one, they had never been in a 
position to do so. However, she added: "As time went on and we were being told nothing, 
we really felt they [the government officials] knew something and weren't telling us . . .  
and we resented that." Thus, among the wives in San Diego, Lemoore, and the San 
Francisco Bay area, as well as in other military aviation concentrated areas with POW 
and MIA wives, there was a growing consensus by the end of the Johnson administration 
that governmental authorities "knew a lot more than they were telling us. . .  . they just 
were not passing the information on." Sherry, for instance, recalled that when the 
Secretary of the Navy, during the Johnson administration, spoke to the group of wives for
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ninety minutes, she said that he said, "Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing!" She 
called it, "Big time talk."
Experiences like those that Sherry Martin described established a cognitive frame 
of mind for perceiving the efforts of the new administration. The frame, in effect, filtered 
out shifts—that, initially, at least, were quite subtle and not entirely definitive—in the 
government's message during the early months o f the Nixon administration."6 
Frustration, Doubts, and Cynicism
"I always felt we put them in a closet, a dark closet, and closed the door 
and nobody could open the door—that was the way I felt 
the government had done to the men."
Shirley Stark
Over a period of years, multiple factors brought about a growing disconcertion 
about the government's forthrightness about the POW and MIA situation among a group 
of women who, along with the parents of some of the captives, would become the 
nucleus of the POW and MIA movement. A reoccurring comment that many of the 
women recalled, both during the Johnson administration and during the early stages of 
the Nixon administration, had to do with assurances regarding the men held captive. The 
statement to Sybil Stockdale by Philip Heymann, Assistant to Ambassador Harriman, is 
characteristic o f what most government officials working the POW and MIA issue were 
saying to the wives and other family members. As she recalled, he assured her that
116
In m y interview  with Richard Capen, he acknow ledged the d ifficu lties that confronted the 
Secretary o f  D efense and his staff w hen they initiated the new  round o f  briefings for w ives and fam ily  
members o f  POW s and M IA s. This w as due, in part, he said to the fact that the fam ilies had been told to 
keep quiet for fear o f  endangering their husband's or son's lives or possib ly  negatively affecting the 
government's war settlem ent negotiations.
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"everything possible was being done for the men's welfare and he had reason to believe—  
good reason to believe—that the men were being well treated." Eventually, as Phyllis 
Galanti pointed out, the wives were no longer "swallowing every thing they [i.e., 
government officials] said hook, line, and sinker." In spite of their growing skepticism, 
however, most of the wives clung to often-repeated claim that the men were being well 
treated. "It was hope against hope, hope against hope, and hope against hope they could 
be right," Sybil Stockdale recalled during my interview with her. Sybil quickly added 
that, in time, the wives "finally found out they [the government officials] weren't right, 
over and over and over again." Sybil told me, "That's when you really become cynical."
It appears from the wives stories, in fact, that the more contact they had with 
governmental officials, the more they considered their statements perfunctory and, often, 
outright lies. Shirley Stark said it directly and unabashedly: "They lied!" Some 
governmental officials, as most the wives recalled, continually issued optimistic 
statements. Sybil, for instance, remembered a group of officials declaring, without any 
qualifications: "Don't worry, they'll be home by Christmas." This sort of statement made 
Sybil and many other wives feel government officials "were such liars—total—  
complete."
This judgment and the wives growing cynicism may see a bit harsh, but, in fact, 
from an historical perspective, the harsh judgments, and the wives' cynicism seem 
justifiable. As early as September 1966, in fact, when the wives and families were told 
that their men were being treated well by the North Vietnamese, there were clear 
indications government and military leadership were aware of the practice of torture by
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the North Vietnamese on American prisoners."7 (See Appendix F for additional 
references regarding inhumane treatment of the prisoners after 1966.)
Furthermore, there was even evidence o f torture that became public early on. 
Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTjg) Dieter Dengler, for instance, was shot down on February 
1, 1966— crash landing his plane in Laos. The following day, the communists' members 
of the Pathet Lao captured him. For six months, prior to his escape, LTjg Dengler 
endured torture, depravation, and human suffering. Among other things, he was "tied 
behind a water buffalo and dragged through the brush," and exposure to environmental 
elements. After his escape and an additional six-weeks of medical treatment, LTjg 
Dengler spoke at a news conference in San Diego, California, attended by fifty of the
nations largest news agencies. He told those in attendance about his experiences as a
118
prisoner.
For the women, government officials' patronizing method o f communication 
could be as frustrating as the inaccurate message being communicated. With passion in 
her voice decades after the events occurred, Phyllis Galanti told me that the Department 
of State drove her "absolutely up the wall." She had the same reaction to "some 
Congressmen and Senators." She added: "You just felt like they were patting you on the 
head and telling you how brave you were, but that nothing was ever going to happen."
Karen Butler offered a somewhat more analytical characterization of government 
officials' treatment of the women. She felt that the officials she spoke with or those that 
came to address the wives were "just kind o f paying attention to us and not telling us
117
"Ranger Pilot T ells Vietnam Escape Story," The North Islander (San D iego , CA), Friday, 
Sep tem b ^ 81 6 ,1966. Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection .
Ibid.
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Rise of the Reluctant Sorority 
really much of anything." Karen added: "It was more of a political reason of paying 
attention to us than really being informational."
Just as the wives were frustrated with government officials, the wives were 
equally frustrated with the antiwar activists, especially those who went to North Vietnam 
and visited the prisoners. Sherry Martin remembered that these antiwar activists 
inevitably returned to the United States to convey to the American people "a rosy picture" 
of the men held captive. "We all knew that was a bunch of bologna," Sherry told me.
A variety of events, some small and seemingly inconsequential and others that 
played out on the world stage, pushed the wives increasingly toward political activism
119
despite their socialization to be the military-wife equivalent of Harriet Nelson. One of 
the seemingly inconsequential events (except, o f course, the person who experienced it) 
involved Sybil Stockdale receiving a letter that the United States Navy had sent to her 
husband, Commander James B. Stockdale— even though he was in prison in Hanoi. 
Imagine Sybil's shock and disbelief when she opened the letter and read the following
statement in the opening paragraph: "Congratulations, you have been selected for deep
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draft command." The letter convinced her, "if nothing else did, that it was hopeless not 
to just go to the top."
When Sybil and others such as Karen Butler began contacting high-ranking 
government officials, they took note of the fact that, among the governmental officials 
they were dealing with, Karen said, "there were factions that wanted to know what the
119In the A B C  television  series The A dven tures o f  O zzie  an d  H arrie t ( 1952-1966), Harriet N elson  
played the character o f  a charming w ife  w ho adored and supported her husband w hile serving the fam ily  
w ith absq^te devotion.
D eep dra ft com m and  is a professional selection to command a large am phibious ship, w hich  is 
a prerequisite to com m anding an aircraft carrier.
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other was saying." This quest for inside information led Commander Boroughs to ask 
Sybil and Karen to secretly tape a meeting with Nixon administration and Department of 
Defense officials. The meeting occurred in May 1969 at Naval Air Station Miramar in 
San Diego, California, during one of the Washington Road Shows. Both were amused by 
their stints as sleuths; today they giggle and guffaw as they recount hiding listening 
devices in their girdles. But both also were seriously troubled— and, interestingly, 
continue to be seriously troubled— by the governmental infighting and failure to 
communicate that the request to "wear a wire" represented. Sybil recalled the primary 
Washington DC personalities in attendance were Richard Capen, Charlie Havens, and 
Frank Sieverts.
Sybil and Karen were set up with the microphone attached to their bra and a wire 
running down to the recording box at the top of their girdles and then to an on-off switch 
near their knee. All this paraphernalia was obscured by modest dress.
Sybil noted that the tapes they were “wearing” lasted no more than thirty minutes. 
Sybil told me that, after nearly an hour in the meeting, she raised her hand and said, "You 
know, we ladies have to have a restroom break." At that point, Sybil and Karen, as Sybil 
recalled, "whipped into the stalls" to turn the tapes over and return to the meeting.
Karen told me she thought the whole event was "hysterical." Laughing she said, "I 
remember being very cognizant of keeping my arm kind of protecting my body where the 
little box was so that somebody didn’t bump into me and wonder why [I] had this metal 
box under [my] dress."
In fact, both women were amused by their stint as sleuths; today they giggle and 
guffaw as they recount hiding listening devices in their girdles. But both also were
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seriously troubled— and, interestingly, continue to be seriously troubled— by the 
governmental infighting they observed and government officials’ apparent failure of to 
understand—much less be troubled—by what their request for the women to "wear a 
wire" represented.
Both Karen and Sybil never felt they were given any classified or secret 
information. Karen summed it up her view of the so-called Washington Road Shows— 
and also the views of the other women I interviewed—as follows: "I never felt like there 
was significant information anyway. I never felt we really learned anything from 
anybody—it was more of a political reason of paying attention to us than really being 
information." Clearly, the government’s “procedural display” approach to 
communication was a catalyst for the women’s growing activism.
An international incident— and the events that transpired on the home front in its 
wake— also served as a catalyst for action. On January 23, 1968, North Korea seized the 
USS PUEBLO in what the United States said was international waters. The North 
Koreans disputed this claim and charged that the ship was engaged in ongoing spy 
activities. Along with the ship, eighty-two crewmembers were taken prisoner.
Rose Bucher, the wife of the Commanding Officer of the USS PUEBLO, did 
something immediately after the capture o f the ship, that the wives o f POWs and MIAs in 
North Vietnam had not done: She went public, criticized the United States government, 
and gathered public support for the captives' release. As Bonnie Singleton—who in the 
words of Sybil Stockdale was developing into a "real fire burner"— recalled, "My 
husband's plane had been down for three years when the Pueblo was taken captive, and 
within six months [actually eleven], the whole Pueblo crew was returned. So, I thought, if
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I've been cooperative for all these years and stayed quiet and done what people said and 
kept all my questions to m yself. . . then maybe what she did was okay."
Bonnie Singleton was not the only POW wife who took note o f what Joyce 
Bucher did and the eventual outcome o f the USS PUEBLO incident. Among the informal 
POW and MIA wives groups scattered across the nation, Bucher's actions sparked a great 
deal o f discussion and soul searching about keeping quiet and the wisdom of supporting 
the government's Quiet Diplomacy strategy.
Finally, the sheer amount of time and the perception that nothing was really 
happening was a significant factor in transforming the wives into political activists.
Wives like Shirley Stark and Phyllis Galanti, for example, were incredibly frustrated by 
the debate at the Paris Peace Talks about the shape o f the negotiation table. Decade's 
later, frustration continued to be evident. During my interview with her, Shirley Stark 
quipped, "I came so close to sending our dining room table . . .  to Paris."
Other wives experienced similar sorts of frustration as months turned into years 
and their husbands were not home by Christmas as government officials had glibly 
promised. Sometimes privately and sometimes during discussion with the other wives or 
with trusted friends, the women began to arrive at a position that Phyllis Galanti 
articulated during my interview with her. She told me, "I think, for most of us, all of us 
military wives, the main frustration is that, if  we were going to stay in this war, by-golly, 
do something to win it or end it; it just seemed to be going on forever. I mean the peace 
talks talking about the size and shape of the table for a couple of years. Bombing 
pauses— all those things were really awful for our morale."
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Thus, a variety of incidents and events, some that played out on the international 
and national stage, and some that were relatively inconsequential (except, o f course, to 
the women experienced them), caused a growing number of wives to rethink very basic 
assumptions about the wisdom of their government and their own place in the scheme of 
things. However, although their numbers were growing, the group was still, most 
certainly, a minority even among those who qualified for membership in "the reluctant 
sorority." After all, none of the potential wives or family members had been socialized to 
enter the political arena, and, consequently, an extensive transformation process was 
required as a precursor to political activity on the part of the wives and families.
Socialization and social roles also were a factor for those who had begun to make 
the transformation. Sybil Stockdale and others, in fact, years later spoke of the significant 
challenge posed by the need to overcome the "male-female thing—the male thing— in 
Washington." This Washington DC attitude, as Sybil characterized it, assumed that 
females were members of the weaker sex that needed bureaucracies to "take care o f you." 
To overcome the attitudes in Washington, the wives realized that they needed to end-run 
government officials. This meant taking their case directly to the American public. This 
task, however, turned out to be a bit more daunting than the wives originally realized.
The American Public
"I felt like I had been dropped into the middle of another time."
Karen Butler
It was disconcerting to the wives, who were moving toward greater activism 
during the period from 1968 to 1969, to discover that the American public knew very 
little about the POWs and MIAs in North Vietnam. Partly because o f the public’s
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ignorance, the wives became more vocal and began talking to civic groups. Sandy 
Dennison, for instance, recalled that she and others spoke at the Elk's and Lion's Clubs 
and that, afterwards, men would to come up and say, "We didn't even realize that there 
were prisoners over there." Sandy's bewilderment was captured in her own response, 
which she recounted to me decades later: "I thought, 'My God don't you read the 
newspaper or whatever?"'
Karen Butler, who also began speaking to the same sorts of groups at about the 
same time, expressed a similar sentiment: "They didn't even know about Vietnam or 
didn't know there were POWs!" She added: "We had loved ones that were sitting over 
there in a prisoner camp for a long time already and people were totally oblivious to the 
fact that anything was really happening." She was astounded that educated people could 
function without basic knowledge o f world events: "That was just incredible! It was 
mind-boggling!" she said. Then, in almost a prophetic voice, she crystallized what many 
o f the wives also yearned to proclaim publicly: "People, it's important what's going on 
and what we're doing and the decisions that are being made."
Marie Estocin had similar experiences to the ones that Sandy Dennison and Karen 
Butler had had, and these experiences galvanized her commitment to make the "public 
more aware of what was going on." When cashing a check at a local bank in San Diego, 
California, a very large and significant Navy town, she was required to place her 
husband's duty station on the check. Accordingly, she wrote, "POW." Marie recalled,
"The lady at the bank would look at me and say, 'What's a POW?"' Straightforwardly 
Marie said, "POW is a Prisoner of War!" The teller responded with, "A prisoner o f war of 
what?" To Marie, this sort of response—which happened more than once— "seemed like
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'John Doe' wasn't involved." This lack o f involvement frustrated her even more because 
the wives had been increasing their efforts to speak out and elevate public awareness of 
the POW and MIA issues.
Variations of Marie's story were told by the other POW and MIA wives whenever 
they gathered, and they repeated the stories to me when I interviewed them decades later. 
Mary Winn, for example, indicated that she, too, recognized that, in the early stages of 
the war, "People didn't even realize that we had prisoners of war in Southeast Asia." She 
heard comments like: "Prisoners?" "What prisoners?" "You mean Stillwater?" (Stillwater 
was a state prison in the area where Mary Winn lived at the time.) Mary told me that 
when she got this response she would frankly inform them, "Southeast Asia! They are 
held in Hanoi or camps in South Vietnam."
Mary also indicated that, at times, the public responses she encountered appeared 
to be fueled by something more than ignorance of the war and the POW and MIA issue. 
Mary recalled that, while collecting signatures at a bank to protest violations of the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, a man asked her, 
"What's a nice looking woman like you doing out here with this?" She said, "Well, my 
husband is a prisoner of war." Drawing back, he said, "Your husband deserves what he 
got!" Sherry Martin also recalled war protestors who, on learning about the wives' 
husband in Hanoi, would respond cruelly by saying to the wives, "What in the world 
would we want them back for?"
Even groups that the women had reason to believe would be their allies were not 
always supportive in the early years. Sybil Stockdale recalled, that in the early days, "The 
National Navy League [a civilian organization dedicated to the education of Americans
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and elected officials on Navy-Marine Corps issues and concerns] refused to pass a 
resolution supporting humane treatment for the Prisoners of War in 1967-68." Sybil 
explained this lack of support by noting that the POW and MIA issue "was not yet public 
. . . There was no bandwagon."
Sherry Martin provided a less charitable interpretation of the situation. She stated, 
"America just didn't want to hear about" the POW and MIA issue. Rather, from Sherry's 
perspective, at least, Americans "were hoping the whole thing would go away without 
them having do a single thing."
Thus, the wives interpreted—and continue to interpret—the public's responses to 
their initial forays into the public arena somewhat differently. Despite their somewhat 
different interpretations, however, all agreed that the ignorance, indifference, and, at 
times, outright hostility they all had encountered represented a barrier every bit as large 
as the barriers they had encountered when dealing with Washington bureaucrats. The 
seemingly insurmountable barriers they faced, however, did not cause the women to 
retreat. Rather, they continued to wage their war to bring the POW and MIA issue into 
the political arena on two fronts: They continued to meet with and lobby government 
officials; they also continued their efforts to educate the public about the issue.
The latter campaign, as Alice Stratton would note decades later, "target[ed] the 
heartstrings o f the American people." This sort of targeting meant that the wives 
conducted "many campaigns to get people involved in human-interest things," according 
to Alice. Eventually, as Alice Stratton later recalled, the POW and MIA issue "touched 
them and they responded." Alice speculated that the eventual success o f their campaigns 
was due to "people feeling the unfairness o f their [the prisoners’; mistreatment.” Then
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she quickly articulated another hypothesis: “Maybe it is because we just kept the 
publicity up and hammering away and caught the attention." Alice also emphasized a 
point that is in no way ambiguous: "We sure didn't give up once we started.. .  . They 
couldn't get rid of us."
Not surprisingly, the informal group's success with the public also gave them 
clout with politicians and government officials. In addition, the activities had an 
additional, largely unanticipated benefit: It brought the increasingly activists wives and 
families together through various informal networks, networks that also recruited new 
activists to the movement. These informal networks also served as the foundation for the 
more formal organization that would soon be created..
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"If I had to lose my husband, and he had to be shot down, 
then I was fortunate in meeting these women 
because we just grew up together—we really did."
Sandy Dennison
Establishing Support, Networking, and Developing an Agenda 
"Everybody was so relieved to be talking 
to someone else in the same circumstance."
Sybil Stockdale
After more than three decades, the women's voices still conveyed the sense of 
isolation and frustrations that they felt after learning their husbands were either a POW or 
MIA. The Keep Quiet policy had prompted uncertainty and isolation. They followed 
government official's directives, at first, and kept quiet because they were told that doing 
otherwise would bring suffering and hardship on their husbands.
None of this was easy. Jenny Connell Robertson, for instance, said to me that, 
after being told her husband was a POW, she felt "terribly isolated . . . extremely 
isolated." Sandy Dennison remembered the "high level of frustration" that accompanied 
the rules and policies the wives had to follow. Marie Estocin said the lack o f information 
and the inability to obtain answers to questions made the wives "totally frustrated . . . 
[There was] lots of frustration."
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Marie also told me about a small group of wives who began to reach out to each 
other in modest and tentative ways. The wives "were glued to the TV," she said, "calling 
each other because they were showing things on TV all the time." For the wives, any 
television clip that mentioned POW and MIA matters sparked discussion.
Slowly, sometimes haltingly, some of the women began to find each other; they 
gathered informally, at first, and provided each other tremendous personal support. The 
informal group also provided an opportunity to voice concerns and raise questions about 
the government's directives and policies, especially the government's Quiet Diplomacy 
approach to dealing with the POW and MIA issue. Soon the wives had renamed the Quiet 
Diplomacy approach “the Keep Quiet policy.”
Over time, however, the women became increasingly less quiet and the concerns 
that they initially voiced to each other were translated into action. Their actions were 
modest, at first, but, in due course, the wives' voiced concerns became a full-fledged 
action agenda.
The incremental steps the wives took had three distinct organizational analogs. 
First, the informal group became the League of Wives o f American Vietnam Prisoners of 
War (October 1967) which was still primarily an informal organization established to 
facilitate networking and the sharing of information and support among the wives.
Second, the League of Wives, out of necessity, became the National League of Families 
of American Prisoners in Southeast Asia (June 20, 1969). And third, the organization 
underwent a name change when the League incorporated in Washington DC to National 
League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (June 30,
1970). This section tells the group's organizational transformation story.
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A Support Group Forms
Eventually, the wives discussions led to the formation of an informal group of 
POW and MIA wives in San Diego and Lemoore, California, who began to meet on a 
regular basis. When searching through Sybil Stockdale's personal archival files, in fact, I 
came across a piece a paper with the following written on it: "First Wives Meeting, 
October 6,1966." In discussing this date with Sybil, it became clear that this October 
meeting was the first intentional gathering of a group of wives to discuss their situation. 
Sybil had learned from Patsy Crayton (another POW wife) that there was growing 
frustration about the government's Quiet Diplomacy policy, along with the desire for a 
more formal gathering of the wives to share information and discuss what was being 
disseminated from the government. Sybil had invited the group for lunch and, as she later 
recalled: "Everybody was so relieved to be talking to someone else in the same 
circumstance."
What was supposed to be a noon luncheon, lasting a couple o f hours, went until 
after five in the evening. Sybil told me, "We just couldn't part." In a letter dated February 
12, 1967, to Rene, a new POW wife in another location of the country, Sybil wrote the 
following about the wives group:
There are fourteen of us now here in this area and we get together about every 
three weeks for an exchange of information and social respite from family 
responsibilities. Among us we have about 30 children. Our next meeting will be a 
baby shower for a girl whose husband was shot down in November and who 
expects her fifth child in early March. The age span among the wives here goes 
from 42 (guess who she is) to 22 but the bond is close and overrides all the
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chronological differences. I was the only one here in my circumstance for several 
months and then was joined by two others . .  . one with four children and one with 
none who has a very responsible position with an Investment Company in San 
Diego. By September our number had risen to 10 and the girls asked me if I 
would plan a time for all who were interested to get together. Our first meeting 
was a luncheon here at my house and I must say that one had the feeling that a 
dam had burst as the questions and conversation tumbled one upon the other in a 
veritable race of communication. All stayed longer than she had intended and was 
reluctant to leave this newly found oasis o f comfort and understanding from 
others who were almost literally "in the same boat." It certainly was not a morbid 
affair and I doubt that an unsuspecting caller would have guessed for a moment
the purpose o f our gathering. Only the hope and plan for another gathering soon
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finally allowed us to dissemble.
Ongoing Support
After this first meeting, as Sybil Stockdale told me, the women "agreed that [they] 
would meet on a regular basis— as regular as squadron wives would always meet every 
month." This decision is hardly surprising. After all, as Sherry Martin told me, many of 
the wives "were already friends" when their husbands became prisoners or were 
classified as missing in action. In fact, the women who gathered in Sybil Stockdale's 
home on October 6, 1966, all lived on or near the military base and were part of a 
relatively closed and highly structured military community. Within this community, as 
Sybil comments suggest, wives' groups meetings a were well-established standard
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operating procedure. Thus, it was natural and relatively easy for these women to turn to 
each other for assistance and support. Sherry noted, for example, that she "felt more 
comfortable talking about fears . . . anxiety, worry . . . with someone that has the same 
problem." She recalled that among the women "there was a com radely.. . . We could say 
anything to each other and we'd understand even if you went off and screamed in the 
bushes somewhere. We understood!"
Jenny Connell Robertson said much the same thing. She noted that it was often 
difficult "to be with other people because they didn't understand what you were going 
through." By contrast, there was a "comfort zone just being with POW wives. . . . We 
became more like family."
This sentiment was also echoed in Sybil Stockdale's February 12, 1967, to Rene,
cited above. She wrote: "Our meetings are not unlike the usual social times which wives
have when their husbands are away. Most of them are held in each other's home as we
. 1 2 2
feel a great need for privacy to freely discuss the problems which beset us all."
Family imagery was used frequently as the women attempted to characterize their 
coming together in the early years after their husbands were shot down. Karen Butler, for 
instance, recalled: "Maybe it was the traumatic aspect of it but I think it takes something 
fairly extraordinary to create the kind of bonding that occurred. We raised our children 
together in a man-less world. We did the holidays. It was a very strong, obviously female 
dominated, but I think it did provide extended family stability. It reached out to people 
and brought them together and helped them not to feel alone or like a freak if they were 
in an area that wasn't military—that nobody else in the town that was in that situation."
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Support fo r  Those Who Lived Outside o f  San Diego
Not all military wives lived near a military installation and had a ready-made 
support group, because of their location, of course. Phyllis Galanti, for example, had to 
travel to be part of a group of women who shared her experience, but she indicated that 
she was willing to do this, despite the inconvenience. She told me: "When there's nobody 
else around who knows what you're going through, and you find somebody that you can 
converse with, it really helps."
Other women actually migrated to cities with large military bases where there was 
a concentration of POW and MIA wives. And even women who were already associated 
with a large military installation occasionally became part of the migration movement.
For instance, a number of wives continued to live in base housing at Lemoore, California, 
for a time after their husbands had been shot down. However, the black military car 
entering the neighborhood to deliver unpleasant news to another wife was a painful 
reminder of their own black-car experience. After seeing the car drive down the street to 
another home too many times, some of the women decided to relocate to off-base 
housing in San Diego, California, where others had relocated.
The choice of San Diego was intentional. The Navy grapevine told o f a vibrant 
and vital group of POW and MIA wives operating in San Diego. Today, we might call 
the group that had formed a "support group." Sandy Dennison, for instance, said the 
following about how the informal group functioned: "When one of you is down the other 
can be up and you just pick each other up. . . .  I can’t tell you how many times we took 
care o f each other's kids when one of them had to go to the hospital." And, in a light-
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hearted voice that brimmed with laughter, Marie Estocin acknowledged: "It was a 
definite support group, but we didn't even know we were a support group at that time."
Similar groups formed in other cites, as well. Alice Stratton, for instance, told me 
that she and a group of wives in the San Francisco Bay area first met as a "social group" 
between 1967 and 1968. The social group was replaced by a support group, however, 
after a photograph o f Alice's husband appeared in Life magazine in the infamous "bowing 
photograph" in which Alice's husband was pictured deferring to his North Vietnamese 
captors while in what looked like a near comatose state. Because o f the international 
exposure of the photograph, the Navy permitted Alice to conduct "one interview" with 
the media. The interview and subsequent story appeared in several local and national 
newspapers along with her photograph. The result, she said, was that "other POW and 
MIA wives in the area called me up and . . .  we started to get together" on a regular basis. 
Women also began to "get together" in places like Virginia Beach, Virginia, Dallas, 
Texas, and Jacksonville, Florida, where there also were large concentrations of POW and 
MIA wives.
Chloe Moore talked about the twenty or more wives who lived on base at Naval 
Air Station Lemoore in Northern California. A number of wives stayed on base housing 
and as Chloe said there was an outpouring of support from other families, which she felt, 
had the attitude of "there by the grace o f God go I." Chloe told me that during the 
holidays squadron personnel were very helpful if decorations needed put up or taken 
down. She said she never felt she was "being avoided or shrugged off because you were 
the one that had a husband that was gone."
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Adapting to the Challenge 
Not all POW and MIA wives lived in places where there were concentrations of 
POW and MIA wives, and most of these "outliers" were unable or unwilling to relocate 
to places that had women in similar situations. There was a concerted effort, however, to 
make these outliers a part o f the network that was beginning to form. Some wives I 
interviewed, for instance, spoke of a resolute commitment to locate and communicate 
with other wives in remote geographical locations who were away from military 
installations. In spite of the official governmental directive to refrain from contacting 
other wives, the women made attempts to locate others via squadron "grapevines." In 
fact, each wife that I interviewed mentioned her ability to obtain names of other POW 
and MIA wives through this unofficial method.
The wives obtained names and made contact, as Sherry Martin told me, "to tell 
the other wives that were sitting in Kansas, Iowa, and other places . .  . that there is 
somebody out there who cares, who is in the same situation, and trying to get as much 
information." Many of the wives I interviewed indicated that they wanted no one to be 
left out; some, however, told me that they had encountered a number o f wives who 
wanted to remain alone and detached from the group, which was respected.
From Support Group to Limited Political Activism
A possible motive that these wives may have had for remaining detached was that 
the San Diego group was morphing from a support group into a group of political 
activists. Talk of politics and the venting of frustration with government officials and the 
government's keep quite policy, o f course, had always been part o f group meetings.
Indeed, some political talk even had occurred in the San Diego group’s first 
official meeting in October 1966. The wives I interviewed who attended the first session
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in San Diego, California, in fact, all agreed that the meeting not only provided personal 
support but also the need to communicate with government officials and begin asking 
them for information. Yet, in the early days, the women felt quite powerless. Decades 
later, Shirley Stark would characterize the group’s thinking early on as follows: "Think 
about it? Coronado? This little place? What could we do here?"
Over the next several months, however, the women began to inch toward 
activism. Sherry Martin, for instance, spoke to me about how she, Sybil Stockdale and 
Shirley Stark, as early as 1967, would meet at Sybil's house nearly everyday to write 
letters, file correspondence, and talk. Even at this early stage, Sherry recalled that Sybil 
had begun to question comments made by Senators and was now teaching others to not 
only question the comments but hold officials accountable for such statements by writing 
letters to them. While reflecting back on these early days, Sherry Martin remembered that 
they "worked around [Sybil's] dining room table." O f Sybil, herself, Sherry stated, "She 
was really the instigator— a fantastic person."
Sybil's home was not the only San Diego area home where meetings were held. 
Marie Estocin, for instance, talked about meetings at Jenny Connell Robertson's home 
with Sybil Stockdale, Karen Butler, Jenny, and herself. Marie told me that they "would 
get together and say, 'What do we do?"' From their discussions, Marie said, that they 
"decided that writing letters was the first step." Clearly, this activity o f airing their 
thoughts and writing letters became a precursor to the future, more formally organized 
campaign to hold elected officials accountable for public statements and to "pressure" the 
government to address the POW and MIA issue.
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Adapting to the Challenge
Networking Across the Nation
The women's letter-writing campaigns mention above, however, was not only 
directed at public officials but internal to the group as well. Sherry Marin recalled that the 
wives' had another goal, which was "to keep [other wives and family members] abreast of 
what [they] were doing and what was going on." And Sybil Stockdale, with humor and 
unmistakable emphasis, proclaimed: "There is no communication system like a bunch of 
Navy wives!"
Thus, in their working sessions, in fact, Sybil Stockdale, Sherry Martin, and 
Shirley Stark— all from Coronado, California—developed contact files on other wives 
and family members of POWs and MIAs throughout the country. These files also proved 
useful in establishing the formal organization that eventually developed, as did the 
informal network that had begun to develop and informally coordinate activities. Alice 
Stratton of San Francisco Bay Area, who had become the communication conduit in 
Northern California, remembered Sybil Stockdale contacting her and telling her the San 
Diego group was "wanting to do something" beyond the support-group type meeting. 
Alice, who became the Northern California coordinator, was also working closely with 
two other wives MaeRose Evans and Julie Butler, remembered that the Bay Area groups 
of wives "were really ready to say, 'Yes!'" to this suggestion.
Sybil and her San Diego crew were not always the ones to initiate contact with 
those who became key players in the more formal organization that would eventually 
develop, however. Marty Halyburton, who was not living near a major military 
installation, was given Sybil Stockdale's telephone number by a Navy official after her 
husband's status had changed from KIA to POW. In February 1967, Marty contacted
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Sybil and, at Sybil's encouragement, she, too, "began writing letters to those heads of 
state who maintained diplomatic relations with North Vietnam." Marty recalled that for 
the wives and families this letter writing campaign "was one o f the early efforts" to get 
the attention of international leaders on the POW and MIA matter.
Mary Winn was another wife who initiated contact with Sybil and the San Diego 
group. Mary's husband was an Air Force, rather than a Navy, pilot. When he was shot 
down, she also was given Sybil Stockdale's name as a primary point of contact on POW 
and MIA matters. She remembered Sybil being characterized as "a woman in California 
knows a lot about this."
By April 1969 Mary had "tracked down this woman in California and telephoned 
her" and discovered that "she did know a lot about" the POW and MIA issues. A few 
months later, in August 1969 Mary Winn visited Sybil Stockdale at Summer Island in 
Branford, Connecticut. Sybil met Mary at the train station and they ended up sitting in 
Sybil’s car where they talked for hours about POW and MIA matters. From these 
conversations, Mary learned Sybil was a seasoned veteran in the POW and MIA wives 
circuit and had an incredible amount o f experience and knowledge about dealing with 
officials in Washington DC.
Summary
Thus, what began primarily as a support group and a forum to vent frustration and 
complain about government policy and government officials, slowly morphed into a 
political movement. To be sure, the morphing process was an incremental one. The first 
steps were relatively tentative: writing letters and visiting government and military 
officials. Eventually, however, the women would become more assertive and would
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construct a formal organization out o f their informal networks. It was this core group, as 
Jenny Connell Robertson recalled, "that developed into the League of Families." The 
League of Families, in turn, successfully challenged a diplomatic policy at the highest 
levels of government. Before all of this could happen, however, the wives had to learn to 
how to play a game they had never been taught growing up in the 1950s: the rough and 
tumble game of politics.
Maintaining Appropriate Behavior with Governmental Officials 
"Be a lady and be yourself."
Mrs. Bailey, Mother of Sybil Stockdale 
The wives consciously thought about how they should behave when dealing with 
government officials. No wife I interviewed recalled receiving advice on proper personal 
conduct when conducting business within governmental power structures, however. What 
Sybil Stockdale continued to bear in mind were the words o f her mother, "Be a lady, and 
be yourself." Given the situations, she told me, it "was hard sometimes to do both at the 
same time." She knew she had to try however. She said: "I instinctively knew that we had 
to do it [interact with policymakers] in a dignified way. If  we didn't, we weren't going to 
get anywhere because they'd write us o ff  as a bunch o f  hysterical women. So I knew we 
had to be dignified about it."
This need to conduct herself in a dignified manner became an early entry into the 
diary Sybil started on September 11, 1965, two days after her husband was shot down.
On Friday, September 17, she wrote, "I am in a rage of belligerence today. Why in hell
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can't those slobs tell me whatever Stan Turner hinted he knew." Then she added the 
following comment:
The hell of it is I can't rage and scream as I would like to do because (1) It would 
work to my disadvantage as I would then be treated as an unstable neurotic (2)
My observers would rejoice in announcing I am "cracking" at last— Thank heaven 
for [omitted] and [omitted] where I can pour out all my inner rage and know my
124
confidence will be honoured [sz'c].
Despite the emphasis on remaining dignified, emotion was occasionally 
employed. The use of emotion, however, was always calculated. Mary Winn, for 
instance, told me: "Almost anything was fair, but we tried to be dignified—not 
hysterical—except if  it seemed to serve a useful purpose. It was very controlled." She 
added: "The hysteria would have been very calculated because this was too serious."
One aspect o f controlling emotions was controlling the content of public 
comments. Alice Stratton told me there was a standing policy developed by the emerging 
leadership group that governed the wives and family members personal conduct: They 
would not "deviate off into criticism of the government." Alice told me, "Sybil beat [this 
idea] into our heads and [the idea also was] what MaeRose Evans, a POW wife in San 
Francisco Bay area, talked to our group about."
The decision to control emotions and refrain from criticizing the government in 
public comments proved to be significant in gaining access to the highest levels of 
government. After President Nixon's inauguration in January 1969 Sybil Stockdale wrote
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Admiral Stansfield Turner, a N aval A cadem y classm ate o f  Sybil Stockdale's husband, held  
several prominent naval com m and positions during his career and served as President o f  the N aval War 
C ollege, Newport, Rhode Island, 1972 to 1974. From 1977 to 1981 he w as the D irector o f  the Central 
Intelligence A gency (C IA ) during the Carter administration.
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a letter in which she requested an appointment to speak with President Nixon about POW 
and MIA matters. In staffing the request, Colonel James D. Hughes, Armed Forces Aide 
to the President, wrote to John D. Erlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Affairs, and commented on Sybil's "favorable character reference" from both Admiral 
Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, and Mr. Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant 
for POW matters in the Department o f State. Colonel Hughes also noted the following:
125
"She has been described as an intelligent, stable and articulate woman."
Later the issue o f emotional stability reappeared among White House staff when 
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, sent a memorandum to President Nixon, in which he 
recommended to the President that a select group of POW and MIA wives and family 
members meet with him in the White House. Melvin Laird's memorandum initiated a 
flurry o f discussion among the White House staff that reviewed Laird's recommendation 
and added their comments via official internal memorandum. In a memorandum drafted 
for Stephen Bull, Special Assistant to the President and Appointments Secretary, Colonel 
Hughes endorsed Laird's recommendation but added an important caveat: "I would not 
disagree with this provided that they were very carefully screened for emotional stability 
and judgment."'26
The meeting with President Nixon did eventually happen after nearly a year of 
discussion within the administration staff. In the time between Sybil's initial requests for 
a meeting with President Nixon in January 1969 until the meeting actually occurred in
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December 1969 the women attempted to keep the POW and MIA issue alive by making 
many personal calls on a variety of government officials in Washington DC.
Influencing the Governmental Power Structures 
"We came to know quickly that the men were not very high on Washington's list of 
priorities and it was up to us to make them seem very important."
Mary Winn 
Personal Contact Becomes an Imperative
While discussing the various attempts to persuade elected and appointed officials 
to recognize their concerns about the status o f the husbands, Sybil Stockdale articulated 
one of three "imperatives" that she had embraced during the wives' group's 
transformation from a support group to a potent political force. Two of these imperatives 
related to the establishment of rules and standard operating procedures o f the formal 
organization that eventually would be established; these imperatives will be discussed in 
a later section o f this historical account. The implementation o f the third imperative, 
which related to contact with public officials, predated the establishment of the formal 
organization. Sybil characterized this third imperative as follows: "Nothing takes the 
place of a personal visit. Nothing! Nothing can be as strong as a personal visit. If you can, 
get in and see them face-to-face then that's . . . the goal. You've got to talk to them face to 
face; until you do that you're not going to get anywhere. You're another layer . . . you're a 
bother to them."
In fact, one of the ongoing activities of the wives was contacting officials in the 
Departments o f State, Department of Defense, and members of Congress. One of the 
Congressmen the group contacted was the Honorable Melvin Laird (R-WI). The personal
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visits or letters written to his office paid dividends later on when Melvin Laird became 
President Nixon's Secretary of Defense. There will be more on this later.
Marie Estocin recalled: "We were just putting out a plea hoping that someone 
would start listening to us." Marie also echoed a common theme o f the wives; they 
expected government officials "to be truthful. . . .  to be honest. . . .  to get information.. .  . 
to let us know what was happening. . . .  to start making the general public more aware of 
what was going on."
Coming, Ready or Not
The women were not always given a warm welcome in the corridors of power, 
especially early on. Sandy Dennison put all of this in context: "What government official 
would want to see this wife who hasn't heard from her husband in four or five years 
descending on his or her office?" she asked rhetorically. She added that, despite the 
apparent discomfort, no governmental office would "treat us like a nonentity."
The women who traveled to Washington DC each had stories about the officials 
they met. Mary Winn's experience demonstrates the varied response between two 
nationally known political figures. She recalled, "Eugene McCarthy (D-MN) was 
invariably courteous and kind. He never failed to see me when I appeared at his office, 
whether or not I had an appointment. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) had a different 
approach, he would call me unexpectedly, out o f the blue, to ask how we were doing, and 
[ask] could he be of any help. His talks seemed more generally political than specifically 
related to the plight of our men."
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Another Reason fo r  Contact
Some wives such as Sherry Martin wrote letters, sent telegrams, or made phone 
calls, in part, to vent frustrations. Sherry, for instance, sent a telegram to the Secretary of 
the Navy stating her irritation with the way the government was handling a number of 
POW and MIA issues. The governmental response to this telegram was similar to 
responses received by the other wives. Sherry indicated she received "a very proforma 
type of letter." From her perspective, the response letter read as though the government 
official could now "put a check in that box" about communication with POW and MIA 
wives. Despite this proforma response, however, Sherry indicated she was glad she wrote 
this and similar sorts of letters that got similar responses. The communication with 
governmental officials, via telegrams or letters, was a way to vent, "It got it out of my 
system," she told me.
A Shift in Opinion
During my interview with him, Richard Capen noted, with considerable pride, 
that attitudes on the POW and MIA issue on Capital Hill were beginning to change in the 
early 1970s. As with any social change, there were undoubtedly a number of reasons for 
this shift, but, certainly, the continual contact by the POW and MIA wives would have to 
be among the reasons that, in Capen’s words, the POW and MIA issue, "became popular . 
. . the thing to do."
Congressional change in attitude was evident when Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) 
arranged a tribute to POWs in Constitutional Hall on May 1, 1970. The tribute was 
entitled: "Day of Appeal for International Justice for all American Prisoners of War and 
Servicemen Missing in Action in South East Asia." The tribute was designed to focus
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attention on POW and MIA matters and the detrimental influence o f the husbands' 
imprisonment on their families. Seven days before the event, on April 23, 1970, Congress 
passed a Joint Resolution concerning POWs. Though this action had little real 
consequence and, therefore, could be seen as perfunctory, the act did demonstrate that 
Congress had, at least, become aware of the plight of the POWs and the families o f the 
MIAs. The women considered this newfound awareness at least a modest victory.
What the wives were not aware of, however, was the "intense pressure" for the 
President or Vice President to attend the ceremony and officially greet the assembled
127group. In the end, neither the President nor the Vice President attended the Tribute.
The decision not to attend suggests that, at the highest level o f government, even 
an action that had little more than symbolic significance was believed to have high costs 
or high risks attached to it. Clearly, the wives had more work to do. Part of that work 
turned out to be the establishment and incorporation of a formal national organization, 
The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Action in 
Southeast Asia.
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"The idea was to involve everyone emotionally so that they would put the whammy on 
the government to keep pressure on the North Vietnamese government, 
but also on our own government. We didn't say 'our own government' that was all kind of 
under the table and quiet. But boy it was there . . . very much so."
Sybil Stockdale
The League o f  Wives o f  American Vietnam Prisoners o f  War becomes, The National 
League o f  Families o f  American Prisoners in Southeast Asia, which becomes, The 
National League o f  Families o f  American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia 
"It is my personal opinion that they were particularly effective 
in being sure that the executive branch's attention remained fixed 
on the matter of their concern."
A1 Haig, Jr.
Shirley Stark told me that the wives were "chipping away . . .  a little bit here and 
there" in terms of getting the government and the American public to attend to the POW 
and MIA issue. She also indicated, however, that progress was slow until the National 
League of Families of American Prisoners in Southeast Asia was formed in June 1969. 
(On June 30, 1970, the name was officially registered as the National League o f Families 
of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.)
The story of the formation of the national organization is a story an incremental 
evolution and improvisation. Decades later, in fact, Sybil Stockdale declared: "The whole 
thing was improvisation." Sybil, noted, however, that, throughout all the improvising,
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there "was the commitment," that "was so personal that that is the difference.. .  . It just 
wasn't some issue you wanted to accomplish. It was life and death. And, so you were 
willing to spend your money and do things that you wouldn't do normally."
The need for improvisation should be obvious from the contextual information 
that has already been presented. Phyllis Galanti summarized this contextual information 
as follows: She noted that the wives, via the National League, "became pretty powerful." 
She also noted, however, that the women's acquisition of power "was slow. . . . We were 
neophytes," she told me. She also said as a group: "We didn't have any training." Phyllis, 
in fact, characterized the wives' formation of the National League as "a step into 
unknown territory."
Karen Butler told a similar story about the League's formation, albeit from a 
somewhat different perspective. Karen had participated in the informal wives' group that 
preceded the establishment o f the National League, but, as she told me, she "never stayed 
intimately involved where it was my whole life." For a few years, Karen represented and 
spoke for the League o f Wives and National League at the local level in San Diego. But, 
her involvement slowed down even more when she "made the decision that [she] needed 
to finish school and move forward in [her] life."
Despite the change in her level of involvement, however, Karen, told a similar 
story about the League's formation: "They were kind of learning as they were going [at 
first]. . .  The system [the wives had set up to communicate with government officials and 
each other] was not very well organized." She even wondered, somewhat humorously, 
whether "they had their act together" in the early years.
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These early years, however, provided invaluable learning opportunities and set the 
stage for the more organized effort that was to follow. Gradually, sometimes haltingly, 
the group of wives that gathered around Sybil Stockdale's table in Coronado or some 
other home and began to reach out to other groups and individuals around the country. 
They also began to understand that their piecemeal approach that involved individuals 
contacting government officials either through correspondence or in person was having a 
limited impact. As noted before, but what seemed to materialize again in interviews, was 
Jenny Connell Robertson's recollection that the frustration and anger generated by the so- 
called Washington Road Show became an impetus for the women to realize that there 
was a need "to be more form al.. . .  We thought we needed to be a little more organized" 
to deal with governmental officials, Jenny said.
Karen Butler spoke about the idea for the formal organization and a greater level 
of wives activism was born around Sybil Stockdale's dining room table when the group 
was still relatively small and informal. Sybil, herself, described to me the founding o f the 
League of Wives o f American Vietnam Prisoners o f War in 1967:
We wanted somebody from Washington to come to San Diego and tell us what 
was going on. We couldn't get anybody to come. We had been writing letters 
individually. Then we decided we would organize. I didn't know anything about 
the way you're supposed to organize a group. I looked the word ‘league’ up in the 
dictionary—that seemed to fit. We gave ourselves the League of Wives of 
American Vietnam Prisoners of War. We didn't say, "Missing in Action" because 
if  they were missing they were either dead or prisoners o f war. We rented a 
mailbox. We had stationary printed up and we elected officers. We instructed our
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secretary to send a letter to Washington asking somebody from the Department o f 
State to come and talk to us.
Sybil added: "In three weeks, Harriman's assistant was out here and talked to us. That, of 
course, showed us what organization would do. They responded when we asked them as 
a League to come. They didn't respond at all when we were individuals."
The lesson about the importance o f having a formal organization was reinforced 
several years later when delegations of wives, on two separate occasions, traveled to Los 
Angeles to convince the writers and editors of Look magazine to run a story on their 
husbands' plight. The wives were rebuffed. Sandy Dennison recalled being told that their 
husbands "weren't news worthy enough." The comment shocked Sandy; three decades 
later, she still had emotion in her voice as she told me the magazine's reaction to their 
story pitch was "a terrible thing for a wife to hear." She described the magazine's 
rejection as "a low point" not only in her life but also in the lives of the others.
For Sybil Stockdale, however, the rebuff was a galvanizing moment. Sandy 
remembers Sybil's comment on their return trip to San Diego: "That's it," Sandy recalled 
Sybil saying. She noted that Look personnel were more interested in the informal 
organization the wives had formed than in their husbands' stories. Instantaneously, Sandy 
told me, Sybil "made the decision that she was going to form the National League of 
Families." Sybil, in other words decided, more or less instantaneously, to transform the 
League of American Wives of American Vietnam Prisoners of War, a more or less 
informal regional group that was little more than a Navy wives squadron group with a 
letterhead and a post office box, into a formal, national organization. Sybil, herself,
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described the San Diego group's transformation into the National league, as follows: "We 
had become so by my magic wand of naming us as such."
Although Sybil made the decision to establish the national organization quickly, 
she had her concerns, which she knew about but not known by others. In May 1966 Sybil 
made a trip to Washington DC to meet with Commander Bob Boroughs in the Pentagon 
and Mr. Philip Heymann, one of Ambassador Averell Harriman's assistants in the 
Department of State. In a meeting with Commander Boroughs, he asked Sybil to consider 
assisting the office o f Naval Intelligence with covert communications with her husband 
via her letters. She agreed to participate but decades later she told me that it was a very 
stressful experience and she feared making a mistake that would endanger her husband's 
life— if not result in him being killed.
Her concern, also, was that the covert communications with her husband might be 
discovered or compromised due to the forthcoming attention on the National League, in 
addition to her subsequent trips to Paris where she would confront North Vietnamese 
governmental officials. As the National League grew in prominence and activism, she 
recalled her feelings; "It was really very, very, very scary for me because I was deeply 
involved in the covert communication." Yet, as she told me, in time she was able to 
separate her work in the National League and her covert communications with her 
husband. She said, "I thought of them as quite separate."
Despite her fears and concerns, Sybil, with two of her youngest sons (the other 
two were in Prep School and College), left her home in Coronado, moved to Washington 
DC. There she pursued the goals of the National League, and in time, formally
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established the National League o f Families o f American Prisoners and Missing in 
Southeast Asia in June 1970.
Retrospectively, Sandy remembers that Sybil's move to Washington and the 
establishment of a formal national organization "were kind of a turning point." She also 
acknowledged, however, that things might have changed "anyway because the 
administrations were changing and the war was going in a different way." My review of 
declassified government documents, however, suggests that, despite the significance of 
other two factors Sandy mentioned, the formation of the National League was essential 
for bringing the POW and MIA issue into the policy arena.
There will be more about the League's influence in a subsequent chapter. Before 
discussing this topic, however, more needs to be said about the formation of the League 
and its metamorphosis over time. As noted, the precursor of the National League was an 
ad hoc organization loosely based on a Navy aviation squadron wives' support group. 
While the structure of the ad hoc organization closely resembled the structure of a 
squadron wives' support group, the substance o f what the group was actually quite 
different: This group became the voice of the POW and MIA wives and family members 
and quickly became the voice of the POW and MIA wives and family members with 
government officials and the general public. With increasing forcefulness, the group 
began to demand action from governmental officials and challenged the government's 
Quiet Diplomacy strategy, which has already been noted, the wives referred to as the 
"Keep Quiet" policy.
When this ad hoc group transformed itself into a national organization, the 
substantive agenda remained largely the same as the agenda pursued by the San Diego
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squadron wives group. Although there were many changes, the League, in fact, never lost 
the wives' groups' focus on providing mutual support, gathering and disseminating 
information to wives and families, educating the American public, and demanding 
governmental responsibility for the well being of POWs and accountability o f MIAs. The 
form of the organization, of necessity, changed rather dramatically, however.
The transformation of an informal group of squadron wives into an effective 
formal national organization, in fact, required making a number o f fundamental 
decisions, adopting formal policies, and establishing basic standard operating procedures 
in a number of areas. These areas included making decisions about leadership, 
membership, funding, organizational structure, message, and strategies.
Leadership
"It’s an era when women were not as deeply involved 
in leadership roles in business or government."
Richard Capen
Among the many questions an organization must resolve during its formation are 
questions about who will hold leadership positions and how those in leadership positions 
will be selected. Interestingly, the National League never formally addressed these 
questions until it was formally incorporated in the summer o f 1970. At that time, a formal 
governance Board was established, along with procedures that were to be used by the 
Board to select the organization's National Director. Before formal incorporation, 
however, there was never any question about who the group's leader would be. Sybil 
Stockdale was the obvious— and unquestioned— choice. As Sherry Martin noted, Sybil
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Stockdale the obvious leader "no matter what part o f the country she was in .... From 
little ole Coronado around the dining room table to Washington. "
Sybil Stockdale was the unquestioned leader of the group for a number of reasons. 
She had been the moving force behind the informal support group that had gathered 
around her dining room table in Coronado, California, and was also the leader of the 
League of Wives that had been established, mostly to facilitate information sharing 
among wives who did not live in Southern California and who, consequently, could not 
gather around Sybil’s table. She also had transformed the League o f Wives into the 
National League after the group had been rebuffed by Look magazine simply by, as she 
said, "waving her magic wand."
Even if  the above factors had not existed, Sybil's personality, education, and 
presence undoubtedly would have made her the group's natural leader. One of the 
questions I posed during the interview dealt with where she and other influential 
members of the group derived their authority to lead a movement. Sybil responded 
immediately: "I never thought about it. Why would we not have authority? They were our 
husbands." Later she added: "Of course, we had authority. It was our business. For the 
government to have the authority, the sole authority— heaven help us— no way!"
In addition to her considerable intellectual and interpersonal skills and the 
personal leadership she had provided in the past, Sybil also was the obvious choice to 
lead the new organization because of the social role she played. When I asked Sherry the 
source-of-authority question, she quickly responded: "By rank." Although she indicated 
that she, personally, did not agree with a wife assuming the rank of her husband, she also 
noted that the tradition in the Navy was that junior wives, in that period, deferred to the
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senior wives’ guidance. In short, in the Navy, leadership is defined by position and this 
thinking applied to Navy wives as well as their husbands at the time— more so then than 
now. Thus, by virtue of her husband's rank—and also the longevity of his capture— Sybil 
would have been the obvious choice to serve as the group's leader even if  she had not 
possessed the natural leadership proclivities and predilections alluded to earlier. It was 
these natural proclivities and predilections, however, which undoubtedly made Sybil an 
effective leader in the formal organization's formative period.
When the organization was incorporated in June 1970, Sybil decided to step aside 
as the organization's official leader for personal reasons. The years had taken their toll, 
and she needed a respite— and as she told me, quite candidly, "I hated Washington. It was 
awful." As noted, at that point, formal procedures were established to fill the National 
Director position. From an organizational standpoint, however, it is probably significant 
that the national organization, in its early years, did not have to contend with leadership 
struggles and find ways of managing the conflict that often accompanies power struggles 
within an emerging organization. It was certainly significant that someone with Sybil's 
experience, skill, and political acumen led the organization, during its early years. Her 
personal power will be readily demonstrated when government's response to Sybil and 
the organization she represented are discussed in the next chapter.
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Membership 
"It was strictly a family organization."
Sybil Stockdale
It is impossible to determine precisely how many National League members there 
were at any given time due to the fact that records, files, and historical documents of the 
National League have been lost.'28 The only estimate of the size of the membership I 
could find was in a memorandum from Colonel Hughes, Armed forces Aide to the
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President, to John D. Erlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. The 
memo from Hughes estimated that the number of women who were members of the 
National League was fifty. During our discussions about this, Sybil Stockdale told me 
that she would estimate a more realistic membership numbered around sixty. It is 
interesting that in a 1970 television interview with Sybil, Barbara Walters introduced 
Sybil as "the leader of 3,000 women and members o f American families whose men are 
believed to be Prisoners o f War."'30 To this date, neither Sybil, nor any of the other wives 
I interviewed know where Barbara Walters acquired this number. It may have been 
extrapolated from estimates of the number of POWs and MIA family members. Of 
course, most of these family members had not joined the National League.
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One w ife  I interviewed told me that the N ational League's historical files were "loaned" to a 
"researcher" and never returned. It is important to note that the som e o f  w ives I interviewed did not 
anticipate the continuation o f  the National League beyond the return o f  the prisoners in 1973. The w om en, 
how ever, understood the importance o f  the N ational League's docum ents for historical purposes, but at the 
time, whcjt^the prisoners returned, the cataloging and securing o f  docum ents w as not a priority.
C olonel James D. H ughes, Armed Forces A ide to the President, to John D. Erlichman,
Assistant to the President for D om estic Affairs, W ashington, DC, Jan. 30, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles  
N D  18-3/CO  165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, 
C ollege I]fjk, M D .
Sybil Stockdale, interview by Barbara W alters, Today  show , N BC , Jan. 20 , 1970.
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six
Two things are clear, however. First, the membership was, by design, quite small. 
Membership, in fact, was restricted, initially, to wives of POWs and MIAs, later, to
131
mothers and fathers of POWs and MIAs, and eventually to other family members. The 
reasons for restricting membership to blood relatives of POWs and MIAs will be 
discussed below.
Second, not all POW and MIA wives and family members chose to become 
members o f the organization. Marty Halyburton, for instance, spoke of attempting to 
contact wives or other family members and discovering that there were those "who didn't 
want to be a part of any of this." The League's response was to respect their decision. 
There was, in fact, a prevailing notion that other wives and family members should be 
respected and allowed to handle the situation in their own way. Graciously, Marty said,
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"We held no hard feelings. It was just their way o f dealing with it."
As suggested above, there were reasons for restricting membership in the 
organization. When Sybil Stockdale discussed the reasons why the League and National 
League became so influential, in fact, she cited restrictive membership as one of the most 
significant components of organization' success: "We never had anybody that was not 
related in some way to a POW or MIA. It was strictly a family organization. I think that 
was terribly key—very, very important." The intent was to ensure that formal members
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The decision to include mothers and fathers w as one impetus for the organization's first name 
change from the League o f  W ives o f  Am erican Vietnam  Prisoners o f  War (October 1967) to the N ational 
League o f  Fam ilies o f  American Prisoners in Southeast A sia  (June 1969). The second name did not include 
the term M issing in A ction because Sybil, as she told m e, the "MIAs w ere w ith us always but w hen it came 
tim e to expand the nam e it seem ed only logical to include MIA" in the title. The League, in fact, underwent 
a third name change, w hich included "Missing" to sign ify  the inclusion o f  M IAs and the presence o f  MIA  
w ives an<|3|am ilies. This occurred when the N ational League incorporated in June 1970.
Even with the limited mem bership, there w as growth with each passing year; how ever, a 
minority o f  members w ere activists in the political and public arena. Richard Capen acknow ledged this and 
told m e that "there were a lot more m em bers but there w ere a relative sm all number w ho w ere really  
leading this effort."
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were committed to resolving the POW and MIA issue and also to ensure that the story the 
organization told was a compelling one, i.e., a highly personal one.
Mary Winn, in my interview with her some thirty years later, reinforced the logic 
for restricted membership when she stated that restricted membership was important in 
maintaining perceptions about "the legitimacy of the group." There could never be any 
doubt, Mary said, that "every person who was with the League had to be a genuine 
member."
As has already been noted, initially, membership was restricted to wives and this 
restriction was undoubtedly significant because it kept the organization small and close- 
knit during its formative years. The organization's size and its informal relationships 
allowed structures to emerge more or less naturally. It also permitted incremental, trial 
and error learning, something that was obviously important, given the wives' lack of 
experience in running large-scale organizations.
Eventually parents were permitted to join the group. Their entry, in fact, was part 
of the reason for the League's first name change: the League of Wives o f American 
Vietnam Prisoners of War became the National League of Lamilies o f American
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Prisoners in Southeast Asia. Eventually, other family members were permitted to 
become part of the group. Sybil indicated that the League "wasn't designed that way, but 
it happened over time." During another conversation, Sybil said the following: "In 
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Sybil also indicated, however, that there was a line that would not be crossed in 
terms of membership: "We never had anybody that was not related in some way to a 
POW or MIA. It was strictly a family organization. I think that was terribly key—very, 
very important." Even when approached by an earnest young man from a neighboring 
community who wanted to help, Sybil would not yield on the issue o f limiting 
membership to family members. Instead, Sybil invited the young man to her house in 
Coronado, and they jointly created a plan to form an affiliated organization: Concerned 
Citizens of America. This organization eventually became one of the many informally 
affiliated organizations that non-family members interested in working on the POW and 
MIA issue could join.
Thus, the decision to limit the League's membership— first to wives, then to wives 
and parents, and, finally, to any blood relative— was , in fact, significant for a number of 
reasons. First, as has already been noted, the membership restriction kept the League 
relatively small, and the League's small size, in turn, made it possible for leaders to 
continue to rely on somewhat informal and highly personal ways o f doing business. 
Second, the family connection also meant that the organization had a built-in, compelling 
story to tell.
Third, the decision to restrict membership to family members also was 
instrumental in thwarting an attempt to take over the organization. In April 1970, 
Commander Boroughs informed Sybil Stockdale that a group o f retired military officers 
wanted to gain control of the National League and permit public membership. Sybil knew 
that "the organization would lose what made it unique and gave it public appeal— only 
relatives of POWs or MIAs could be members." This argument proved to be convincing
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to the National League membership, and the takeover attempt failed. To thwart any future 
takeover attempts, two months later when the National League incorporated, it inserted 
into its by-laws the following language: "The League shall be composed solely o f family 
members o f missing or captured Americans in Southeast Asia. Family members shall be 
given the broadest, possible interpretation and include, among other categories 
recognized by the Board of Directors, a blood or lawful relative of the American who is
134
now or has been a prisoner or missing in Southeast Asia and his or her spouse."
Financing 
"We paid our own bills."
Sybil Stockdale
At the outset o f many of my interviews with Sybil Stockdale, she would share 
with me what she normally referred to as "key" and/or "imperative" ideas from our prior 
discussion. Some o f these related to the formal and informal organizations that had been 
formed during the POW and MIA crisis. One "key," for instance, was a kind of dictum 
that guided action in both the informal squadron wives group and in the national 
organization: "Nothing takes the place of a personal visit." Another key that Sybil 
highlighted related to the membership issue that was just discussed: "We were strictly a 
family organization." A third imperative or key that Sybil highlighted in her 
conversations with me related to the topic of this section: the financing of the 
organization. The imperative was captured in one of Sybil's more pithy statements: "We 
paid our own bills!"
134
Phyllis Galanti, unpublished data, private collection.
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In Sybil's mind, when members o f an organization depend on others to fund their 
work, they give their power and authority away. The dynamics of the organization 
change, and "a whole different complexity" is introduced into organizational life. Sybil 
stated: "The minute you start to collect money, you're in a whole different ballgame.
They [i.e., financiers] feel that because they have contributed an amount of money that 
you owe them something."
Thus, as Sherry Martin, decades later, remembered: "Anything o f any expense at 
a l l . . . we absorbed it." This meant that the women absorbed costs personally rather than 
organizationally. The National League did not even have a treasurer, and no dues were 
ever collected. None of this was easy because the women were not wealthy. Sherry, for 
instance, recalled how the wives really did not have a lot o f money to cover expenses, 
even phone calls, which made the nickel stamp a much better use of personal resources. 
Like many of the women, she juggled personal finances to cover cost o f mailings, phone 
bills, or trips. Similarly, Mary Winn recalled, "The game I played with money was not to 
go into debt during any single month." She too recalled that the "government never 
supplied any funds, nor did I or we ask for any money."
As is often the case in organizational studies, the fiscal reality was not quite as 
clear-cut as the rhetoric about financing. While it is certainly the case that the women did 
not solicit contributions or depend on substantial funding from others to do their work, it 
is also the case that they were offered and when appropriate accepted specific types of 
support. For instance, Sybil noted, "We were given free office spaces in the YMCA in 
San Diego." She also told me, "When I went to Paris [with the hope of confronting the 
North Vietnamese about POW treatment], I would buy the ticket, but Reader's Digest
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reimbursed me." And, in the later years, after the group had been more or less embraced 
by the government, Sybil indicated that she "would travel back and forth [between 
Washington and California] on Mrs. Nixon's plane" if  it was already traveling between 
cities. Other government flights— mostly those under the auspices o f the Department of 
Defense—were available (space permitting, of course) to leaders within the organization 
in the latter years once the government and the National League had become apparent 
(though still somewhat suspicious and indirect) allies.
Even before the thaw had occurred, wives were able to take advantage of a 
Department o f Defense policy that permitted spouses and their children to travel on 
military planes on a space-available basis. At least some of the wives took advantage of 
this privilege. This privilege was not immediately available, due to a bureaucratic 
technicality. The military policy was that family members had to fly with their husbands. 
The wives finally convinced the bureaucrats that their POW or MIA husbands could not 
possible accompany them and the policy was officially modified on May 2, 1968. As of 
July 18, 1968, the wives were permitted to travel on military flights without being 
accompanied by their husbands.
There was also substantial support from private businessman Ross Perot. More 
specifics of the support provided by Perot and others are discussed in a later section.
What is important here, however, is a distinction that, in the minds of women, at 
least, was quite clear: There was a difference between soliciting funds and accepting 
donations (or taking an advantage of scheduled military flights, a privilege accorded to all 
military wives). Soliciting funds was not an acceptable strategy, according to National
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League thinking; it was appropriate to accept donations, however, if  it was clear that the 
donations came with no strings attached.
On at least one occasion, according to Sybil, this clear distinction became a bit 
blurred. Commander Boroughs informed Sybil that the Fairchild-Hiller Corporation 
wanted to present her with a $1,000.00 check but the stipulation was that she would 
personally need to pick up the check at their office in Washington DC. Sybil did not see 
the need for this personal appearance since, for one, she felt she was going to be 
examined by the corporate hierarchy as whether or not she was "emotionally stable." In 
addition, she was concerned about creating the impression that National League members 
or officials actively solicited funds to support the organization.
In the end, however, despite her misgivings, Sybil showed up at Fairchild-Hiller 
Corporate office in Washington DC to accept the check. Less than enthusiastic about 
doing this, however, because, in her mind, the public appearance at the company's office 
muddied a distinction that, to her and the others was quite clear: the group did not solicit 
funds; it only accepted donations.
To some, the distinction between soliciting funds and accepting donations may 
seem to be a bit arcane and academic, or even inconsequential, especially when viewed 
from the perspective of the sort of pragmatic decision just described. Anyone who has 
witnessed an organization in which the organization's substantive mission got ignored 
because of the need for ongoing intensive fund raising efforts, however, will understand 
that the conceptual distinction was almost certainly important in terms of keeping the 
National League "on message" and not distracted by organizational maintenance matters.
148
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Developing an Organization for Exposure of the POW and MIA Issue 
The commitment to not solicit funds, in other words, was another manifestation o f a 
commitment to keep things simple and focused on the task to be accomplished.
Organization
"The unity and strength of the League was more effective 
than individual efforts— and you could see this. You could see how 
the organization was going to be a benefit."
Mary Winn
"As time went on, our organization really became refined in response to specific events."
Sybil Stockdale
As noted, the National League o f Families emerged out o f a more-or-less informal 
group of Navy wives that, organizationally, was modeled after the traditional structure of 
wives groups within naval aviation squadrons—with some likeness in other branches of 
service. Of course, a national organization required the invention o f somewhat different 
structures, and, over time, these different structures began to be put in place.
When discussing the organizational structure of the National League decades 
later, the majority of the women recalled that what was created structurally was primarily 
to facilitate effective and efficient communication. Bonnie Singleton, for example, noted 
that a major benefit of a national organization was the ability to "communicate with one 
another and pass on information and share ideas."
Sybil Stockdale, the prime mover in setting up the national organization, also 
knew that communication and dissemination o f information was the key to a successful 
campaign to influence public officials. To facilitate communication, Sybil, established a 
National Coordinator and Area Coordinators located across the country. In time, she and
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a couple of others, decided to align the area coordinator structure with the state structure, 
so that there was an area coordinator for each state rather than a coordinator for a region 
that might encompass several states. This was done because Sybil and Mary Winn had 
concluded that, as Mary put it, "people would be more responsive" if they could identify 
and represent their state—thereby providing a greater sense o f ownership in the 
organization.
The establishment of the area coordinator structure and the communication 
patterns that flowed through these structures was, o f course, facilitated by the fact that 
most of the key actors knew each other previously and had, in fact, already been 
communicating through informal networks before the formal organization was founded. 
Bonnie Singleton, for example, remembered that she already knew Sybil quite well when 
Sybil called Bonnie in Texas to inform her about the new national organization and 
request that she become the area coordinator for her region of the country.
Decades later, Sybil described to me the League's and National League's Area 
Coordinator's role and responsibilities:
The Area Coordinators— their job was to pass on the information . . .  to 
disseminate the information. For example, suppose we wanted to do our 
"Telegraph-In" [an effort to inundate President Nixon with telegrams urging him 
to promote humane treatment of POWs]. I would contact the area coordinator and 
tell them what we were going to do and they would go ahead and contact all their 
people. That was the way we disseminated the information.
I felt that it was important for me to speak out on the subject and that 
[also] was one of the responsibilities of the area coordinators. Since the purpose
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was communication they, of course, would call television stations and give 
speeches. The more people we could get doing that the better.
Area coordinators and those who worked at the national level not only focused on 
communicating with those outside of the National organization but there was also a 
strong emphasis on within-organization communication. As a member of the National 
League's Board, Marty Halyburton knew it was important to keep in contact with the 
wives throughout the country. She told me, "We kept our 'troops' at home informed of the 
National League." To speed communication internally, the organization was designed in 
such a way that communication flowed in two directions, from the top down and from the 
bottom up. This meant that a new wife or family member to the organization, without any 
position in the League or National League, for any reason, could communicate up to the 
National level without any impediment just as the National leadership and area 
coordinators could send out their communiques to the membership.
The organization's communication system was highly effective. Alice Stratton 
used a metaphor to make this point. She noted that, on various occasions, North 
Vietnamese officials gave letters written by prisoners to antiwar activists, who would 
bring them back to America. "When letters would come out and they'd hit the," Alice told 
me, "they were just like the jungle drums. . . . We'd start hearing, 'They're coming, they're 
coming, they're coming.'" Alice also indicated that the jungle drums were equally 
effective when those at the national level needed to transmit information or promote a 
coordinated campaign. In short, during my conversations with her, Alice credited the 
network of communication that was formalized by the establishment o f a national 
organization with both with keeping the wives and, eventually, other family members
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knowledgeable and "tight" as well as allowing national leaders to quickly mobilize 
members of the group to influence national policy.
Thus, the establishment of a national organization cemented and broadened the 
tightly knit system of communication that had operated on a more piecemeal and ad hoc 
basis previously. In other respects, however, the national organization tended to be what 
organizational theorists refer to as a loosely coupled system. Mary Winn, for example, 
who served as one of the initial regional area coordinators and, later, as the coordinator 
for the state o f Minnesota when area coordinators were designated for each of the states, 
did not recall any rigid mandates or standard operating procedures being imposed on 
those in the field. She noted, for instance, that there was no expectation coming from the 
national level about when or how often membership meetings should be held in a region 
or state. This and other matters were decided locally and were handled differently in 
different regions and states.
The absence of a highly bureaucratic organizational structure, however, should 
not be seen as signaling a lack of leadership at the national level. Rather, the loosely 
coupled structure permitted a type of leadership that encouraged grassroots initiative and 
trusted members’ abilities and insights. Its form of leadership eschewed micromanaging 
or exercising excessive oversight, neither of which was needed given the members’ 
shared and highly focused purpose.
Instead of meddling or spending their limited energy trying to control what 
happening locally, leaders at the national level organized campaigns to influence national 
policymakers and informed the public about the POW and MIA issue through the 
national media. Because of the small, close-knit nature o f the organization, however,
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those in Washington DC were aware of local initiatives and the strengths of those who 
worked at the local level. When appropriate, they tapped the special skills and talents o f 
local actors to help the group, as a whole.
For instance, Sybil Stockdale asked Mary Winn, who worked at the local level as 
an area coordinator, to address the Air Force's policy that prohibited the disclosure of 
POW and MIA wives or family members to other women or family members in the same 
situation. The Air Force also had refused to provide this sort of contact information to the 
National League. Since Mary's husband was in the Air Force, Mary told me that Sybil 
suggested that she "make an appointment to see General John Ryan, then Air Force 
General Chief of Staff, and ask him to amend the Air Force policy to make it possible for 
effected family members to meet one another and derive whatever comfort could be 
gained from knowing others in our circumstances."
Mary requested such a meeting during which she asked General Ryan to clarify 
the Air Force's policy with respect to POW and MIA wives and family members. Mary 
told me that she said to him, "I cannot believe it is the intention of the Air Force to deny 
the family members the comfort of at least knowing one another in the same set of 
circumstances." General Ryan told her it was "not the intention of the Air Force" to do 
this, but he also expressed his concern that "not everyone will wish to" participate. 
Therefore, he asked her, "How do we preserve their privacy?" Mary and the General 
worked out a way to accommodate the Air Force's privacy concerns while still giving the 
League access to those wives and family members who indicated they wanted to be 
contacted. Essentially, the General agreed that the Air Force would contact relatives and 
ask whether they could release their names to the National League. Mary recalled that
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most Air Force wives and relatives "decided they would like to know others and we soon 
had quite a group."
Those unfamiliar with military culture may not appreciate how unusual it was for 
someone of General Ryan's rank to agree to meet with a military wife, must less to 
attempt to accommodate her request; it was equally unusual, especially at that point in 
time, for a military wife to even request such a meeting. How much the existence o f a 
national organization factored into General Ryan and Mary Winn's decisions cannot be 
determined. But it seems obvious that General Ryan would have been aware that the 
request came not just from an Air Force wife or even from a wife whose husband was a 
Vietnam prisoner; rather, as the letterhead on Mary’s letter requesting a meeting made 
clear, the request came from an official of a national organization. And Mary, herself, 
most certainly understood that she was making the request, in part, in her national 
organization role.
Other wives have spoken of the significance of these sorts o f factors. Jenny 
Connell Robertson, for instance, indicated that the establishment o f the National League 
eliminated many of obstacles that the wives first had encountered in the years from 1965 
to 1969. She also indicated that the organizational structure of the National League 
provided a sense of being "united . . . quite strong," and a greater sense of confidence that 
their actions "were having some effect." Similarly, Sandy Dennison noted that the 
National League was a reminder to governmental officials, "We're here, and if you don't 
[address POW and MIA issues] then we're going to do this and this."
Both Sherry Martin and Shirley Stark stated that the move to Washington DC and 
the establishment o f the National League was crucial for the group’s effectiveness.
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Sherry noted, for instance, that San Diego, California, was too far away from the "center 
[and] where things were happening." And Shirley said: "So much comes out of 
Washington. They could call a news conference . . . put out information and hopefully 
some TV stations or networks, newspapers would pick up the s tu ff. .  . and we could 
make people aware o f what was going on more."
At a more mundane—but no less important— level, the national organization 
provided support for activities that were initiated and carried out locally. The national 
organization also established policies— albeit a limited number—to manage emerging 
problems and protect the integrity of the organization as a whole. At least some of these 
policies represent a careful balancing act: they reflected a sensitivity to the importance 
of—and the need to not unduly inhibit or restrict—grassroots initiative and innovation, 
on the one hand, and a commitment to protecting and maintaining the organization's 
principles and mission, on the other hand.
An example was one of the national organization's by-laws approved in June 
1970. This particular by-law was a response to a phenomenon that will be discussed in 
more detail below in the section on the strategies employed by the League. Simply stated, 
a number of local organizations began to affiliate with other organizations, some of 
which were aligned with anti-war activists— though the National League did not endorse 
this manner of activism or political persuasion— it would, however, attempt to use them 
to maintain their momentum and keep their options open. The particular by-law in 
question permitted such activity at the local level but, also, attempted to insulate the 
national organization. It stated: "Members may participate, facilitate and develop 
activities with other private or public groups or organizations and governmental agencies
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which are working to achieve the same humanitarian objectives as the League, but the 
League's endorsement of these activities or organizations shall be subject to the approval
135
of the Board of Directors."
Simply establishing a national organization, of course, is no guarantee that the 
organization will have the sort of impact that the National League, in fact, had. 
Consequently, the League's success story is much more complex and considerably more 
nuanced. Undoubtedly, a significant factor in the success story is the fact that legal 
incorporation came later rather than sooner. The process to legally incorporate the 
National League as a nonprofit organization, in fact, was not begun until late May 1970 
when twenty representatives from the National League met in Washington DC to begin 
the process to incorporate the National League as a nonprofit organization. Even then, as 
noted in the discussion of membership issues, legal incorporation was, in part, a 
defensive move prompted by the takeover attempt by a group of retired military officers, 
whose intentions were to open National League membership to the public. It also, 
however, came from a small group of concerned citizens in and out of government 
looking out for the National League. Legal incorporation finally happened on June 30, 
1970— along with yet another name change designed to highlight the organization's 
concern with those men who were missing in action. Thus, as previously mentioned, the 
official name went from the National League of Families of American Prisoners in 
Southeast Asia to the National League o f Families o f American Prisoners and Missing in 
Southeast Asia. On that date, the newly incorporated organization also opened its new 
office at 1 Constitutional Avenue in Washington DC.
135
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The cavalier approach to legal incorporation, until it became a strategy to respond 
to a particular problem, was significant because it meant that the organization's structure 
could more-or-less evolve— and build on informal standard operating ways of doing 
business that had already been established— in a relatively unhurried and natural way. 
This evolutionary process, along with the small size of the organization that was a 
product of the decision to restrict membership to family members, also meant that the 
National League was an organization held together primarily by relationships rather than 
by bureaucratic rules and regulations. The relational nature of the organization, in turn, 
had implications for the morale and level of commitment o f the organization's members.
Incorporation, o f course, did add a level of formality to the organization that had 
not been present before. When Sybil decided to step aside as the National Coordinator, 
which she had "elected herself' to when the organization was in its formative years, her 
personal choice for her successor— and the first National Coordinator o f the legally 
incorporated entity— was Iris Powers, the mother of a MIA soldier. The Board, however, 
as Sybil told me decades later, "felt we ought to have a wife." Thus, Iris became the 
Assistant Coordinator and Joann Vincent, an Air Force wife, became the first National 
Coordinator.
Incorporation also required that certain aspects of the organization had to be 
written down and made explicit rather than implicit. The Articles of Incorporation and 
By-Laws of the National League, for example, clearly speak to the issue of the longevity 
of their organization: "The Corporation shall exist for so long as its purpose remains
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unfulfilled— as long as men are missing or captured in Southeast Asia."'36 The Articles 
also articulated an eight goals or purposes of the organization:
• Securing human treatment in accordance with the requirements of the 
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners of War 
and as recognized by general humanitarian standards for those Americans 
captured in Southeast Asia;
• By obtaining identification of all those who are being held captive by the
North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao and other hostile forces;
• By obtaining proper medical care for all;
• By making the American people and the people of the world aware of the
unconscionable plight o f those Americans who are missing or captured in 
Southeast Asia and their families;
• By facilitating and promoting communication of information of mutual 
interest among all families o f missing and captured Americans;
• By facilitating and developing activities with other private or public 
groups or organizations and governmental agencies which are working to 
achieve the same humanitarian objectives;
• By maintaining and supporting the morale o f all captured and missing 
Americans and their families; and above all
• By obtaining at the earliest possible time the release o f and a complete
137accounting for all captured or missing Americans in Southeast Asia.
136
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The above purposes were hardly new, however. By the time they were codified as 
part of the Articles o f Incorporation, they had already been lived on a day-to-day basis by 
the organization's members. And by the time organizational procedures had to be 
formally established, they had been tested and modified many times over. The legal 
organization created in the spring of 1970, in short, for the most part mirrored a natural 
organization that had started around and evolved from a gathering around a dining room 
table in Coronado, California.
Message 
"We kept it simple."
Alice Stratton 
"To let people know that things were not all rosy."
Phyllis Galanti
By the time Sybil Stockdale appeared on the January 20, 1970, episode of the 
Today show, the wives who led the national organization had honed a relatively succinct 
message for what interviewer Barbara Walters characterized as the wives' "campaign." 
Essentially the message focused attention on the plight of the prisoners, a plight that most 
Americans were still unaware of when a formal national organization was established. 
There was also a corollary idea that was part of the carefully honed message: the need for 
the prisoners to be afforded humane treatment and, more specifically, the need for the 
North Vietnamese to adhere to the Geneva Convention endorsed and required ways of 
treating POWs.
In retrospect, the simple and straightforward message may appear to be obvious 
and articulating it and getting group members behind it might appear to have been an
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easy task. In fact, as noted previously, initially there was disagreement about what goals 
should be pursued.
This message, which had also been honed over the years, came through loud and 
clear during Sybil's Today show interview. For instance, twice during the interview, Sybil 
referred to the "desperate plight of the prisoners," and, at one point, she told Barbara 
Walters, "We want to secure the protection of the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
treatment o f Prisoners of War for the men."138
Sybil also identified the target audiences for the group's message during the 
interview: Congress, the American public, the citizens o f the world, and the North 
Vietnamese government itself. She predicted that, because of her organization, members 
o f Congress "will become much more personally aware o f how desperate the plight o f all 
the men is." She added, "They will try to search harder for things personally they can do 
to help the men and to make their constituents aware o f the plight of the men."139
Sybil also told Barbara Walters that the National League of Families was "trying 
to make the world aware of the desperate plight of the prisoners. . . .  We have gone to 
many sources and many spheres of influence to try to make all people o f their desperate 
plight." Then echoing an idea about the North Vietnamese's desire for respectability in 
the eyes of the world that she had read about between 1965 and 1966— and that she 
discussed in an exchange o f letters with Averell Harriman, President Johnson's 
Ambassador-at-Large for POW matters, she turned her comments toward the North 
Vietnamese. Confidently she said, "We feel that if  they are criticized that they will soon
138
|39 (See note 138.) 
Ibid.
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see the shortsightedness o f incurring world disrespect for the sake o f using our men as
1* • i  . I 1 4 0political pawns.
Thus, by the time the national organization was not only incorporated but also 
formed, it already had a clear-cut message. Equally interesting is what the message did 
not include: the organization's message said nothing about the legitimacy (or lack of 
legitimacy) of the war; nor did it endorse any political party or political candidate. The 
National League of Families, in fact, had a standing principle to remain neutral and 
refrain from public criticism of elected officials. As the war lengthened, the commitment 
to this principle was increasingly tested and the National League had to develop ways to 
balance a growing push from some of its members for political involvement, on the one 
hand, and the earlier commitment to remain non-partisan. But, in Sybil Stockdale's 1970 
interview with Barbara Walters, the non-partisan message was clear and unequivocal: 
"The organization has taken the position that we . . .  do not feel qualified to say how the 
problem should be solved. We want to make the world aware o f the truth and . . . there 
are many more qualified than we are to come to apolitical conclusion."14'
Decades later, the other women I interviewed affirmed that the clear and 
straightforward message that Sybil communicated during the interview with Barbara 
Walters was, indeed, the organization's message and not just Sybil's personal beliefs. 
Chloe Moore, for instance, recalled that the group's mission was to constantly bring 
before the public North Vietnam's failures with respect to "abiding by the Geneva 
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the hope "that the more Americans became aware of what the truth was and what was 
really happening—that it might make a big difference."
Even Sherry Martin, who earlier had articulated a somewhat different goal for the 
group, eventually saw the national organization's message as being about humane 
treatment. Sherry told me that she was troubled by the American public's lack of concern 
with or interest in the POWs’ plight. Even decades later, she stated, with considerable 
passion: "The whole populace of the United States should have been up in arms about the 
whole situation." She also talked about how she and the others understood that the 
public's apparent ignorance and indifference resulted, in part, from the fact that the POW 
issue did not directly "pertain to a majority o f people" in the way that it did to the family 
members who made up the organization's membership. This hurdle, however, according 
to Sherry, became a motivating factor for the group to get its message out and "to keep 
that ball rolling [and] not to have it stagnate at all." Sherry added: "It was very important 
to keep this issue [about the need for humane treatment] before the American people."
Alice Stratton said the same thing about the organization's message that the other 
women I interviewed had said. Alice, however, did acknowledge that, even early on, 
there were disagreements among wives and family members about whether the 
organization should speak out against the war. She also noted, however, the commitment 
o f the group's members to refrain from discussing their disagreements in public. Her 
position on this matter seemed to have been shared by most of the group's members: "I 
just think that [taking a position on the legitimacy of the war and engaging in partisan 
political battles about the war] would have diminished our message, and we would be
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seen as one more interest group." The goal, Alice said, was to "continue with that one 
message— awareness of their treatment."
In retrospect, this thinking seemed to reflect considerable wisdom, and the 
decision not to engage in partisan politics appears to be a significant variable in 
explaining the influence of the group. As long as the group limited its discussions to the 
topic of prisoner treatment, the group, by virtue of representing wives and other family 
members of the prisoners, could speak with authority and legitimacy. The group members 
could also speak with one voice and provide a unified front; such unity would have been 
lost had the group strayed into other issues on which there was considerable disagreement 
within the group.
The importance of this unity should not be underestimated. Sandy Dennison, for 
instance, emphasized that not only was their simple, straightforward, and consistent 
message important to the group's success, it ultimately was the bond among the wives 
and families that made it possible for the organization to "move mountains."
Furthermore, even the effectiveness of the group's message was inextricably linked with 
the messengers who delivered it. As long as the message was limited to the treatment of 
their husbands, sons and relatives; members could speak with undisputed authority. To 
quote Sybil, when asked about where she and the other members of the organization got 
their authority to speak on the POW issue: "Why would we not have authority? They 
were our husbands."
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Strategies
"We were determined not to let the issue die."
Marty Halyburton 
"We thought this was a major American problem!
We were trying to make it a national interest."
Sherry Martin 
"Shutting our mouths wasn't working."
Shirley Stark
Essentially, the story of the development o f the formal organization's strategies is 
very much like the stories that have already been told about the development o f many of 
the other aspects o f the organization. Like the story of the development of organizational 
structures, for example, the story of the development of strategies was one of 
improvisation and incremental change. Marty Halyburton acknowledged the absence of a 
grand design and the initial ad hoc approach to strategy development by laughing and 
stating, "There wasn't a plan; there was no planned strategy!" However, she quickly 
added that, while the wives were short on knowledge about how to do things at the start, 
they had a clear sense of what needed to be done. She said when the "wives got together 
to sort of work out their strategy," they were clear that they "wanted to make sure 
[governmental officials] knew they had to do something. They just couldn't sit there and 
shove it under the rug."
This clearly defined purpose, in turn, quickly made certain strategies self-evident. 
Retrospectively, Mary mused: "The...strategies were mostly [a] practical, sensible 
outgrowth of the circumstances. The circumstances were the foundation for the
164
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Developing an Organization for Exposure of the POW and MIA Issue 
strategies." She went on to explain: "The men were prisoners and we wanted and needed 
information about them. We wanted identification and accountability of what had 
happened to them. We wanted to improve their care and circumstances. And, we wanted 
to have them released, though we recognized that this was unlikely until a political 
solution was reached. We needed to have people know their plight and ours. . . .  The 
provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War were 
not being observed. The Red Cross was not being allowed in."
Given the agreed-upon need articulated by Mary and others, certain strategies 
quickly appeared. According to Jenny Connell Robertson, these strategies involved using 
methods to "contact representatives. . .  . the media. . . .  and other people." Here, again, 
the strategy story aligned with other aspects of the organization's story that have already 
been told, because many o f the most obvious strategies to accomplish the group's purpose 
were the same strategies members of the organization had used before the group became 
a formal organization.
Chief among these already tried and true methods were personal visits, letter 
writing, public speaking, and openness to innovation from others. Sybil Stockdale had 
developed and used these strategies even during the period when, as Marty Halyburton 
noted, the wives did not have "a whole lot o f options" because of the government’s "Keep 
Quiet" directive.
Personal Visits
Many o f the women I interviewed spoke about various personal visits they made 
on various government or military officials either within their geographical area or in 
Washington DC. Most o f the women, however, took the lead of Sybil Stockdale, who by
165
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six
1968 had become adept at working the system to obtain appointments— especially 
through the office of Commander Bob Boroughs. Part of Sybil's motivation came from 
the lack of or the perfunctory response she received from the telegrams or letters she had 
written to government and military officials. In May 1966, Sybil traveled to Washington 
DC and met with Mr. Philip Heymann, Averell Harriman's assistant. Her first visit was 
followed by a personal visit three months later in August with Ambassador-at-Large 
Harriman. The meeting with Governor Harriman lasted for two hours, which focused on 
the North Vietnamese threat of trying the prisoners as war criminals. That same month, 
August 1966, she met with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald 
(she requested her husband's official status to be changed from "missing" to "prisoner") 
and later with Vice Admiral B. J. Semmes, Jr., at the Bureau of Navy Personnel. During 
her meeting with Vice Admiral Semmes, she admonished him to write an information 
letter to all POW and MIA wives to keep them up-to-date on POW and MIA matters and 
to assure them that the Navy had not forgotten them. In May of 1967, she again called on 
Ambassador Harriman and Senator Everett Dirksen (R-IL). Two months later, she met 
with the new Chief o f Naval Operations, Admiral T. H. Moorer.
Corresponding with Government Officials
Letter writing.
As noted, Sybil Stockdale was the early proponent o f writing letters to 
government officials. She began the practice in September 1965 and perfected the 
strategy as the war progressed. With the formation of a formal national organization, as 
well as the demise of the government's quiet diplomacy policy, in fact, the scale and 
scope of the use of the letter writing strategy increased rather dramatically.
166
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Developing an Organization for Exposure of the POW and MIA Issue
Indeed, the sheer volume of mail the women could deliver to one or more 
government leaders was rather astounding. And, over time, the League members added 
international leaders to their list o f people with which they corresponded. Letter writing 
campaigns also targeted television stations, newspaper and magazine editors and writers, 
public personalities, and corporations. In short, a strategy that had developed out of 
frustration and, in Sybil's words, a desire "to do something" when wives and family 
members felt constrained by government directives to them, became one of the formal 
organization's most potent and effective strategies.
To implement the strategy organizationally, Sybil would inform the wives: "We'll 
have a letter writing campaign." She would then compose three sample letters. Typically, 
the sample letters were brief and straightforward comments. They might include a 
comment like: "You know we didn't agree with what you said in the newspaper, please 
explain yourself."
Wives and other family members were strongly encouraged to translate the 
contents of the sample letters into their own words, so their letters did not have a canned 
feel or smack of being merely a form letter. At times letter writing campaigns responded 
to particular incidents, statements, or events, but, often, they were undertaken to simply 
remind elected and appointed officials that the family members were still around and to 
"give them [i.e., the government officials] a little bit of a boost" into action.
The domestic letter writing campaign was an absolute necessity according to 
Sherry Martin. She noted that it was the way to ask questions and keep pressure on 
elected and appointed officials in Washington. With a sense of urgency she said, "We had 
to do that to get them to respond to us . . .  to tell us." Sherry then recalled the
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"continuousness o f having questions. . .  going into our Representatives and our 
Congressman." Letter writing campaigns and admonitions to persevere among wives 
became part of their routine to keep the message out and buoy each other. Sherry stated: 
"We would say to our fellow wives: 'Write your State Congressman. Tell him your 
situation. Ask him what he's going to do about it. Ask him what the government policy 
is."' Then, sounding a bit like Sybil's comment that certain governmental officials needed 
"a little bit of a boost," Sherry indicated that she considered the letters as a way to "pick 
on him [the government official] a little." Sherry told me that by the late 1960s there were 
POW and MIA wives and family members representing every State and they, all, "just 
kept pinging away."
Other letter writers.
Others added to the "pinging" noise. Alice Stratton and Phyllis Galanti, for 
instance, told me of ordinary citizens, on their own initiative, writing letters, which, both 
said, was an indicator to governmental officials that people cared about the issue and 
were not only willing to write but also to demand action. During an interview with Alice 
Stratton, she recalled the very first letter she wrote on November 1, 1969 to the Palo Alto 
Ministerial Council. In that letter, she requested help and prayers for the men; she 
specifically requested that people "also write letters."
Sherry Martin also acknowledged the contribution of non-League members who 
assisted with "typing letters to various Congressmen" (even though she indicated that she 
wrote and typed her own letters). Phyllis Galanti also remembered "hippies" working side 
by side with "some really right wing people" when producing letters for various POW 
and MIA campaigns.
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A unique approach to contacting government officials: the "telegraph-in. "
By the time President Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in January 1969 the 
National League, in Sybil Stockdale's words, "really became refined in response to 
specific events." One of the communication strategies the group employed was inspired 
by the tactics of war protesters. Sybil recalled that the late 1960s was a time of "sit-ins" 
and "stand-ins" on college campuses and in governmental buildings across America in 
protest to the war o f other civil issues of the day. She decided the National League would 
conduct a "telegraph-in."
Communicating with an estimated sixty wives across the country, who in turn 
communicated with other wives and family members, Sybil issued the directive to send 
as many telegrams as possible to President elect Nixon on Inauguration Day, January 20, 
1969. According to Sybil, the message was simple: the wives were "asking him to give 
the prisoner situation a high priority in his administration." The result, she said, was over 
"two thousand telegrams on his desk that day after his inauguration."
The number, 2,000 had come from a conversation Sybil had had with Alexander 
Butterfield, Assistant Chief of Staff, and Special Assistant to President Nixon, at a 
function in Coronado, California, around 1998 or 1999. Sybil recalled that Butterfield, 
who was in Coronado to speak about his experiences in the Nixon White House, had told 
her privately that the "two thousand telegrams on his desk" the day after the presidential 
inauguration "really made a difference." There will be more on the White House's 
reaction to the organization's first "telegram-in" in the discussion of the White House's 
reaction to the women and the government's evolving approach to the POW and MIA 
issue in a subsequent section.
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Two months later, the organization conducted another telegraph-in. This time the 
telegrams were sent to the Paris Office o f Xuan Thuy, Chief of the North Vietnamese
142
Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
The telegraph-in strategy, as Sybil and others recalled, was used on only two 
occasions. The networking strategy employed with the two telegraph-ins to generate such 
a large amount of correspondence to officials at a particular point in time, however, was 
used in numerous letter-writing campaigns to public officials. Some of these snail-mail 
versions of the telegraph-in approach were used to get officials to attend to the POW and 
MIA issue; others were used to challenge or register displeasure with an official’s actions 
or public comments.
Petition drives.
Some of those interviewed—though certainly not all o f them— also recalled 
various petition campaigns. Shirley Stark and Sandy Dennison remembered wives taking 
turns sitting in front of various stores, requesting signatures to support their efforts for the 
North Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva Convention. Sandy also mentioned they would 
have mimeographed letters available for people to send to Congressman or other 
officials. Shirley recalled that some people were hesitant to sign POW and MIA petitions 
for fear the North Vietnamese would somehow do something to them personally. Sherry 
Martin remembered that the wives "felt that the more people [they] could get to sign this 
kind of thing and [then] present these volumes and volumes o f petitions to the powers 
that be, that, at least, they would see this is not just some little interest group."
142
Le D ue Tho succeeded Xuan Thuy in February 1970.
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Corresponding with world leaders.
It was not only the letter-writing campaign that changed with the formation of a 
national organization but the scope of letter writing activity expanded as well. For 
instance, organization members no longer limited their letter writing to government 
officials within the United States. Rather, world leaders were added to the list of people 
with whom the League's members corresponded.
Marty Elalyburton recalled Sybil's guidance in the early stages o f the campaign to 
write "letters to heads of state that maintained diplomatic relations with North Vietnam." 
Soon, she began a morning ritual of writing about "twenty letters a day," which targeted 
foreign governments and members of Congress. Marty, at the time and decades latter, 
was uncertain about the effectiveness of the international letter writing campaigns. But 
she spoke of the value of simply involving the wives and other family members in the 
activity: "It's pretty hard to sit back and do nothing," she said. She also echoed Sybil's 
words about this activity alleviating some of the feelings o f helplessness among family 
members: "I think there obviously were a great many wives, mothers, fathers, brothers, 
and sisters who felt like this was something positive that they could do."
Alice Stratton was considerably more certain about the positive impact o f the 
group's international letter writing campaigns. Alice, in fact, was certain that the letter 
writing campaigns had been significant and influential in gaining support and changing 
attitudes about the plight o f the prisoners not only within the United States but also 
within the international community. Laughingly, she said that she did not "know if there 
has ever been that many letters written" to international leaders. She remembered 
"truckloads of letters" being "dumped . . . on the embassies." Like the number of the
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women I interviewed, Alice also alluded to prisoners who, upon coming home in 1973, 
spoke o f living conditions and treatment improving significantly after 1970. According to 
Alice and others, this alteration in treatment is evidence that the North Vietnamese "knew 
the prisoners were a liability if they didn't come back. . . . We were at least keeping them 
alive while they were there."
As the war continued and the number o f men imprisoned in North Vietnamese 
increased, the international letter campaigns also continued. Though Phyllis Galanti's 
husband was shot down in June 1966, she spoke about the "fabulous letter writing 
campaign in 1971" in Richmond, Virginia. This letter writing campaigned differed from 
previous ones in at least one important respect: The letters that had been generated were 
not mailed; instead, she went as a representative o f the Richmond delegation to 
Stockholm, Sweden, considered an intermediary nation, to personally meet with Swedish 
officials and deliver the letters to them. This personal delivery strategy was repeated in 
1972 when Phyllis and two other POW wives, under the auspices o f the National League, 
traveled to Paris and then Versailles for the International Communist Conference on 
Indo-China, a conference that included over 800 delegates from communist countries. 
Armed with letters, as well as petitions, the group attempted to meet with various 
communist officials, including the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the 
group was rebuffed and the crop of letters remained undelivered.
Communicating with government officials indirectly rather than directly.
As she told me of the group's failure to deliver the letters, however, Phyllis 
recalled a more positive part of the international letter writing story. She noted that 
League members began targeting "newspapers in foreign countries." The message in
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these letters was consistent with the message the organization was delivering in America: 
The men were being mistreated and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War was being violated. Because of my request for an interview and our 
subsequent discussion about letter writing to international newspapers, Phyllis opened her 
personal archives, which she had kept closed for decades, and found newspapers from 
Berlin, Germany and Cairo, Egypt dealing with and headlining POW and MIA matters.
O f course, the women did not limit their letter writing to the foreign media. 
Domestic newspapers and other domestic media outlets were also recipients of the 
group's targeted correspondence. In fact, over time, the organization's leaders became 
quite astute about the value of communicating to policymakers through letters written to 
the media. For example, by 1970 it was common for Sybil Stockdale to correspond with 
the highest-ranking officials o f government, including the President. However, during 
one of my interviews with her, Sybil told me about watching a television interview with 
President Nixon, conducted by Dan Rather, in the fall of 1972. It was her intention, as 
well as her practice, to "listen very carefully to see if President Nixon mentioned the 
prisoners . .  . and he didn't,” Sybil recalled. When he did not, Sybil recalled that she "was 
really mad" and decided to share her anger with the President. Because o f timing issues 
being of the essence, she corresponded in telegram rather than in letterform. But there 
was also a more important deviation from her standard operating letter-writing 
procedures: She decided to send her correspondence to Dan Rather and merely copy 
President Nixon. She explained her very conscious decisions as follows: "They had 
taught m e . . . .  they had taught me so well exactly how the system works. If you wanted 
to communicate anything to the White House and be strong about it, you sent your
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message directly to a reporter—preferably one [with] the influence of Dan Rather and 
then you sent a copy to the White House. . . . that's how you communicate with them the 
most strongly."
The telegram generated a phone call from the White House by General Hughes 
who, according to Sybil, was not too pleased with her criticism of the President being 
sent to Dan Rather than to the President, himself. Even though General Hughes 
eventually apologized for his comments, the call, however, simply reinforced to Sybil the 
correctness of the lessons about how to influence the White House in the manner that 
"they had taught."
Utilizing the Press
Sybil's decision to contact Dan Rather illustrated another strategy used by the 
National League: send messages to pubic officials via the media. Once again, this 
strategy had been tried long before forming a national organization was even 
contemplated.
Before a national organization was formed, however, the women had had limited 
success to interest the press in telling their husbands' story. Mary Winn, recalled, for 
example, that she, with approval from the Air Force, went to the Minneapolis Star in May 
1969 to talk to a reporter. "The young reporter astonished and confused me," Mary said. 
After listening to her he announced, "That's not news, lady!" As she thought about the 
reporter's, she realized he was right—the "POWs had been in Hanoi too long to be news."
Mary was not the only one who experienced rejection when telling their story to 
the press in the early years. Bonnie Singleton went to the Dallas Morning News with 
three other wives, with the same intention that Mary had had: to tell their story and
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interest the paper in telling their story to the paper's readership. After making 
introductions in the reporters' bureau, a reporter conducted an interview. For forty-five 
minutes, their reporter, Mr. Simmons, listened and, then, promised to write an article 
based on their story. Bonnie told me that she and the two wives who had accompanied 
her were surprised and dismayed with what was published. She said: "The next day we 
saw two lines on the page opposite the obituary section: 'Two wives husband's are 
missing in action in Southeast Asia living in the Dallas area.'"
Even when papers did carry stories about the wives and their husbands, the results 
were, often, less than satisfying. Shirley Stark, for example, bemoaned the fact that "the 
press was not very good about . .  . putting in what you said."
Once the group went national— a move that, as already has been noted, was 
stimulated by a rebuff by the reporters from Look magazine—things began to change. 
How much the mere formation of a national organization factored into the change cannot 
be determined. What is obvious, however, is that leaders o f the national organization 
were proactive in getting the attention of the press.
In July 1969, just a month after Sybil Stockdale, in her words—waved her "magic 
wand" in response to the Look magazine rebuff and "magically" transformed the League 
of Wives into the National League— she traveled to Washington DC to join other wives 
and parents in a meeting with Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense in the Nixon 
administration. On her way to the meeting, Stockdale stopped in New York City to try to 
generate publicity for their cause. She had requested meetings with Life, Time, Parade, 
the New York Times, and the Today show. Only Parade had an interest and provided her 
with a forum to tell— and eventually publish— the wives' story. Elated by this turn of
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events, she showed up the New York Times unannounced. By some good fortune, she met 
with Mr. Palmer, one of the editorial assistants. Palmer provided her with a list of 
newspapers he felt were highly influential, even though their circulations were small, but 
ones he felt the League needed to target. Since she was on her way to see the Secretary of 
Defense in Washington DC, Palmer also gave her the name of a New York Times reporter 
in DC to contact after her meeting with Melvin Laird. The efforts with this type of media 
networking resulted in the publication o f a nearly full-page article in the New York Times 
on July 31, 1969.
Area coordinators and others working at the local level also began to experience 
some success in dealing with the media. Phyllis Galanti, for example, remembered a 
"wonderful supportive press" in Richmond, Virginia, though she also noted that wives in 
other cities had experienced a certain amount o f hostility from the press, "particularly 
[the women in] San Francisco and New York had different experiences." (Whether this 
"hostility" continued after the formation o f the national organization was not clear though 
Alice Stratton, who lived in the San Francisco Bay area, seemed to adjust and navigate 
the apparent hostility.) When I asked Phyllis what League activities had the greatest 
influence on people like Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), 
administration officials, and White House staff, she did not hesitate in offering her 
answer: "We were getting to be very good with the press and the press was really 
following us . . .  I think this got their attention."
One example of individual members being successful with the press at the local 
level involved Shirley Stark. During my interview with Shirley, she mentioned an activity 
she initiated in 1967 when there was a League of Wives but no National League. She
176
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Developing an Organization for Exposure o f the POW and MIA Issue 
contacted the editor of the local newspaper and requested that, on the Editorial page, a 
small section be set aside to count the number of days since the first POW was shot 
down. The editor agreed to do this; August 5, 1964, the day the first POW, LTjg Everett 
Alvarez, was shot down became day one. This simple idea and resultant daily publication 
contributed, in a small way, to the wives overall objective to keep the POW and MIA 
issues in the American conscious.
Working at the national level, Sybil Stockdale also understood that the press was 
vital to the campaign of the National League. She also understood, however, that, even 
though she knew that the wives "needed them [reporters and other news people] 
desperately.. . .  we didn't want to be used by them—we wanted to use them." The goal 
was a unique balancing act to neither irritate nor alienate the press while retaining at least 
some control over the telling o f their story. I asked Sybil if  she thought the wives 
succeeded in making the press their ally, and she responded, "Oh, absolutely without any 
question." She added, "I think when they [governmental officials] saw how the media 
was responding to us and how the human-interest story was spreading across the 
country."
All of this, amazingly, was accomplished without the assistance of public 
relations professionals. During my interview with Phyllis Galanti, in fact, she recalled 
having been asked a question about what public relations firm was representing the 
National League and wives. To her such a question "was such a riot because we just sort 
o f stumbled . . .  we just sort of made this up as we went along." She acknowledged, 
however, that "we knew inside and out [what we were talking about] . .  . There was no 
way the press could catch us."
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In fact, the wives eagerly (but informally) shared tips on dealing with the media. 
Once again, a strategy before the advent o f a national organization was continued once 
the national organization was formed. O f course, once there was a national organization 
existed, there was a mechanism to create formal methods to supplement informal ones. 
Phyllis, for instance, provided me with a copy of the National League’s basic primer on 
How to Handle Your Contacts with the News Media (Appendix G). The document 
provided wives and family members with not only pertinent interview guidelines but also 
strategies to further the National League's goal o f educating Americans about the plight 
of the POWs, POW and MIA issues, and other related matters.
The absence of public relations professionals was not accidental, however. When 
Sybil met with Mr. Palmer, the Assistant to the Editor o f the New York Times, he told her 
that the "slightest taint of Washington slickness was the surest turn-off for the media." 
Decades later, Sybil recalled that making media outlets their "strongest allies" 
necessitated that the National League maintain its integrity. Undoubtedly, maintaining 
integrity—or at least the perception that integrity was being maintained—was facilitated 
by the League's do-it-yourself approach to dealing with the media.
Utilizing Television
The national organization also embraced strategies that were not used extensively 
in the earlier, more informal campaigns. One of these newer strategies involved using 
television to communicate the group's message and indirectly influence government 
decision makers. Sybil Stockdale, for instance, viewed television as the most influential 
public medium. Reflecting on all her years of leading the National League and engaging 
in numerous activities to keep pressure on governmental officials, she commented, "The
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power of television is absolutely staggering . .  . mind-boggling." Even though television 
was a relatively new medium at the time, she concluded: "If you're not on television, 
you're nobody. You're nothing."
As her previously discussed interview with Barbara Walters clearly indicates, by 
January 1970 Sybil managed to turn around her initial rebuff from the Today show and 
got herself—and her message about prisoner abuse— on television. Some wives at the 
local level also participated in television interviews. Like most people, the more they 
were in front of the camera, the more skilled they became in using the media to get the 
organization’s story across to the American people and to influence, albeit indirectly, 
government officials to attend to the treatment o f Vietnam prisoners.
Public Speaking as a Strategy
Whether or not there was a television camera present, the members o f the 
organization were encouraged to speak publicly about the plight of the prisoners. As a 
result, public speaking became part of the list o f standard operating strategies used by the 
National League.
In the early years, of course, the government's Quiet Diplomacy policy (or, the 
use the wives' nomenclature, the Keep Quiet policy), inhibited any public (and, often, 
even private) discussion of the POW and MIA issue. Like so many other things about the 
group, serendipity played a part in changing this situation. In early 1967, the principal at 
the school where Sybil Stockdale taught was also the President o f the Kiwanis Club in 
Imperial Beach, California. At the last minute, his scheduled speaker for a meeting of the 
group had cancelled, and this turn of events led him to ask Sybil to speak. As Sybil
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remembered, his request was simple: "Tell about your husband’s circumstances [and] 
about your circumstances."
Sybil agreed to speak—despite the government's directive to keep quiet— and 
what she discovered, consequently, was the publics' lack of awareness about POW and 
MIA issues. This lack of awareness compelled her to continue to challenge the 
government's existing policy and to make additional speeches. She also began to 
encourage others to speak out, and, both because of her positional power as the leader of 
the squadron wives' group and her personal power and the relationships among the wives 
that had already begun to be cemented as early as 1967, other wives responded 
enthusiastically.
As the wives began to organize themselves— first as the more-or-less informal 
League of Wives of American Vietnam Prisoners o f War, then as the still somewhat 
informal National League of Families of American Prisoners in Southeast Asia and, 
finally, as the legally incorporated (but still somewhat loosely coupled) National League 
of Families o f American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia— they became the 
definitive spokespersons for the POW and MIA issue. "We went around and gave 
speeches. We'd go anywhere to do our talking," Sybil told me. This speaking, in all sorts 
of venues, produced two results, according to Sybil: It spread the word and involved the 
public in POW and MIA issues. All the wives interviewed were involved with public 
speaking, although to varying degrees. Mary Winn talked about being on early morning 
radio talk shows and speaking at schools. She also told me that she spoke at Red Cross 
meetings, including both the annual meeting of the Red Cross in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
and the annual national convention of the Red Cross held in Chicago— at which she was
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the keynote speaker. In Mary's words, she "took every opportunity to make known the 
plight of our prisoners." She also indicated that the activity provided some personal 
psychological and emotional relief: "It helped me, that is, to hurt less— not to focus too 
closely on [her husband] but to work for the benefit of all the POWs and their families."
Sandy Dennison, another frequent public speaker, recalled that, in their speeches, 
the wives would challenge groups, even high school audiences, to take the message home 
and ask other family members if they were aware o f the plight of the prisoners. Phyllis 
Galanti also attempted to recruit supporters in her speeches and was quite successful in 
mobilizing an entire city to support the campaign to ensure humane treatment of the 
prisoners and adherence to the Geneva Convention agreement on prisoner treatment. 
Because of one speech, Phyllis met two individuals who wanted to help the POW and 
MIA families. In her words, "They just turned the city [Richmond, Virginia] upside down 
. . . they got in touch with women's clubs, church groups, and schools and said, 'Do you 
need a speaker?"' They not only arranged for Phyllis to speak to groups; they, themselves, 
took on the speaker role when required to broaden the distribution of the message.
Like the other wives I interviewed, Karen Butler considered the speeches 
extremely useful in making people aware o f the plight of the POWs and issues 
concerning MIAs. Chloe Moore indicated that she, also, made speeches that focused on 
making people aware of the obligation of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva 
Convention. In her mind— and in the mind of the other women—the speeches were not 
the platform, and never became the platform, to appeal for the release o f the men; rather, 
awareness and human treatment was her central theme.
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Marty Halyburton was another wife who was frequently on the podium. Initially 
Marty realized some audience members did not know how to respond to the stark and 
disturbing story she was telling, but she discovered that, when the wives were open and 
candid, a speech "opens the door" for greater discussion. She also acknowledged the 
uniqueness of each story told, because, for each POW and MIA, there were many 
personal family stories. She believed the greatest benefit of the public speaking campaign 
was that POWs and MIAs, along with their families, became "human" to listeners. Names 
were given faces; it "wasn't just numbers." In her estimation, the human touch "made this 
a real issue" for the American people. Phyllis Galanti also voiced this same sentiment: 
"The more you can personalize it and get away from numbers and talk about your 
husband—that was better."
Marty told me of one especially memorable speaking engagement. Marty received 
a phone call from a college friend, whose father was a lawyer in Atlanta, Georgia. He 
asked her if she would address a group of attorneys in the near future, and she agreed to 
do this. After a couple of weeks, she received another phone call from the same 
individual informing her that a keynote speaker cancelled his appearance at the last 
minute; he asked Marty to push up her speaking date to that evening. Once again, Marty 
quickly agreed to the request. On entering the hotel in downtown Atlanta, she learned she 
would be addressing the American Bar Association and substituting for Senator Bobby 
Kennedy (D-NY). Marty recalled looking at the podium and seeing a multitude of 
microphones intended to capture the speech o f the Senator. Marty rose to the challenge. 
Her speech led to a call from Ross Perot, who requested her presence at a news 
conference in Atlanta on POW and MIA issues.
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Even though all the wives spoke publicly, public speaking was not everyone's 
forte. Alice Stratton, for instance, said she "was not accustomed to public speaking" and 
was nervous most of the time. "To some degree," she said, "nervousness is good because 
that means you're going to make sure you do a good job." Over time, however, she felt 
she improved but acknowledged the emotional aspect was always in her heart and mind.
Despite her anxiety about speaking in public, Alice indicated that did not consider 
tears useful. "The tears were always there behind the acceptance and behind the facade . .
. the sadness was always there." She recognized a certain amount of emotion was 
effective but that it could also obscure the message. Therefore, she controlled all emotion 
as best as possible. That is why she had what she called "a standard prepared speech."
She only changed it after POW Doug Hegdahl was released by North Vietnam, to which, 
she incorporated into her "stump" speech references of Hegdahl's confirmation of torture. 
Alice would also, on occasion, change her standard speech and encourage citizens to 
engage in a letter writing or telegram initiative being planned by the wives. Even if  no 
specific initiatives were being planned at a given point in time, Alice said that, in her 
prepared speech, she always "had a whole list" of individuals for people to write.
Although Alice relied on her own standard speech, there was not a prescribed 
speech for the wives to make. Phyllis Galanti noted that the wives would share "what 
kind of things in our speeches got a good response," but she and others confirmed that, in 
the area of speech making, as in most other areas, the National League remained the 
quintessential grassroots organization. Marty Halyburton added that, even without a 
"patent[ed] speech," the group had "a compelling message." Once again, it seems that 
authenticity trumped technique.
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Refraining from Partisan Politics and Taking a Position on the War
In discussing group members' speech making, Phyllis Galanti stressed that the 
members' speeches never asked the audience to take a specific "stand on the war." This 
commitment to neutrality on the war issue and a more general commitment to 
nonpartisanship, both o f which were previously discussed, must also be added to the list 
of strategies employed by the group. These strategies, in fact, were adopted very early in 
the process.
Phyllis Galanti, for example, spoke of the group's conscious decision not to 
choose political sides and to ensure activities under the "flag of the National League" 
remained nonpartisan. This decision, in her mind, ensured "support from the whole 
spectrum" o f politicians and public alike.
Sherry Martin also thought the group's commitment to nonpartisanship and 
neutrality on the war issue assisted the wives in establishing and maintaining their 
influence. Similarly, when Alice Stratton was asked whether she thought keeping 
criticism of the Johnson and Nixon administration private rather than public was effective 
she replied, "Oh, absolutely." Alice argued that being in "sync with the government" and 
refraining from "criticizing their conduct of the war" were important elements of the 
group's overall strategy. She added, "I think that is why we eventually won over the 
government." Alice also viewed the nonpartisan policy and non-criticism of elected 
officials as a way for the wives to be "seen as unified" and "saying the same thing."
In fact, the decision to say nothing about the war, itself, was indeed important in 
retaining at least the appearance of unity and for sending a unified and clear message 
about the treatment of the prisoners. In actuality, the women and other family members
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were not unified on the legitimacy of the war and the different parties' proposal for 
dealing with the war issue. All of the wives I interviewed, in fact, alluded to this lack of 
unity. Phyllis Galanti, for example, acknowledged the wives held strong and often 
differing political feelings, but in most cases agreed that they would not have their 
feelings "voiced publicly." And Alice Stratton even acknowledged that "there were some 
splinter groups" who departed from the non-partisanship strategy; these groups "went off 
with their drumbeat against the government," according to Alice.
For the most part, however, those who remained in the National League's tent 
abided by the nonpartisanship strategy, especially in the early years of the National 
organization when the group was still attempting to make the treatment of prisoners a 
public issue. Alice Stratton, for instance, acknowledged that she and others "stuck to the 
party line of the National League" despite their "private gripes."
Adhering to this particular party line became increasingly difficult for some 
members of the group, especially after the group had been successful in getting the POW 
and MIA issue on the national policy agenda. What irritated a number o f them was that 
the war dragged on with no conclusion in sight, participants at the Paris Peace Talks 
argued about such mundane matters as the shape o f the table, and North Vietnamese 
officials continued to snub international protocol. When political factions did develop, 
one of the members o f the National League, for example, agreed to second the 
nomination of George McGovern at the Democratic convention. Other wives, out of 
exasperation, protested the handling of the war in front o f the White House during the 
summer of 1972.
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There were also efforts in some states and regions to form alliances with groups 
that had obvious political agendas. Bonnie Singleton, for example, spoke of a group of 
anti-war activists who "wanted to be the ones to bring out the letters from the prisoners 
and take letters to the prisoners." They would act as a courier of sorts, who also gave 
antiwar groups desired publicity. Jane Fonda was part o f one of the first groups of people 
to go to North Vietnam for this purpose. While Bonnie saw this turn of events in positive 
terms because it signaled, "everyone around the world was drawn to this issue of the 
Prisoners of War," other members of the organization saw it as a direct challenge to the 
group’s commitment to remain nonpartisan and neutral.
As alluded to previously, the establishment o f alliances with partisan groups 
resulted in the inclusion of a policy into the by-laws of the organization as part of its legal 
incorporation in the summer of 1970. The by-laws stated: "Members may participate, 
facilitate and develop activities with other private or public groups or organizations and 
governmental agencies which are working to achieve the same humanitarian objectives as 
the League, but the League's endorsement of these activities or organizations shall be
143
subject to the approval of the Board o f Directors." Clearly, the wording of this 
particular by-law evidences an effort to balance the growing desire of some of the 
organization's members to choose up sides in the Vietnam debate with the group's 
articulated commitment to nonpartisanship and keeping the group neutral on the war.
Interestingly, even those who remained committed to nonpartisanship as a 
strategy began to modify their interactions with public officials somewhat. Even as early 
August 1966 Sybil had raised critical questions about the conduct of the war with
143
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Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations, and in May of 1967, she 
raised similar issues during a private conversation with Republican Congressional leader, 
Senator Everett Dirksen (R-IL). In December 1967, Sybil Stockdale sent the following 
clear-cut— and quite confrontational—telegram to Ambassador-at-Large Averell 
Harriman: "I am enraged at the flaunting o f mistreatment of prisoners by the North 
Vietnamese. What are we doing about it? I beg you to support our men who are in such 
agony. Yours Sincerely, Mrs. James B. Stockdale."
These challenges, especially by the League and National League, were initially, 
all made out of the view o f the public eye. By 1972, however, as was alluded to in the 
earlier discussion of the group's use of the press, Sybil's decision to write to Dan Rather 
(and copy Richard Nixon) rather than to the President, himself, represented a willingness 
to be at least somewhat confrontational in public as well as in private.
Years later, Sybil confirmed that she knew precisely what she was doing when 
she made the decision to contact Dan Rather and only copy President Nixon. And she 
indicated to me: "I got the results I wanted— I got their attention!" Sybil noted that, 
initially, "getting their attention" resulted in a rather belligerent phone call from General 
Hughes, the military liaison officer in the Nixon White House. Within twenty-four hours, 
Sybil received a second phone call from General Hughes. This time General Hughes 
apologized for his earlier response; he also said, according to Sybil, "[In the future] you 
can use my plane to travel from Coronado to Washington DC, Mrs. Stockdale." Sybil told 
me that she replied: "Mrs. Stockdale will buy her own ticket. She will pay her own way."
The nonpartisan policy, in fact, never implied a lack of commitment to the 
overarching goal to bring about a governmental policy shift. As Alice Stratton told me,
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"If you don't bring about some change in what's happening, what are you doing it for?" 
And, even though Chloe Moore felt "there was a lot more political stuff going on but," 
she still furthered the goals of the League o f Wives and National League with official 
visits, letters, and attendance at League events in Washington DC. Nonpartisanship, in 
other words, was always a means to an end rather than an end to itself. As the war 
continued and the peace talks showed no indication of progress, the utility of this strategy 
began to be questioned, in modest ways by some and in ways more dramatic by others. 
Working With (and, in Some Cases, Helping to Form) Affiliated Groups
The reference to working with other organizations in the previous section speaks 
to another relatively pervasive strategy employed by the National League. Again, the use 
o f this strategy predated the founding o f the national organization, as the discussion of 
the formation of Concerned Citizens o f America in an earlier part of this discussion 
indicated. As was noted, earlier, the plan to form this organization was concocted by 
Sybil and a concerned citizen who was refused membership in the League of Wives (the 
group that predated the national organization) because he was, obviously, not a wife. 
Even other family members were not permitted to join the organization at that time. Thus 
Joe McCain, brother o f POW and now Senator John McCain, was forced to join the 
Concerned Citizens group rather than the still somewhat informal (and local) 
organization that the wives had begun to create.
Operationally, the distinction between the two organizations was not particularly 
significant. Concerned Citizens (which was, like the wives' group, nonpartisan) and the 
League of Wives frequently worked together to accomplish the goal o f calling attention 
to the prisoners plight and the failure o f the North Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva
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Convention agreements about the humane treatment of prisoners. For example, for some 
time, Joe McCain worked in an office space at the YMCA in downtown San Diego, 
California, that had been donated to the League of Wives. In fact, decades later, Sybil 
chuckled as she told me that Joe, in effect, "moved in— free rent. The volunteers said,
'I'm not going to come anymore until Joe McCain gets his underwear out of these desk 
drawers!"'
The close working relationship evidenced between the League of Wives and 
Concerned Citizens o f America was duplicated with other organizations. One such group 
was United We Stand, an organization formed by Ross Perot to publicize and generate 
public support for the POW issue. Another group was VIVA (Voices in Vital America). 
VIVA was important because it generated the idea of selling POW and MIA bracelets. 
Each bracelet was a simple metal band that contained the name and rank o f a POW and 
the date on which he had been shot down. Carol Bates Brown, who co-founded VIVA 
when she was a university student, provided an historical account:
The idea for the bracelets was started by a fellow college student, Kay Hunter, 
and me, as a way to remember American prisoners o f war suffering in captivity in 
Southeast Asia. In late 1969, television personality Bob Dornan (who, several 
years later, was elected to the US Congress) introduced us and several other 
members of VIVA (Voices in Vital America) to three wives o f missing pilots.
They thought our student group could assist them in drawing public attention to
144the prisoners and missing in Vietnam.
144
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Attempts to contact Ms. Bates Brown were unsuccessful.
189
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six
The student group initially circulated petitions and letters to Hanoi demanding 
humane treatment for the POWs. Soon they came up with the bracelet idea. The POW 
and MIA bracelets quickly became one of the most visible symbols of the plight of the 
POWs and MIAs. All of the wives, when interviewed decades later, acknowledged the 
remarkable impact of the bracelets. As Alice Stratton said, "The bracelet wearing was 
really smart."
The affiliation-with-external-groups strategy also was employed, to good effect, 
at the local level, most notably in Dallas, Texas. In 1969, after the formation of the 
National League of Families, Bonnie Singleton— a POW wife from Dallas, Texas— 
implement an idea she had that involved forming an affiliated citizen group called 
"Dallas Cares." Bonnie felt the POW and MIA families could not handle the magnitude 
o f the task before them as an exclusive family group. Bonnie estimated that she, herself, 
spoke, on average, five times a week to organizations in the North Texas area. To begin 
to rectify the problem, Bonnie helped form a citizen group that, among other things, had a 
speakers' bureau. The group was housed at the Dallas Naval Air Station, which provided 
free office space and a telephone. The group's purpose was much like the National 
League's: to bring attention to the POW and MIA issue and compliance with the Geneva 
Convention.
Other "Cares" organizations sprung up in other communities, though the record 
of where is sketchy, at best. Bonnie indicated that she knew of "organizations all over the 
country" but she could provide no other details about what had happened in other 
communities where local organizations were a product of grassroots initiatives and 
informal networking with wives and family members in other cities such as Dallas rather
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than a push from the national organization. During the interview, Bonnie was candid that 
Cares did not have a "national cohesion" or "any national base" like the National League 
of Families.
This lack o f national direction resulted in some Cares groups affiliating with 
peace groups and, in effect, challenging the national organization's commitment to non- 
partisanship and neutrality on the war. As was noted in the previous section, this 
challenge did finally result in a modest, defensive reaction of the newly incorporated 
national group, an reaction that took the form o f a by-law that both permitted local 
discretion but made the National League's endorsement of local groups' affiliation with 
other groups contingent on the National board's approval.
External Support
"You cannot believe what some of these organizations and people did."
Bonnie Singleton
The previous discussion of strategies indicated that the National League quickly 
established ways of operating that limited organizational membership to family members 
and prohibited the soliciting of funds. It is also the case, however, that the National 
League could not have functioned without the financial support and in-kind contributions 
of a number of groups and individuals. Individuals also provided other sorts o f invaluable 
support, as well. This section discusses the groups and individuals that the wives I 
interviewed mentioned as being essential to their effort.
Before discussing the particular external groups and individuals cited by the 
wives as being especially important to the organization's operation, it seems important to 
articulate two caveats. The first caveat is a reminder of a point that was made earlier in
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discussing the organization's fiscal strategies: Sybil was adamant that individuals, 
companies, or organizations "all donated" to the organization and that the National 
League "never solicited" contributions. Thus, from Sybil's perspective, when an official 
within the Retired Officers Association, who Mary Winn knew, offered the National 
League office space at 1 Constitution Avenue in Washington DC after Sybil and Mary 
had paid him a visit, the offer was not the result of a solicitation. Since there appeared to 
be no quid-pro-quo, the offer could be accepted, much like when the YMCA of San 
Diego had offered the Concerned Citizens o f America free office space in downtown San 
Diego. The distinction, here, in Sybil's mind, at least, was important because the 
accepting as opposed to soliciting donations ensured that no one would be able to 
question the National League's motives.
The second caveat is that the National League, on some occasions, refused 
contributions. Mary Winn recalled, for instance, that the group was offered "professional 
help" in the areas of fund raising and public relations. Mary recalled that Sybil rejected 
this sort of help because she wanted the wives and families to do the work themselves, 
"even if we don't do it quite as smoothly as professionals would." In short, the decision to 
reject assistance suggests that there was a conscious decision to tilt toward authenticity 
rather than technique.
With the above caveats noted, we can turn to brief discussions o f the individuals 
and groups whose external support the interviewees most frequently mentioned. Heading 
the list of supporters and support organizations was Texas billionaire, Ross Perot.
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Ross Perot
The wives I interviewed who met Ross Perot all acknowledged his dedication and 
commitment— even at great personal expense— to support their efforts to make the plight 
of the prisoners known, turn the POW and MIA issue into a media spectacle thereby 
bringing the issue into American consciousness, and a determination to hold the North 
Vietnamese accountable. Marty Halyburton affectionately referred to Perot as having a 
"bee in his bonnet" about the POW issue. She also noted, "Perot's work was very public 
and dramatic," which is exactly what the wives required. In Sybil Stockdale's opinion, 
Ross Perot did "marvelous and wonderful stuff for the POWs . . .  he put the issue on the 
front page." She added, "His support as a private citizen was extremely important" in that 
he not only was instrumental in obtaining publicity but funding trips to Paris for the 
wives. It was during one trip to Paris that Perot funded that a small group of wives asked 
the North Vietnamese, "Are we wives, or are we widows?" The question, publicized 
throughout the world and, consequently, it brought attention to the prisoners' plight.
Unlike most other supporters, Ross Perot had the financial ability and connections 
to bring attention to bear on the POW and MIA issue. Karen Butler referred to Ross Perot 
as a "media magnet." "[He] amplified everything we tried to do a thousand times over," 
Karen said. She characterized Ross Perot’s efforts as "very significant and very 
effective." Shirley Stark indicated that she was grateful that someone of prestige and 
influence "cared."
145
Mr. Perot declined to be interviewed for this research project but subsequently, and graciously, 
agreed to permit the author to review  his personal POW  and M IA files post dissertation. During our short 
conversation on July 21, 2 0 0 5 ,1 discussed som e o f  the preliminary findings and how  the w om en recalled  
his support and contribution to the POW s and M IAs matter.
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Other wives I interviewed also appreciated the commitment and contribution of 
Ross Perot. Marie Estocin spoke about a meeting at Hotel del Coronado, Coronado, 
California, that Ross Perot hosted. The meeting launched a cross-country caravan of 
vehicles to publicize the POW and MIA issue. The caravan gathered letters across the 
United States, which were then delivered to governmental officials in Washington DC. 
Marie said wives understood that this was another way to make the public aware of the 
prisoners' plight, as well as make a statement to governmental officials that it was their 
duty to "keep the wives informed."
Bonnie Singleton attested to Perot's generosity. At one point, Perot asked Bonnie 
what he could do to help her and the Dallas Cares organization Bonnie had started in her 
hometown. She simply requested bumper stickers to publicize the POW and MIA issue. 
She was not aware, at the time, of Perot's vast wealth or his influence. His wealth, at 
least, soon became apparent as Bonnie and her group were inundated with bumper 
stickers carrying an array of messages that included: "POWs Never Have a Nice Day" (an 
adaptive use o f the 1960s colloquial saying, "Have a Nice Day!"), and "MIA— Only 
Hanoi Knows." Soon the Perot-funded bumper sticker campaign went national.
Bonnie also soon began to realize the extent o f Perot's influence. She told me that 
Ross Perot arranged for Bonnie and her son to appear in a full-page article in the Dallas 
Morning News. According to Bonnie, the article centered on Perot announcing that "he 
had met this three year old boy who had never seen his father and who deserved an 
answer about whether his father was alive or not." His objective, she recalled, was "to 
draw some attention to it" and then ask people to voice their concern. From this 
experience, Ross Perot started the "United We Stand" organization.
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Sybil Stockdale was convinced that Ross Perot "was working hand in glove with 
the Nixon administration" and that he was influential in obtaining President Nixon’s 
support for the wives. The historical record is a bit more ambiguous on this point, 
however. It was clear from a number of White House memoranda that Ross Perot did 
speak with the President directly on his activities and issues related to POWs and
146 .MIAs. It is also clear that these talks resulted in certain actions.
For example, a memorandum from Nixon aide, Alexander Butterfield, 
summarized a meeting between President Nixon and Perot, which noted that, during the 
meeting; the President had been "reiterating his continued interest in resolving the POW 
dilemma." The memo also indicated that the President "felt that a separate team or 
organizations was needed, something independent of, or at least detached, from, the 
Department o f State," and that these so-called action team approach "should serve to 
make the priority on this matter more clear. . . . not only to the Hanoi Government and 
the U. S. Public, but our Departments of State and Defense as well." The memorandum 
also mentions Perot's strong conviction "that the action team system would certainly do 
more than is being done to relieve the plight o f U. S. prisoners." The memo concluded by 
noting that President Nixon, by February 15, wanted "a game plan on how best to 
organize a White House team, the sole duty of which will be to work for" specific 
objectives. These objectives were as follows:
• impartial inspection of POW facilities
146
A lexander Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon, to 
Richard N ixon, President o f  the U nited States, W ashington, DC, Jan. 31 , 1970; Presidential Materials 
Project, Presidential Materials R eview  Board, R eview  on Contested D ocum ents, W hite H ouse Special 
Files; S taff M ember and O ffice Files; Alexander P. Butterfield (Jan. 1970); N ixon  Presidential Materials; 
National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, MD.
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• free exchange of mail and packages
• release of a list o f names o f all known prisoners
• the earliest possible release of all prisoners'47
Given the State Department's well-established commitment to pursuing a strategy 
of Quiet Diplomacy— a commitment that did not simply disappear with the change of 
administrations— this decision during the Perot meeting to establish a White House team 
independent of the State Department could be considered as a significant move. Thus, the 
historical record at least partially supports Sybil Stockdale's assumptions about Ross 
Perot's influence within the White House.
My interview with presidential aide, Alexander Butterfield, however, suggests a 
somewhat contradictory— or at least a considerably more complex— story. Butterfield 
told me that Perot "was always more harm than he was good for us." He added that those 
in the White House actually "tried to distance [themselves] from the things Perot was 
doing." He went so far as to say, "We were scared to death o f him.'" Butterfield added 
that Perot was a "true loose cannon" and noted, "you can't have a Wildman attached to the 
President or to the White House or to the Department of State."
Butterfield did say, however, that Perot "is a very generous man, not a bad guy 
sitting around like this chewing the fat," and that "he's done some wonderfully generous
147
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things." He also noted that for "the wives he was very good . . . very generous with his 
money . . .  his heart was in the right place." Thus, while his influence on the Nixon 
administration could be debated, his support for the National League and his assistance in 
spreading the League's message across to the nation is exceedingly clear. To this day, the 
wives I interviewed acknowledged and remained exceedingly grateful for this support. 
Senator Bob Dole
Many of the wives who I interviewed also mentioned the support of Senator 
Robert Dole o f Kansas and spoke of the work Senator Dole did to help them get the POW 
and MIA issue on the national agenda. Though Mr. Dole did not grant an interview, he 
sent me a number of important and pertinent documents related to his work on the POW 
and MIA issue. Richard Capen, Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Nixon 
administration, also provided information about Mr. Dole's contributions. Capen was the 
one who put the story of the significance o f Dole's support in context. When I 
interviewed him, in fact, Capen spoke about his personal frustration with obtaining high 
ranking elected and appointed officials— even within the Nixon administration in which 
Capen served— to attend to the POW and MIA issue. "We couldn't get the interest o f the 
Department of State. We couldn't get the interest of the White House. We couldn't get 
Kissinger's interest. They were all doing other things."
As in the Johnson administration, the "other things" dealt with ending the war. 
Capen said that whenever he and others raised the POW and MIA issue, the response,
148
At his own expense, R oss Perot chartered tw o airplanes for the express purposes o f  delivering  
26  tons o f  food and Christmas presents to Am erican prisoners in Hanoi in 1969. Though not successfu l, the 
act gained widespread media attention.
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invariably, was, "We're not going to worry about this."
So Capen did an end-run of sorts, and attempted to use pressure from Congress to 
get the POW and MIA issue on the national agenda. An obvious point person for this 
effort would be World War II veteran, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS). Capen recalled 
telling Senator Dole that the POW and MIA situation not only was "an important issue" 
but that it also was an issue "right up [his] alley." Capen told me that "it was Bob Dole 
who took the issue" and ran with it, and many o f the wives had similar recollections. 
Even Sandy Dennison, who was concerned that Senator Dole was overly hawkish on the 
war, acknowledged that his involvement with the POW and MIA issue was genuine and 
important.
Among the materials Senator Dole sent to me was his April 29, 1970, testimony 
before the house Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on National Security Policy
149
and Scientific Developments. His statement to the committee acknowledged previous 
testimony and a plethora of documents that the committee had received that substantiated 
the "humiliation and abuse" of POWs and the "unpardonable manipulation of 
information" of North Vietnam. His statement also summarized how Congressional 
participation was taking a leading role to advocate for and demand humane treatment of 
POW, as well as a full accounting o f MIAs.150
In his testimony, Dole also mentioned the National League of Families meeting 
that was scheduled to begin on May 2, 1970, and the designation o f May 3 as a National 
Day of Prayer "for humane treatment and safe return of these brave Americans."151
149
] 5 0  Senator Bob D ole, correspondence with author, March 28 , 2003 .
151 I b i d *
Ibid.
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Finally, Senator Dole mentioned a tribute to the POWs billed as: "Appeal for 
International Justice," scheduled for Constitutional Flail on May 1.
Senator Dole was instrumental in organizing the May 1 tribute. He did this after 
attending a similar sort o f Constitutional Hall event several months earlier in February 
1970. There were only 300 attendees at that earlier event in a venue that seats 3000. 
Because of the sparse turnout and support among colleagues, Senator Dole resolved to fill
152
Constitution Hall in 90 days. He accomplished this goal.
Ross Perot and Sybil Stockdale were named the honorary co-chairpersons of the 
May event, and Senator Dole was one o f the speakers. In his correspondence to me, Mr. 
Dole included a copy of his opening remarks at the, "Appeal for International Justice" in 
Constitutional Hall. The speech is a clarion call for citizenry to become actively involved 
in the POW and MIA issue:
In Ancient Greece, a philosopher was once asked, "When will justice come to 
Athens?" He replied, "Justice will never come to Athens until those who are not 
injured start to become as indignant as those who are injured." Today we say that 
international justice will never come to Southeast Asia unless we who do not have 
loved ones missing or listed as Prisoners of War start to become as indignant as 
those who do.153
The Senator concluded his remarks by saying that being sympathetic to the prisoners and 
their families was insufficient. "We must organize," he said," to demonstrate continuing 
American concern for captured and missing American servicemen." Then laying down
152
P O W  an d  MIA Tribute D ay, 9 1 st C ong., 2nd sess., C on gression a l R eco rd  116 (March 12, 1970, 
to M arch^p, 1970): p. 8331.
Senator Bob D ole, Constitutional Hall, W ashington, DC, M ay 1, 1970, unpublished data, 
private collection.
199
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six
the gauntlet, he declared Americans "must mobilize the court o f world opinion against
,  . . ,,1 5 4
these atrocities.
Mr. Dole continued to bring the POW and MIA issue before the Senate, as 
attested by entries in the Congressional Record for May 20, 1970, July 20, 1971, and 
September 29, 1971. Also included in the packet of material Senator Dole sent to me was 
a copy of a personal letter he had sent to members o f the House and Senate. In that letter, 
he requested that members of Congress offer their allocated seats to POW and MIA 
family members from their States to attend the Joint Session o f Congress on September 
22, 1970. At that time, Colonel Frank Borman would report on his eleven-nation trip in 
support of the POWs and MIAs. From these documents and other files from the National 
Archives, it is apparent that Mr. Dole was tireless in his efforts to gain support, publicity, 
and maintain pressure on North Vietnam for their violations o f the Geneva Convention. 
Most of this was done without the public fanfare, which resulted in him never given the 
credit for his efforts. The wives I interviewed, however, knew about the external support 
Senator Dole provided their organization and their organization's agenda.
Other External Support: The National Advertising Council's Campaign
As has already been noted in the discussion of the national organization's 
finances, the National League also benefited from significant (but unsolicited) donations 
from a number of organizations. One organization that was mentioned as significant by a 
number of the wives I interviewed— and by Richard Capen and Alexander Butterfield—  
was the Advertising Council. The Advertising Council is, as it was then, a private, non­
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social issues to educate Americans and change public attitude. The Council made a major 
effort to publicize the plight of the prisoners, and a number of the wives, even decades 
later, continue to believe that this publicity was important in raising public awareness of 
the POW and MIA issue.
It is not clear what role, if any, the National League played in encouraging the 
Advertising Council's media blitz. What is clear was the role that President Nixon and 
members o f his administration played in encouraging the Advertising Council's POW 
campaign. For instance, a March 22, 1971, White House memorandum from Alexander 
Butterfield to Brigadier General Hughes contains the subject line, "Full-Time PR 
Activities relative to the administration's efforts on behalf of POWs and those listed as 
MIA" and refers to a March 10 meeting between Mr. Robert Keim, President of 
Advertising Council, and the President.155 As the later section on the government's 
response to the POW issue, in general, and the National Leagues efforts, in particular, 
will make clear, the Advertising Council's POW campaign was part o f a more general 
strategy within the Nixon administration to use the POW and MIA issue to address a 
number of diplomatic and political goals.
In discussions of the political process, however, intentions must be separated out 
from effects. Whatever intentions motivated the Advertising Council's campaign to 
increase public awareness of the POW issue; the wives who recalled the campaign were 
convinced that the campaign provided their cause invaluable support.
155
The m em o also refers to "other m em bers o f  the ad hoc interagency group on P O W s and Ml's." 
Alexander P. Butterfield, A ssistant C hief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon , to Brigadier 
General James D. H ughes, Military Assistant to the President, W ashington, D C , Mar. 22, 1971; Presidential 
Materials R eview  Board, R eview  on Contested D ocum ents, W hite H ouse Special Files; S ta ff M ember and 
O ffice Files; A lexander P. Butterfield, (Mar. 1971); N ixon  Presidential M aterials; National A rchives at 
C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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Putting External Support in Context
What this section demonstrated was that the wives and family members did not 
work in isolation. Individuals such as Ross Perot and Senator Robert Dole and 
organizations such as the National Advertising Council became powerful and important 
allies, and they were, in fact, highly important in communicating the National League's 
message about the unjust and illegal treatment of the POWs.
This discussion o f external support, however, should not be seen as, in any way, 
minimizing the importance of the wives' and family members' efforts to get the POW 
issue onto government officials' agenda and into the consciousness o f the American 
People. The POW wives were out in front on the POW issue; they were publicizing the 
POW issue before any of their external allies embraced it. Even before a national 
organization had been formed, and long before Senator Dole attempted to rouse his 
colleagues and Ross Perot was attempting to influence President Nixon or the American 
public, the POW wives were making their personal visits and corresponding with 
government officials. As early as January 1969 soon after the telegraph-in discussed 
above, Sybil Stockdale wrote to President Nixon, in her leadership role in what was then 
the League of Wives, asking for a meeting with him. It took almost a year for that request 
to be granted—the meeting finally occurred on December 12, 1969— but, during the 
intervening year, as the section on the government's response will clearly indicate, the 
administration was quite aware of the wives and the issue that they had raised.
Furthermore, even before the Advertising Council entered the picture, the wives 
had been working to generate publicity to, as Mary Winn said, "arouse the support o f the 
American public" and have "local groups appeal to Congressman and Senators and
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government officials." Over the years, the wives and the other family members who 
became part of the formal organization that had been formed became quite adept at doing 
publicity and applying pressure indirectly. In part, this was because of only the wives and 
family members had a truly compelling personal story to tell. Sybil, for instance, was 
convinced that if  the reality of the POW and MIA issue failed to touch the publics' soul it 
would not spread; therefore, according to Sybil, "the idea was to involve everyone 
emotionally."
By the time Sybil Stockdale and a group o f representative wives and mothers 
from, what had become, the National League of Families of American Prisoners in 
Southeast Asia met with President Nixon at the end of 1969, it was obvious that the 
group had achieved its goals of both obtaining the public's attention and placing the POW 
and MIA issue on government officials' radar screen. It was still not clear, at the time, 
however, whether or not the treatment of the prisoners had improved, nor was it clear that 
improvement would occur in the near future. Consequently, the National League adopted 
a new set of strategies that, in at least some significant respects, broke with the standard 
operating procedures that the group had used in the past: the group decided to become 
players on the world stage.
Bold Maneuvers: The National League Becomes a Player on the World Stage 
"In 1972 I did go under the League umbrella to Paris for [the]
International Communist Conference on Indo-China at Versailles.
There were 800 communist delegates. . . . three of us were chosen to go over.
I represented all families in North Vietnam, 
one representing South Vietnam, and one from Laos."
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Phyllis Galanti, Wife o f POW
As with most other strategies employed by the National League, even what I have 
characterized in the heading for this section as the National League's "bold international 
maneuver," had been, in a sense, rehearsed on a more informal basis prior to the National 
League officially embracing and utilizing the strategy. Indeed, one-third of the wives I 
interviewed spoke of making a trip to Paris, to confront the North Vietnamese 
representatives to the Peace Talks. Many o f these trips happened outside of the auspices 
of the League of Wives or the National League.
The first trip to Paris, in fact, occurred in September 1968 with a second one two 
months later in November. A local Dallas, Texas, television station, paid for the first trip 
and Ross Perot funded the second trip. The first trip included a delegation of four POW 
wives from Texas headed by Bonnie Singleton; the second trip included Bonnie and one 
other wife from the first trip. This group— like all the other groups that would follow 
them to Paris with and without the imprimatur of the League of Wives or the National 
League— had a clear agenda: they wanted information about their husbands and their 
questions about their husbands' situations answered. Furthermore, they wanted to 
confront the North Vietnamese about their mistreatment o f the prisoners, violations of the 
Geneva Convention, and generate publicity about the plight o f the prisoners.
Bonnie also told me that she and the others who accompanied her to Paris understood the 
need to remain independent of the United States government. While discussing this point 
with me, Bonnie recalled the advice of Murphy Martin, a local television personality in 
Dallas. According to Bonnie, Martin had told her that the wives were "best served by not 
affiliating with anyone but just going as yourselves— be yourselves." Bonnie told me that
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she and the others "knew that the North Vietnamese would immediately claim [they] 
were pawns of the government and the military." Consequently, she— and most of the 
other wives I interviewed who had worked internationally— understood that keeping their 
distance from the United States government and eschewing official governmental 
sponsorship— would help them, in Bonnie's words, "have credibility in the world."156
Interestingly, Sybil Stockdale opposed the Texas delegation's trip. Bonnie recalled 
receiving a phone call from Sybil in 1968, while Bonnie was planning the Dallas-based 
wives' first trip to Paris. According to Bonnie, the major objection was that the group had 
not done its homework and, consequently, could do more harm than good.
During their telephone call, Sybil told Bonnie about a similar group of wives from 
California that was planning a similar group. Members of this group, however, were 
educating themselves about the cultural differences between Americans and Vietnamese 
before making the trip. Sybil believed that such knowledge was of vital importance so 
that the wives would not "make [the North Vietnamese officials] angry by embarrassing 
them." Bonnie told me that she "explained to [Sybil] that [the Dallas group] never 
thought about anybody not liking the idea or feeling like [they] were doing something 
wrong." Bonnie said, "It was an independent decision that [they] made," not an 
organizational one. She and her delegation went to Paris, and Sybil and Bonnie agreed to
156
Som e o f  the w ives I interviewed did speak about receiving advice or guidance w hen they 
visited Paris. For instance, B onnie Singleton recalled that before departing on their first trip Frank Sieverts, 
Department o f  State, told the w om en that they could not m ake it appear they had any connections w ith the 
American government. Furthermore, he told her that neither the Department o f  State nor the American  
government could be held "responsible for what m ight happen to you." On her second trip, Henry Cabot 
Lodge was in Paris and wanted to m eet with her and the other w ife  before they w ent to the North  
Vietnam ese Embassy. B ecause o f  her com m itm ent not to be v iew ed as a patsy or entangled w ith American  
government interests she refused to m eet with Lodge. Another instance w as m entioned by C hloe M oore.
She told me that prior to her and three other w om en departing A m erica for Paris they w ere "debriefed" by 
governmental authorities and told not to discuss w ith anyone the status o f  their husbands as either POW  or 
MIA. They could only talk in terms of: "My husband is in the service, he's overseas."
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respectfully disagree on this point. The emphasis here is on the adverb respectfully. As 
with a number of other significant disagreements among members o f the League of 
Wives and the two iterations of the National League, those who disagreed found ways to 
manage these disagreements and keep them from becoming personal and undermining 
the effectiveness o f the group.
Other informal delegations followed Bonnie Singleton's lead in going to Paris 
before the strategy was officially embraced and employed by the national organization. 
Sybil's concerns about avoiding offending the North Vietnamese became a moot point 
during most of these early visits. From the women I interviewed it appeared that for 
sometime after meeting with Bonnie Singleton and her group the North Vietnamese 
delegates to Paris mostly ignored the wives who came to meet with them— often not even 
opening the door.
Chloe Moore, for instance, recalled feelings of desperation and frustration when 
she and a group of wives went to Paris and were denied any opportunity to speak with 
North Vietnamese officials. She told me, "We'd wait at the door [of the North 
Vietnamese embassy] and bang on the door. The French police would come and say to 
us; 'Leave right now, or we'll take you in.' They weren't very friendly. We were not 
successful."
Similarly, Marie Estocin's told me that during her first trip to Paris with Jenny 
Connell Robertson and their children, the North Vietnamese officials "slammed the door" 
in their face. Jenny told me that the experience "was very painful" for her and her 
children. On their second trip to Paris, during which their children once again 
accompanied them, Marie and Jenny were advised, and Marie did not remember by
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whom, to have media personnel follow them to the North Vietnamese Embassy. Marie 
told me she remembered UPI camera crews and photographers at the Embassy and "shot 
the whole series of [them] pounding on the door and note getting a response." Marie told 
me the goal "was to prove to the American public that the Vietnamese were not 
cooperating with us as far as getting out information in a truthful way. UPI cameras shot 
that whole series and situation of us pounding on the door and not getting a response."
Indeed, although the wives who went to Paris without the official support o f the 
national organization were less than successful in getting access to the North Vietnamese, 
their trips were quite successful in generating publicity at home and abroad. Ross Perot 
and Congressman Olin Teague (D-TX), for example, had used their influence to ensure 
that the Dallas media covered Bonnie Singleton's first and second trip to Paris. And Jenny 
Connell Robertson recalled that the news media that covered their second attempt to 
speak to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris photographed the children carrying 
pictures of their dads. If pictures are worth a thousand words, these pictures 
instantaneously told a truly compelling story.
This sort of human twist, along with the inherent drama associated with 
confrontation, ensured continued media interest in covering wives groups' attempts to 
talk with the North Vietnamese delegates, and the stories the media reported ensured 
global recognition of and continued worldwide publicity for the POW and MIA issue.
The wives also traveled to neutral countries and, at times, were successful in arranging 
meetings with government officials in these countries. Bonnie Singleton, for example, 
told me o f her meeting with Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden.
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Whether meeting with international leaders or talking with the international press, 
the wives' message was always the same. As Chloe Moore told me, the wives did not 
"request that they [the North Vietnamese] release our husbands . . . that was futile." 
Rather the request was for information, humane treatment, adherence to the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and holding the North 
Vietnamese accountable for the men.
This focus on the need for humane treatment and the failure of the North 
Vietnamese to provide such treatment and adhere to the Geneva Convention served to 
embarrass the North Vietnamese, according to Bonnie Singleton. She noted that the 
North Vietnamese began to mount their own publicity campaign aimed at denying the 
wives' charges about prisoner mistreatment, which taught the wives an important lesson: 
"The North Vietnamese were responsive to the pressure o f public opinion."
Sybil Stockdale first traveled to Paris in August 1969. She headed an official 
delegation representing the newly formed National League. Unlike most of the other 
wives who had been rebuffed in their attempts to talk with the North Vietnamese 
representatives in Paris, Sybil and her delegation were formally received by the North 
Vietnamese delegation. Presumably, this occurred, at least in part, because Sybil and her 
delegation were official representatives o f national organization and because o f Sybil's 
status as the National's League's founder and initial National Coordinator o f the League 
o f Wives and National League o f Families. The decision by North Vietnamese officials to 
meet with Sybil and her delegation may also have been influenced by what appeared to 
be growing concerns among the North Vietnamese about negative POW publicity.
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At any rate, the meeting took place on October 4. After a few opening remarks, 
Xuan Oanh, head o f the North Vietnamese delegation, pulled out the July 31, 1969, 
edition o f the New York Times that contained a story and a photo o f her sitting on the 
steps of the Capital in Washington DC. According to Sybil, Xuan Oanh told her, "We 
know all about you Mrs. Stockdale . . . .We know you are the organizer" of the National 
League o f Families. Sybil told me that her "heart just dropped" because she was "scared 
to death about what he was going to say" next. What else did he know, she wondered. 
What other issue was he about to raise? There was an extended period o f silence, during 
which Sybil purposely refrained from speaking. She simply waited. After a time, the 
conversation turned to other matters, i.e., the issues that the National League had been 
raising for a number of years: mail delivery, Red Cross inspections, the North 
Vietnamese to provide a list o f prisoners and account for the missing, and adhere to the 
Geneva Convention agreement about the treatment o f prisoners. As the discussion began 
to cover very familiar ground (albeit with a very unfamiliar audience), Sybil told me, 
decades later, that she began to "feel a lot better."
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"It's pretty hard for them [the wives] to do much if they don't feel the government wants 
them to do it. You're running a risk that you might in fact be jeopardizing lives, or, 
jeopardizing our ability to negotiate a settlement in Paris. How would you know?
If they're [government and military officials] telling you for five years 
you're going to endanger their life . . .  the Peace Talks . .  . embarrass 
the North Vietnamese . . .  it will prolong the war.
All those things could have happened when we did what we did.
But, we didn't think we had the luxury of doing nothing!"
Richard Capen
After nearly four decades, the wives I interviewed, who were part of the League 
of Wives or the National League of Families, remained uncertain— and some were 
downright skeptical— about the impact their group had had on the policymaking process. 
For instance, they were unaware— after all these years— if their work had any direct 
influence on elected or appointed officials in Washington DC. Most wanted to believe 
that they had made a difference, but many doubted that this was the case and all the 
women I interviewed were uncertain about the matter.
At a POW and MIA wives gathering in August 2004,1 presented several White 
House documents to show them the extent of their influence. As the fourteen ladies 
viewed the sample documents, I listened to their comments to each other. It quickly 
became apparent that, for all of the wives, including the politically savvy leader of the 
group, Sybil Stockdale, this was the first time they had been informed of—much less 
seen—documents that focused on their efforts and the impact o f these efforts on the
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Nixon White House. The question put to me, again and again, was, "Do you think we 
really made a difference?" The data reported in this final section strongly supports the 
claim that the women's actions did, indeed, have a significant impact.
Precipitating Events to Influence Nixon White House 
This section begins by discussing activities that the wives engaged in that have 
already been focused on in earlier sections. Here, however, the focus is on the 
government's reaction to these activities.
The League o f  Wives Telegraph-In
By the time of Richard Nixon's election as President in 1968, the National League 
activities, in Sybil Stockdale's words, had "really became refined in response to specific 
events." During my interview with Sybil, she talked about the late 1960s and the number 
o f protest conducted through "sit-ins" and "stand-ins" on college campuses and at 
governmental buildings across America. This effort on the part of anti-war and civil 
rights demonstrators gave her an idea. She decided the League of Wives would conduct a 
"telegraph-in" with the target being the Nixon White House.
Communicating with an estimated sixty wives across the country, which in turn 
communicated with other wives, Sybil asked the wives to send as many telegrams as 
possible to the newly elected President on Inauguration Day, January 20, 1969.
According to Sybil, the message was simple; the wives were "asking him to give the 
prisoner situation a high priority in his administration." The result, she said, was over, 
"two thousand telegrams on his desk that day after his inauguration."
The Nixon White House files stored at the National Archives and Records 
Administration in College Park, Maryland contain actual telegrams sent to the White
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House. One such telegram, dated January 20, 1969, is from Mrs. Nell R. Peele of 
Raleigh, North Carolina. Her request to the President is straightforward: "I ask today 
every effort be made on behalf of the prisoners who are utterly helpless without the 
intervention by you— our President—their Commander-in-Chief. My congratulations to 
you on this historic day; my prayers join those o f millions for your immediate solution to 
our agony of suspense, as we await the release o f our prisoners and the return of our sons
157
and husbands."
The files also contain numerous letters and memoranda regarding the wives 
"telegraph-in." In a White House memorandum dated January 22, 1969, Gwen King, 
White House Staff and Correspondence, informed Bromley Smith, White House Staff, 
about the telegrams arriving for the President from families o f prisoners of war in North 
Vietnam. She wrote:
Since noon January 20, 1969, 424 telegrams have been received from families of 
POW in NVN— and the telegraph office says they are continuing to come in. The 
theme is substantially the same: (a) that the President give top priority to 
obtaining the release of the prisoners of war (b) that the North Vietnamese supply 
a list of the prisoners of war (c) that the families be allowed to correspond with 
them, and (d) that no deals be made with the North Vietnamese in negotiation in
158
Paris without including release of prisoners of war.
157
Mrs. N ell R. Pelle, to Richard N ixon , President o f  the U nited States, R aleigh, N C , January 20 , 
1969; W hite House Central Files N D  18-3; Prisoners; [1969-70]; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National 
A rchives C ollege Park, C ollege Park, MD.
Gwen King, W hite H ouse S taff and Correspondence, to Brom ley Sm ith, W hite H ouse Staff, 
W ashington, DC, January 22, 1969; White H ouse Central F iles N D  18-3/CO 165; Beginning; 12/31/69; 
N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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She also informed Smith that 393 telegrams "have been sent to the Department of
State" and she wanted to know from Smith about routing procedures she should take for
• • •  159 those continuing to arrive.
As mentioned in Chapter 7, Sybil Stockdale had had the opportunity to speak with 
Alexander Butterfield, Assistant Chief o f Staff, and Special Assistant to President Nixon, 
at a function in Coronado, California, where he discussed his experiences in the Nixon 
White House. She told me that they spoke about the telegraph-in and that from 
Butterfield's recollection the "two thousand telegrams on his desk really made a 
difference" and that they "had an effect on the President." Years later, during an interview 
with me for this study, Butterfield reiterated the belief that the telegrams that arrived on 
inauguration day certainly got the POW and MIA issue on Nixon's radar screen.
There is one other bit of, admittedly, circumstantial evidence that Butterfield's 
judgment about the impact o f the telegram campaign is, indeed, correct. President Nixon 
conducted his first press conference, on January 27, 1969. During the press conference, 
when prompted by two different questions about ending the war, President Nixon said 
that certain steps "can be taken now . . .  [that] we believe the other side should agree to 
and can agree to." These steps included, as Nixon said, "the exchange o f prisoners,"
something that, as has been noted, traditionally occurs only when a war has ended.
It is difficult to definitively connect the dots between President Nixon's press 
conference endorsement of exchanging prisoners sooner rather than later, on the one 
hand, and the telegraph-in, on the other. Indeed, at the press conference, President Nixon
159
160 I b l d i
President, N ew s Conference o f  January 27 , 1969, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the U nited  
States, Richard N ixon, (1969): 10.
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clearly indicated that he was endorsing the recommendations for immediate action made 
by Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge's influence on Nixon's 
thinking also is confirmed in notes that Nixon made on ledger paper a week or so prior to
the press conference: "V. Nam: Lodge statement— sets forth American position: (1)
161
Mutual withdrawal -  (2) D.M.Z. restoring -  (3) Prisoner Exchange."
Even if Lodge was the prime catalyst, however, it is possible that the wives 
influenced Lodge’s thinking. Bonnie Singleton mentioned corresponding with him and 
his request to meet with her. Bonnie, however, was about to embark on her second trip to 
Paris to confront the North Vietnamese delegation when Mr. Lodge wanted to meet. 
Consequently, she refused in order to maintain a sense of independence from 
government.
Sybil Stockdale indicated that she also had contacted Ambassador Lodge to 
inform him of a second telegraph-in two months after the group’s first effort. The second
telegraph-in was aimed, not at President Nixon, but at Xuan Thuy in Paris, Chief of the
162
North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
Whether any of these contacts stimulated Ambassador Lodge’s advice to the 
President on the POW issue cannot be known, at this point. Even if it did not, however, it 
seems reasonable to assume, in light of Butterfield's remarks about the White House's 
awareness of the thousands of telegrams that arrived on inauguration day, that the 
women’s actions played at least some part in increasing the saliency of the POW and
MIA issue within the Nixon administration. From the wives perspective, of course, the
161
President's Handwriting, W ashington, DC, January 20 and 21; W hite H ouse Special F iles, 
President's O ffice Files; W hite H ouse N otes April 1969; Handwriting 1968-A p ril 1969, January 1969; 
N ixon P ru d en tia l Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D .
(See note 142.)
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important thing was the President o f the United States, for whatever reason, mentioned 
the POW/MIA issue during his first press conference.
The League o f  Wives Official Request to Meet with Nixon
"I think we will prevail in our efforts to see the President personally."
Sybil Stockdale
Immediately after the wives telegraph-in, Sybil Stockdale sent a telegram dated 
January 23, 1969, to President Nixon requesting a meeting with him. In her telegram, 
Sybil informed President Nixon that she was asked by the League o f Wives of American 
Prisoners in Vietnam "to represent them in asking for a brief visit." She requested that, if  
possible, the meeting be scheduled on either January 30 or 31, which corresponded with 
the two days that she would be in Washington DC.163
As it turned out, this lone telegram by Sybil Stockdale initiated several internal 
White House, Department o f Defense, and Department of State memoranda. In a letter 
dated January 29, 1969, Carl S. Wallace, Office of the Secretary of Defense, wrote to 
Colonel Hughes, Armed Forces Aide to the President, and discussed Sybil's request to 
meet with the President. Wallace's memorandum indicated that the Office o f the 
Secretary of Defense and Department o f State recommended the President see her, but in 
conjunction with other wives. Furthermore, Wallace wrote, if  President Nixon were to 
meet with the women, the recommendation is that "no advance publicity of this meeting 
be given." The memorandum also included background information about Sybil 
Stockdale; Wallace characterized Sybil as an "articulate, forthright, and a vigorous leader 
among this group of women whose husbands are prisoners." (This is also the
163
Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection.
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memorandum that characterized Sybil's personality as "intelligent, stable and articulate
164
woman. )
On January 30, 1969, Colonel Hughes sent a memorandum to John D. Erlichman, 
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs about Sybil's request. The opening line of 
the memorandum is indicative of the amount of influence Sybil Stockdale and the wives 
had gained within the Department of Defense. Hughes wrote: "We have received some 
pressure from within the Department of Defense for a Mrs. James B. Stockdale to be
165
received by the President in an official call." He also addressed additional matters,
which, according to him, required serious consideration "if any meeting should take place
166
and, if so, what form it should take; and who should be represented."
The Hughes memorandum is important for a number reasons. One reason is that it 
documents that the women had been successful in signing up allies within the 
Department of Defense. The memo also is important because it is the first official 
indication about the government's perception of the number of women involved with the 
League of Wives; the memo estimates the number as "fifty." The estimate is significant 
because it demonstrates that size does not necessarily matter when it comes to garnering 
political influence. Despite their small size, the wives had the power to generate a flurry
167
of activity within the Nixon administration.
164
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Just over three decades later, Richard Capen, during my interview with him, 
offered a somewhat different perspective about the size of the group relative to those 
advancing the cause; he noted that "there were a lot more members . . . [but] there were 
relative small numbers who were really leading this effort." Even when less active and 
potential members are included in the count, the group could hardly be considered 
sizable. It is much more likely that the group got the White House's attention because of 
its cohesiveness and consistent message rather than the size of its membership.
Colonel Hughes responded to Sybil's request on January 31, 1969, and informed
her that President Nixon could not meet with her due to "an extremely heavy schedule
168
and post-transition workload." He reminded Sybil that at the President's first press 
conference and "from other public statements which he has made [the prisoners] are a 
matter o f primary concern to him."169 The letter concluded with his assurances that the 
POWs "will not be forgotten here at the White House. They will be a matter of concern to
170
the President and to all of us until they are safely returned to this country."
On February 12, 1969, Sybil Stockdale sent a letter to Colonel Hughes at the 
White House in response to his January 31 letter. Its full contents demonstrate Sybil's 
determination, her continued commitment to the personal visit strategy for influencing 
public officials (even the President o f the United States), and her developing political 
savvy which, in this instance, is demonstrated by her expressed intent to establish a 
broader and more representative political coalition prior to making a second request a
168
C olonel James D. Hughes, Arm ed Forces A ide to the President, to Mrs. Sybil Stockdale, 
W ashington, DC, January 31, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles N D  18-3/C O  165; N D  18-3, Beginning;
1 2 /3 1 /6 9 ;^ ixon Presidential Materials; N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
I 7 0  Ibid.
Ibid.
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meeting. (This last insight, o f course, mirrored the recommendation in Wallace 
memorandum that the President should meet with other POW and MIA wives, not just 
Sybil. Sybil, o f course, did not know about the Wallace recommendation.) Here is what 
Sybil wrote to Colonel Hughes:
Thank you for your very kind reply about my request to visit with the President. I 
am indeed glad that the military representatives at the White House are so aware 
of the POW's in Vietnam and any efforts which you exert to give their plight a 
high level priority consideration will be much appreciated. However, I think we 
will prevail in our efforts to see the President personally, as nothing (as I am sure 
you know) is as impressive as a personal visit. I will take heed from my recent 
experience, however, and will join forces with the other services having prisoners 
there when submitting my next request. I hope that we may meet soon and thank
171
you for your past efforts in my behalf.
After Sybil sent the above letter, the issue of a White House visit appears to have 
been closed. The National Archives, for instance, contains no letters or memoranda on 
this topic for a number of months after Sybil sent her letter to Colonel Hughes. Closure, 
however, was only temporary. As comments in Sybil's letter promise, the personal visit 
issue did, indeed, re-emerge later in the game as the women intensified their efforts to 
compel the United States government to take action on the POW and MIA issue. There 
will be more on these intensified efforts— including efforts to use the personal visit 
strategy with the President of the United States— in the later parts of this chapter.
171
Mrs. Sybil Stockdale, to C olonel James D . H ughes, Armed Forces A ide to the President, 
Coronado, CA, February 12, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles N D  18-3/C O  165; Beginning; 12/31/69; 
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Capital Hill Visits and the Congressional Record
"This fact, that the wives had been badgering members o f Congress 
and that [their] activity started to appear in the news and television, kind of forced Nixon
to finally see them and talk to them."
Alexander Butterfield
As was noted in previous sections, the wives extensively used their personal visit 
strategy on members o f Congress. Over time, and as a result of these visits and the 
relationships and sensitivity to the POW and MIA issue that developed from them, 
statements were made on the floors o f the House and Senate that demonstrated growing 
support in the legislative branch for the women and their cause. The Congressional 
Record of the era, in fact, documents mounting support on Capital Hill among Senators 
and Congressman, including members o f President Nixon's political party.
Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA), echoed many of the National League themes 
regarding the plight of the prisoners, accountability o f POWs and MIAs by Hanoi, lack of 
communication between prisoners and families, violations o f the Geneva Convention, 
and even the accusation of possible murder. He stated: "We who have not suffered such a 
loss first hand must do more than wring our hands in sympathy. We must make this 
problem one of the highest possible priorities in our every contact with the Communist 
w orld .. . . Until the day they are free, we Americans cannot rest. Our national conscience
172
will not permit us to."
The same day, Senator Charles Goodell (R-NY), referred to how the POW and
172
Remarks: A m erican P rison ers o f  N orth  Vietnam, 9 1 st C ong., 2 n sess., C on gression a l R eco rd  
116 (April 23, 1970, to M ay 4 , 1970): p. 13850.
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MIA matter had gained unanimous support among Americans who demanded justice 
even though the war has created division in the country. Senator Goodell said, "Last year, 
I noted that among the many sad chapters to the history o f the war in Vietnam, the most 
obnoxious chapter of all deals with the mistreatment of the POW's. This was true then.
173
Sadly, the same is true today."
Congressional support for the League and its cause did not only come from 
Republicans; rather, the evidence from the Congressional Record suggests that interest in 
the POW and MIA issue and support for the National League was bipartisan. Senator 
William Proxmire (D-WI), for instance, used time on the Senate floor to request support 
for Republican Senator Robert Dole's Constitutional Hall tribute scheduled for May 
1970. Like other elected leaders, Republicans and Democrats, his speech echoed the 
themes o f the National League before appealing to the Nixon administration for "a 
determined commitment" on the POW and MIA matter. That commitment, he said, 
"cannot live on rhetoric alone. It is time to reaffirm that commitment by action: action in 
serious negotiations through the Read Cross, the United Nations, and other international 
organizations; action to get other nations to intervene in our behalf for the prisoners of 
war; and action by individual citizens working through local groups."174
There is other evidence, beyond the formal speeches recorded in the 
Congressional Record, to demonstrate that the members of the National League had 
become, over the years, exceedingly influential with members of Congress. Sybil's 
correspondence file from the era, for example, contains a letter to her from Congressman
173
174 Ibid., Rem arks: A p p ea l f o r  In ternational Justice on PO W s. p. 13875.
Ibid., Rem arks: Serious C om m itm ent N eed ed  to H elp  P rison ers o f  W ar—R ally  a t  
C onstitu tional Hall. p. 13876.
220
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The United States Government Responds 
Olin Teague (D-TX). In the letter, Congressman Teague indicates that he had heard about 
a "newsletter" Sybil Stockdale was developing for wives and family members of POWs 
and MIAs. He wrote: "I do not know whether or not the Congressional Record can be 
used for a medium o f exchange; but if you think so, just let me know."'75
The Congressional Record turned out to be an ill-suited venue for publishing a 
newsletter written for wives o f POWs and MIAs, and issues o f the newsletter, 
consequently, never were published in the Congressional Record. Congressman Teague's 
offer to attempt to do this, however, illustrates the sort o f relationships the women had 
established with certain members of the legislative branch by the start o f the Nixon 
administration.
175
From Congressman Olin Teague (D -T X ) to Mrs. James Stockdale, February 3, 1967. Sybil 
Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection.
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A Defining Moment: Secretary o f  Defense Melvin Laird Goes Public and Shift's the
Government's POW  and MIA Policy 
"I had a responsibility to them."
Melving Laird, Secretary o f Defense 
"Once Melvin Laird did that [the public announcement] it became a National 'Okay."
My God, you couldn't keep'em from jumping on."
Sybil Stockdale
One of the members of Congress the wives visited during the Johnson 
administration was a nine-term congressman from Wisconsin, Melvin Laird. As the 
ranking Republican on the Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, he knew a lot about 
Defense issues. He had also been President Nixon's defense advisor during the 
presidential campaign.
When Richard Nixon became President, he tapped Congressman Laird to be his 
Secretary o f Defense. This meant that the National League had at least one exceedingly 
influential "friend" within the Nixon administration. Laird, in fact, used his influence in a 
number o f ways to support the goals o f the National League. His actions and influenced 
are discussed below.
Melvin Laird: The Reluctant Secretary o f  Defense
Richard Capen, an Assistant Secretary o f Defense in the Nixon administration, 
told me during an interview, that Melvin Laird had "reluctantly agreed to become 
Secretary of Defense" (emphasis added). Capen also told me that Melvin Laird 
established two ground rules before accepting the appointment. First, "he would pick his 
own people." This was because, as Richard Capen said, Melvin Laird did not "want any
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political cast offs, or IOUs, or some governor who had lost and needed to have a job" 
working for him. The second ground rule was just as definitive: "If anybody in the White 
House had a reason to contact the Department of Defense, they had to contact him 
[Melvin Laird] and it [i.e., the person initiating the contact] had to either be the President 
or Kissinger. No one else was allowed to contact people down the line and cause 
problems and confusion in the Department o f Defense."
These conditions, which the President, obviously agreed to, meant that the 
National League's friend in the executive branch of government was, indeed, powerful, 
even more powerful than the typical Secretary of Defense would be. Laird quickly used 
his power to make the POW and MIA matter as a salient political issue within the 
administration.
Richard Capen: A Second Ally in the Department o f  Defense
Another o f the National League's allies within the upper echelon of the Nixon 
Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary o f Defense for Public Affairs Richard Capen. 
Capen was not only a competent ally but also an essential sounding board for Laird on 
the POW and MIA issue, which eventually led to the reversal of the previous 
administration's policy of Quiet Diplomacy.’76
During my interview with Capen, he recalled that, during Melvin Laird's first 
meeting with the Assistant Secretaries o f Defense, the group reviewed the first of many 
casualty reports from the war. According to Capen, the reported "number was 502 
killed." With great emphasis, he told me, "I will never forget that number! All of the 
sudden it was our war and those are our killed' (emphasis added).
176
Capen's later post w as A ssistant Secretary o f  D efense for L egislative A ffairs.
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Handling the POW and MIA issue was also now their responsibility— or at least 
they would make it the Department of Defense's responsibility even though the 
Department of State had been responsible within the Johnson administration. Capen told 
me that, early in the Nixon administration, "it was hard to get anybody's attention [on the 
POW and MIA issue] because there were so many more huge issues involved at this 
point." According to Capen, the issues included the ABM treaty (antiballistic missile), the 
war in Vietnam, and then the issue on Capital Hill to "limit the President's flexibility" to 
conduct the war. This already full agenda meant that any proposal for the government to 
become more proactive on POW and MIA matters competed with a plethora of other as 
geopolitical and domestic issues already on the administration's plate.
Still, at the start of the Nixon presidency, Melvin Laird's staff reviewed the POW 
and MIA issue and the prior administration's approach to it. Capen was already familiar 
with the issue because he had lived in San Diego, California, before accepting the 
Assistant Secretary post in the Department of Defense. Consequently, he was aware of 
the personal impact of the POW and MIA issue on wives and families, as well as family 
members' views of the existing policy and the government's rationale for it. Decades 
later, during my interview with him, Capen referred to the POW and MIA issue as "a 
huge cloud of pressure hanging over everybody, including the government [on] how to 
treat this issue and save lives." He also indicated that he knew that maintaining the 
previous administration's Quiet Diplomacy-Keep Quiet policy on the POW and MIA 
issue would result in a revolt by the POW and MIA family members.
Based on his experience and knowledge, he decided to speak with Laird about the 
status of the POW and MIA issue, but not before, he had additional evidence to show
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Laird. The evidence included all the photographs the Department of Defense had 
gathered through intelligence and other means, including photographs and films of the 
POWs paraded through the streets of Hanoi. When he completed his review and compiled 
his data, he went to Laird and said: "Mel, I don't think we can afford to keep quiet 
anymore. We know they're being tortured. We know they're not getting letters. We know 
they're not getting medical care. We know some of them are dying in captivity. We've got
177
some famous pictures; including the one o f John McCain."
Capen's advice to Laird was unequivocal: Capen told me he told the Secretary of 
Defense, "We have an obligation to go public. We cannot take the chance that any more 
men are going to die. We're going to have to take the chance that by putting the heat on 
we will cause the enemy to treat the men better."
As it turned out, the Secretary agreed. As Capen later told me: "We didn't think 
we had the luxury o f doing nothing." Laird, himself, during my interview with him as 
part of this study, characterized President Johnson's Quiet Diplomacy strategy a "do 
nothing policy" because it did not address the plight o f the POWs nor seek to change the 
conditions for the men.
Laird's Publicly Announces a Change in POW  and MIA Policy
So, at a press conference in the Pentagon on May 19, 1969— which not so 
coincidentally, was the birthday o f Ho Chi Minh, the President of North Vietnam, and a 
day of celebration for the North Vietnamese— Secretary of Defense Laird spoke to the
177
Richard Capen told m e that M elvin Laird asked him, as a courtesy, to show  Admiral John 
McCain II, C om m and-in-C hief o f  Pacific Forces, all the photographic evidence they obtained on his son  
John and the pending decision to go public about the abuse and maltreatment o f  the prisoners. Capen said 
Admiral McCain com m itted h im se lf to the decision and told Capen he would: "Help se ll it w ith the POW  
and MIA families."
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American public and the world about the plight of the POWs and his concerns 
over MIAs. Strongly critical of North Vietnamese government he said:
I am deeply shocked and disappointed by this cruel response of Hanoi's 
representative to such a basic request for humanitarian action. Hundreds of 
American wives, children, and parents continue to live in a tragic state of 
uncertainty caused by the lack of information concerning the fate of their loved 
ones. This needless anxiety is caused by the persistent refusal by North Vietnam 
to release the names of U.S. prisoners of war.
I want to reaffirm the continuing hope that Hanoi will provide a list of 
American prisoners and permit a free flow o f mail between U.S. prisoners o f war 
and their families. We continue to urge the immediate release o f sick and 
wounded prisoners, the neutral inspection o f prisoner of war facilities, and the
178
prompt release of all American prisoners.
These comments (and others in a DOD News Release) signaled, clearly and 
unequivocally, an end to the government's so-called Keep Quiet policy. Interestingly, 
during my interview with Laird, he confirmed that the "the public announcement [about 
the shift in policy] was not approved by Richard Nixon or Henry Kissinger." He did not 
ask for approval, he told me, because Kissinger opposed any public discussion by 
administration officials about the plight of the POWs because he was concerned about 
Hanoi's diplomatic response and possible repercussions on his secret negotiation track. 
Richard Capen, who characterized the shift in policy that Laird announced at his
178
Mr. M elvin Laird, Secretary o f  D efense, to Press C onference, W ashington, DC, M ay 19, 1969; 
M elvin R. Laird Papers; Laird Public Statements (Bound); 3 /27 /69  -  6 /20/69; Departm ent o f  D efen se  
Papers; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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May 19 press conference "a big moment for [the POW] issue," told me that the 
announcement was "a huge risk on Melvin Laird's part." "People were pretty unhappy" 
with his decision, Capen told me. He recalled hearing comments like: the "Secretary of 
Defense— he's gone off and created all this thing and we don't have the diplomatic 
strategy behind i t . . . . We don’t know where it's headed. . . . We don't have any control 
over it." Capen also articulated another complaint he heard during this time: "We've got 
all these women who are calling on members of Congress, they're having their meetings, 
they’re going to the White House."
Capen did acknowledge that the strategy that he had urged Laird to implement 
was, indeed, "high-risk stuff." In retrospect, however, he is certain that, despite the 
negative comments o f many government officials at the time, the decision to go public 
about violations of the Geneva Convention and the inhumane treatment "made a huge 
difference."
Capen did complain that Laird "never received the credit" for his action on 
reversing the Quiet Diplomacy policy nor for the initiatives he undertook on the POW 
and MIA issue. "Everyone was getting the credit [for the eventual success o f the POW 
and MIA efforts], including the liberals," he told me; "but so what; that's life!"
Among the wives of the POWs, however, Laird's efforts were noted and very 
much appreciated. As was indicated in an earlier section, the wives recognized—and 
continue to recognize—the contributions he made, including his decision to reverse what 
was, for them, the Keep Quiet Policy And Laird, himself, even today, is clear about his 
motives. During my interview with him, Laird indicated that he decided to circumvent 
Kissinger (and, also, in effect, the President) because he saw his primary responsibility,
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as Secretary of Defense, as being to the American servicemen held captive in Hanoi: "I 
had a responsibility to them— the military men," (emphasis added), he said. He went onto  
explain that this sense of responsibility came, in part, from having read the prisoners 
coded letters, taking note of the lack of information made available to the International
179
Red Cross, and the wives storiesl
The Washington Road Show Rolls Again!
Richard Capen told me he immediately realized the announcement of the policy 
shift would create confusion among the families. Military casualty officers, he noted, had 
constantly reminded families not speak to anyone about their situation. Furthermore, 
Capen was aware that officials within the Department of State and Defense had been 
telling the wives that, if they spoke out, they "might endanger the lives of men" or 
jeopardize the government's "ability to negotiate a settlement in Paris." With the 
government now going public on the inhumane treatment, the families— Capen 
surmised—would have legitimate questions about the effect on their husbands or sons.
In fact, the women that I interviewed for this study had concluded that the 
government's Quiet Diplomacy policy was dysfunctional long before the Secretary of 
Defense's announcement of its demise. Long before Laird made his announcement, in 
fact, Sybil Stockdale had led the fight to obtain a change in the policy. Because of these 
efforts, Sybil received a courtesy phone call from Richard Capen (Department of 
Defense) and Frank Sieverts (Department of State) on the morning of May 19. As Sybil 
told me, she recalled that Capen told her, "At ten o'clock this morning, Washington time, 
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, is going to stand up and acknowledge the fact
179
The Honorable M elvin R. Laird, correspondence w ith author, M ay 22 and June 14, 2003.
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publicly that our prisoners are not being treated humanely." Sybil she said the 
announcement was a "major, major, major victory." She hastened to tell me, somewhat 
somberly, that, by then; her husband "had been in prison four years."
O f course, it is certainly possible— and even likely—that not every wife shared 
Sybil's views about the Quiet Diplomacy policy. As Capen noted, the wives were not a 
"monolithic group of women." Thus, it was probably appropriate that Laird and Capen 
decided it was necessary to bring POW and MIA families up-to-date on the Department 
of Defense's POW and MIA policy and what going public would mean in terms of the 
government’s overall POW/MIA strategy. At any rate, in the summer of 1969, the 
decision from May 19 was translated into anew  series o f briefings for families. Or, to use 
the wives’ words, there was a new Washington Road Shows coming to town.
As was noted in a previous section, the perceptions of the wives I interviewed 
with respect to the new round of briefings was conditioned, at least somewhat, by their 
experience with prior performances by government officials. Even today, many remain 
critical o f what they saw and heard. Some o f the women, however, did detect some 
differences between the government briefings before and after the Laird announcement.
Jenny Connell Robertson, for instance, told me that, after the announcement, 
government and military officials "seemed to listen to [the wives] more intently and more 
seriously . . . and tr[ied] to answer some of our questions." During the previous 
administration, she told me, Washington Road Shows were nothing more than a series of 
speeches; when the women spoke "they [government officials] didn't listen . . .  they 
wanted us to sit and listen." After Laird's announcement of the government's change in
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policy and his willingness to speak publicly about the mistreatment of the POWs, the 
"response was definitely different."
So, What Did the Wives Play in Laird's Decision to Reverse the Quiet Diplomacy Policy
It is always difficult to attribute a shift in policy to the actions o f a particular 
group of individuals or to a particular set o f strategies. Comments by Richard Capen 
suggest that this is certainly the case due to Laird's decision to reverse the government's 
policy o f Quiet Diplomacy, as well as with other governmental actions that flowed from 
this policy reversal. In my interview with Capen, he acknowledged the wives "worked 
hard" to bring about the government's public acknowledgment of inhumane treatment and 
to hold North Vietnam accountable for the prisoners and of those missing. He told me, 
however, that the wives did not save "the lives o f their husbands single-handedly. It just 
doesn’t' work that way." Rather, "an issue like this," according to Capen, "grows much 
beyond any one person or one department." Indeed, in one sense, he said, the POW and 
MIA issue was not the "driving force behind the overall effort to end, to win, or resolve 
the war in Vietnam." He added, however, that the POW and MIA issue "was a part of it." 
Clearly, the wives actions helped make the POW and MIA issue "a part of it"; their 
actions kept the issue front and center in discourse and debate about what to do about the 
Vietnam War.
Capen, in fact, characterized the relationship between the Department o f Defense 
and the wives and their formal organization as a partnership, albeit a partnership with 
self-imposed limitations. "It would have been inappropriate to team up per se because the 
beauty of this was it was independent," Capen told me. According to Capen, it was 
functional for both parties to maintain a degree of separation between the National
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League and a government agency and between the leaders o f the National League and 
government officials. Because o f this separation—or, according to Capen, because of it—  
the wives, in Capen's words, "played a very important, a very strong supportive role" 
(emphasis added).
Maintaining this supportive role and the influence that went with it while also 
remaining separate and independent could not have been easy. Comments that Secretary 
of Defense Melvin Laird made in 1981 during an interview with Vernon E. Davis, 
Consultant for the Historical Office in the Office of the Secretary o f Defense, suggest the 
wisdom of the League's conscious decision to remain focused on the POW and MIA 
issue and to remain nonpartisan on other aspects o f the war. In a "Memorandum for the 
Record," Davis summarized a comment Melvin Laird made about the National League as 
follows: "The impression Mr. Melvin Laird retained of the National League o f Families 
was that its members, especially its leadership, had consistently supported Department o f 
Defense policies. In particular, they had defended Vietnamization after others had 
become critical o f it"180
In fact, there was considerable disagreement within the organization about the 
administration's Vietnam policies. In deciding to sidestep such issues at the 
organizational level, however, the National League transformed itself into the 
organizational equivalent of a Rorschach test. As noted earlier, the decision not to take 
sides on the larger Vietnam War questions helped promote group cohesion as well as 
ensured that the League would have a consistent and highly focused message. Laird's
180
M emorandum for the Record by Vernon E. D avis, April 10, 1981, O ffice  o f  the Secretary o f  
D efense, O SD  Historical O ffice.
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comments suggest that the strategy also helped maintain the League's fragile partnership 
with the Department of Defense and, in so doing, maintain League members' access to 
those with power and their ability to influence the issue that was their central concern. 
The organization’s nonpartisan stance, of course, also did not alienated the dovish critics 
of the administration, many of whom also supported the League.
Nixon White House Activity on POW  and MIA Wives Meeting 
"We had a hell-of-a-time getting Kissinger to meet with [the wives]—they didn't 
want to meet with Kissinger. They wanted to meet with the President."
Richard Capen
As part of the research, I considered it critically important to locate official White 
House documents to determine— as best as possible— what any impact that the League's 
actions had on the Nixon White House, not just the Department of Defense. This research 
took place at National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, 
Maryland.
The amount of relevant material housed at the National Archives is enormous. I 
ended up reviewing about seventy-five boxes o f materials related specifically to POW 
and MIA issues. These boxes contained letters, notes, and memoranda related to POW 
and MIA issues within the Nixon administration. A typical box contains approximately 
1,000 pages of material; some of the boxes I examined contained less than this amount.
Of the tens-of-thousands of pages I reviewed, approximately 350 pages were 
deemed sufficiently relevant to my research topic to make copies for analysis. 
Systematically analyzing even this number o f pages was a daunting task. I must note, 
however, that thousands of documents remain unread while others remain classified by
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the government and are not releasable to the public—unless a researcher submits a 
"Mandatory Review Request" form. I submitted such forms; at the Department of 
Defense, which enabled me to have two classified documents from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense declassified.181 At the National Archives, however, I could not get 
approval in a timely manner, possibly because all such requests also required approval 
from attorneys for the Nixon estate. Even within the boxes of materials to which I had 
access, often I discovered a "Document Withdrawal Record" form, which indicated 
materials had been removed from the box for national security reasons or because of 
privacy issues.
Despite the access problems, I learned that some members o f the White Staff had 
a greater level of involvement in POW and MIA matters than other members did. One of 
those who the records indicated was heavily involved with the issue was Alexander 
Butterfield, the presidential aide who, during the Watergate hearings, revealed that the 
Oval Office had a taping system. I contacted Butterfield, and he agreed to be interviewed. 
He also commented on a number o f memos he had authored that I had discovered in the 
National Archives.
Butterfield turned out to be a man who possessed— and was willing to share— a 
unique insider perspective of how the Nixon White House operated, in general, and the 
White House's treatment of the POW and MIA issue, in particular. Consequently,
1 8 1
I made an attempt to listen to one W hite H ouse Oval O ffice audio tape, w hich the N A R A  
W hite H ouse tape logs indicated Oval O ffice  d iscussions related to POW  and M IA matters. W ithin the 
N ixon  Presidential Materials at N A R A , the catalogue o f  tapes lists 312 audio tape reference numbers that 
contain conversations related to POW  and M IA matters. D ue to the deplorable audio quality I could not be 
confident in my ability to correctly decipher conversations. H ow ever, once the audio tapes are 
professionally remastered and transcribed, the conversations w ould be invaluable for additional research on 
POW  and MIA matters.
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interview data was used to supplement information gleaned from National Archives 
documents in attempting to connect any dots that existed between the wives’ actions and 
the administration’s shifts in policy.
During my interview with him, I soon realized that this was a public figure of 
uncharacteristic candor. Without being braggadocios, he told me his relationship with 
President Nixon was akin to a "personal aide [doing] many things for Richard Nixon on a 
personal level." Before becoming part of the White House staff, Butterfield had retired 
from the United States Air Force. Because he had been a Squadron Commander in 
Vietnam, as well a career officer, he knew some of the prisoners in Hanoi. Also, having 
been raised in Coronado, California, a naval aviation town, many o f his friends were 
graduates of the Naval Academy who later flew in the Navy or Marine Corps. A number 
of these pilots had been shot down and imprisoned. He spoke to me about this unusual 
twist of fate and said, "I had friends in prison, and, suddenly, there I was in the White 
House."
Butterfield also told me that many of the POW and MIA wives— through their 
communication network— had learned that he was working in the White House. Their 
hope, he said, was that he "would be able to pick up their cause and be one of their 
representatives . . .  in the White House." He told me that he did end up playing this quasi­
role, though "in a completely unofficial capacity." He added that he was "not necessarily 
the White House's point man, although maybe in the eyes o f some [he] came to be that" 
but he "wasn't designated by Nixon" to deal with the POW and MIA issue, however.
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White House Considers Plans fo r  POW  and MIA Wives to Meet with the President 
As has been noted in a number of places already, Sybil Stockdale considered 
personal visits one of the most effective ways of influencing public officials. At the 
outset of this section, a failed attempt to arrange a meeting with the President was 
discussed. It was also noted that Sybil "did not take no for an answer" and made it clear 
that she would make another request for a meeting in the near future. Several months 
later, she did just that.
The archival material I reviewed indicated that the second request created a flurry 
of activity and memo writing among the White House staff. The staff may have preferred 
to ignore the POW and MIA matter, as Capen had noted, but Mrs. Stockdale's request to 
discuss the matter with the President required some sort of response. White House staff 
members disagreed about what that response should be.
A key actor, o f course, was Alexander Butterfield. Butterfield drafted a 
memorandum for the President titled: "A Plan to Counter Assertions o f an Ineffective 
Vietnam Policy." This memo outlined a number o f arguments that could be used to 
counter false assertions about Nixon's Vietnam policy. Under a separate cover,
Butterfield attached a document to the memorandum titled: "Game Plan for The 
President's Pursuit for Peace Speech." Item number 46 of the memo highlighted the fact 
that the POW issue could now benefit the President and suggested that the administration 
"plan for bringing to Washington a representative group o f POW wives for call on the 
President—mid December."'82 
182
Alexander P. Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon, to 
Richard N ixon, President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, September 23 , 1969; W hite H ouse Special 
Files; Staff M embers and O ffice Files; A lexander B . Butterfield, Correspondence, F ile January 1969 to 
June 1970; N ixon Presidential Materials; N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, C o llege  Park, M D.
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A couple o f days after Alexander Butterfield sent his memorandum to the 
President, Melvin Laird also sent a memorandum to the President. Dated September 25, 
1969, this memorandum appealed directly for the President to intervene and meet with 
POW and MIA wives. In making his case, Laird explained his own actions during the 
May 19, 1969 press conference discussed previously. He told the President that he had 
acted out of a "deep concern for the welfare of our captured and missing servicemen, 
together with my concern for the inhumane attitude on prisoner matters by the North 
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong." He also assured the President that he had taken action
183
only after "a thorough review of the problem."
Finally, the Laird memo noted that "an increasing number" o f prisoner's relatives 
have contacted "government officials, members of Congress and the news media." Wives 
and parents, he told the Nixon, were requesting, via his office, a meeting with the 
President. He recommended to the President that a representative group of twenty family 
members of POWs and MIAs meet in the White House. The meeting, Laird wrote, would 
also provide the President with an opportunity to express his personal concern and 
indicate concern for the matter at highest level of government.184 
Internal White House's Debate over the Proposed Visit
By September 27, 1969, the idea of the President meeting with the wives was 
gaining momentum in the White House. In a memorandum from Colonel Hughes to 
Stephen Bull, Special Assistant to the President and Appointments Secretary, it appeared 
Bull had requested Hughes' assistance to set up an appointment with "two wives."
183
Mr. M elvin  Laird, Secretary o f  D efense, to Richard N ixon , President o f  the United States, 
W ashington, DC, Septem ber 25 , 1969; W hite H ouse Central Files, N D  18-3/C O  165; Beginning; 12/31/69; 
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Hughes' memo referred to the memorandum "just received" by the President from Melvin 
Laird. Colonel Hughes informed Bull that he considered the wives meeting with 
President Nixon appropriate, but recommended one wife from each branch of service 
rather than the plans stipulated in either the Bull or the Laird memos. Hughes also 
recommended scheduling the meeting in conjunction with a church service after which 
the President would speak with the wives. In his mind, the meeting would have a "much 
better public impact if  it were done in this manner." He added that whatever decision was 
made about the number of people who should attend; those who attended needed to be
185
"carefully screened for emotional stability and judgment."
Other archived memos indicate that not all members of the White House staff 
supported the meeting. The memo writers articulated a number of reasons for opposing 
the meeting. One reason echoed Colonel Hughes' concern about the emotional stability of 
those who would attend the meeting. In a memo Bryce Harlow sent to another White 
House staff member, Hugh Sloan, Jr., Harlow indicated that he was "much afraid of a 
personal meeting o f these distraught women with the President." Unlike Hughes, Harlow 
did not appear to believe that the potential problems that might arise from the President
meeting with what he believed were emotionally distraught women could be managed by
186
simply increasing the number of women in attendance.
A far more compelling and influential reason for not scheduling the meeting was
185
C olonel James D. Hughes, Armed Forces A ide to the President, to Stephen Bull, Special 
A ssistant to the President and Appointm ents Secretary, W ashington, D C , Septem ber 27, 1969; W hite 
H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3 CO/165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National 
A rchives C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
Bryce H arlow, Presidential Counselor and A dviser, to H ugh Sloan, S taff A ssistant to the 
President, W ashington, DC, October 6, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3 CO/165; Beginning; 
12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
237
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Seven
put forth by Henry Kissinger who, at the time was Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs. In a memo to the President to the President dated October 2, 1969, 
Kissinger first acknowledged the President's concern about the POW and MIA matter. He 
then wrote the following: "There is some tenuous evidence that Hanoi, on the defensive 
from our demands for an accounting o f our prisoners, has shifted its policy somewhat and 
may be willing to provide the families, privately, with information on their loved ones' 
status. Thus, we have taken a careful hands-off policy with regard to the wives, lest we 
jeopardize their chances o f learning the facts about their husbands." Kissinger concluded 
his memo as follows: "Because of this, I would recommend that you do not meet with
187
any of the wives involved."
There is evidence that the President attended to and, with some reluctance, 
decided to heed Kissinger's advice, at least for a while. I found another copy of the 
Kissinger memo in the White House file box, for example, and beside Kissinger's punch­
line ("I would recommend that you do not meet with any of the wives involved.") there is
188
the following handwritten note: "but let's reexamine each week RN."
I also discovered the following short memorandum from Dwight Chapin, the 
President's Appointment Secretary, to H. R. Haldeman that presumably had the Kissinger 
memo attached: "Here is what Kissinger sa id  let me know if this should be reopened.
187
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It is now off the schedule." Haldeman response was a handwritten note on the memo:
"No— leave it off. H."
There are a number o f other indications that the Kissinger argument had garnered 
widespread support among White House staff members and that there was a growing 
consensus within the staff against scheduling a meeting. I discovered a memo from 
Colonel Haig to Hugh Sloan dated October 8,1969, in which Haig referred to a "paper on 
Mr. Kissinger's desk." Their position, Haig told Sloan, was based on the "pitfalls of 
associating them [the wives and family members] officially with the US Government and 
thus providing an excuse for the North Vietnamese not to be responsive to their requests
190
for the names of prisoners." Haig noted that if  Kissinger's recommendation was 
approved, there would—in all probability— not be a meeting between the President and 
the wives.
The following day, October 9, Colonel Haig sent a memorandum to Dwight 
Chapin, who evidently requested "Henry's opinion" on inviting POW and MIA wives to 
meet with the President. Colonel Haig states:
Henry is opposed to an official White House appearance of POW wives until such 
time as we are sure that private initiatives made by some of them in Paris will 
reap no benefit. Official government linkage with these women at this time could 
be used as a basis by Hanoi for refusal to give the wives the names o f their loved 
ones.
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We should let the situation run until we are convinced that Hanoi has not 
responded to their requests and then make an official overture in behalf of the
191
wives, including a visit to the White House.
There was also a handwritten note, presumably written by Dwight Chapin, on the 
copy of the Haig memorandum that I reviewed. The note stated: "Ask Henry every week 
if change. C.'92
Colonel Haig's memo to Chapin also included one other element that I found in a 
number o f other memoranda, which discussed the White House visit. Haig proposed an 
alternative to the White House meeting, which seemed, in his mind, to offset concerns 
expressed by other staff. His specific alternative would have had the wives meeting with 
the recently returned prisoners. "A visit o f this type would be o f far more benefit at this
193
time," Haig wrote.
Other White House staffers recommended other alternatives. There were 
recommendations to send the wives to Paris, to have the various service auxiliary 
organizations (e.g., the Veterans o f Foreign War and the American Legion) meet with the 
wives and respond to their needs, or invite the wives to attend a worship service in the
194White House in lieu of holding a formal meeting.
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Bryce Harlow, Presidential Counselor and A dviser, to Hugh Sloan, S ta ff A ssistant to the 
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A not-so-subtle subtext in many of the memos—and, at times, a memo's explicit 
text—involved domestic political considerations. For example, Alexander Haig wrote in 
a memo to Dwight Chapin: "We have again taken the temperature on the pros and cons" 
o f the President hosting the wives for a personal visit. We still recommend against the 
President becoming involved at this time." Haig cited two reasons for such a position.
The first reason was familiar: Hanoi will view wives as "propaganda agents o f U.S. 
Government." The second reason also was familiar, but it normally was implicit rather 
than explicitly stated in staff memos: The visit, Haig said, would in effect, "add another 
page to the book of those who claim this is the President's war."
Domestic political considerations also could be used to support the idea of the 
wives meeting with the President. For example, in a memorandum to the President's 
Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, dated October 20,1969, Harry S. Dent, Deputy Counsel 
and Special Counsel to the President, indicated that he recently had seen news reports 
about the POW wives. He wrote:
Here are some more POW wives speaking out for the President. A White House 
visit by some POW wives would be a big plus on this question. These ladies have
195
the sympathy of just about everybody these days.
Others in the White House must have seen the same news reports that Dent 
alluded to in his memo to Haldeman. On October 17, 1969, Dwight Chapin wrote the 
following to Alexander Haig:
195
Harry S. D ent, D eputy C ounsel and Special C ounsel to the President, to B ob Haldeman, 
Assistant to the President/C hief o f  Staff, W ashington, DC, October 20 , 1969; W hite H ouse Central Files,
N D  18-3 CO/165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; N ational A rch ives at C ollege Park, 
C ollege Park, MD.
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The President had asked us to check with Henry each week in regard to his 
visiting with the prisoner of war wives. You undoubtedly saw last evening's Star 
and noted the comment from Hanoi that in order for the ladies to get their 
husbands out of the POW camps they would have to demonstrate against the 
United States. The women indicated that they would never demonstrate against 
the government for it would only dishonor their husbands.
The question now is whether or not the President should meet with the
196
ladies at this time. Would you please check Henry? Thank you.
The flurry of activity in the White House on this issue seemed to be generated in 
part, and possibly to a large degree, by Sybil Stockdale's two written requests, Melvin 
Laird's intercession, and pressure from Representatives and Senators on the Hill. In the 
end, it appears as if  this confluence of factors led to the decision to schedule a White 
House meeting.
The Meeting is on and Planning fo r  it Begins
At some point during the Fall of 1969, the decision was made to have a 
representative group of POW and MIA wives and family members meet with the 
President. Who, within the White House, made the final decision, how it was made, and 
what reasoning led to the decision remain unanswered questions. Possibly, the answers to 
these questions will some day be found in one or more of the boxes of documents from 
the Nixon White House that I was unable to examine for this study, or from interviews 
for future study.
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What was clear in the materials I was able to review, however, was that the final 
details for the visit were being worked out in early December 1969. The files, for 
instance, include a memo from Richard Capen to Colonel Hughes dated December 3, 
1969. The memo contains a suggested letter o f invitation, comments on who was to be 
invited and the noticeable under-representation o f some groups (e.g., families of enlisted 
men, fathers, and certain geographical areas/congressional districts), and a list of 
Department of Defense past initiatives to keep the wives and family members
197
informed.
Capen's memo also cautioned that, while the families would appreciate the 
meeting, they, nonetheless, would possibly pose difficult questions for the President to 
address. To prepare the President for a possible interrogation, Capen provided Colonel 
Hughes with a list of questions the Department o f Defense had been asked on many
198
occasions by family members along with suggested answers to these questions.
Capen concluded his memo with the following recommendations: (a) the 
President should speak to the media after the meeting, (b) a social meeting with Mrs. 
Nixon should be scheduled, and (c) a Department o f Defense dinner should be scheduled 
for the night following the family members' meeting with the President. The purpose of 
the dinner, Capen wrote, was in order "to brief the families on the status of [the
199
Department of Defense's] efforts to resolve the prisoner problem."
197
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In a memorandum dated December 4, 1969, one day after the date on the Capen 
memo, Alexander Butterfield indicated to Colonel Hughes that the date for the meeting 
with the President had been set; that date, according to Butterfield, was December 12, 
1969. Butterfield also discussed the Capen memo to Colonel Hughes and the material that 
Capen's office had included with the memo. Among other things, Butterfield expressed 
his concern about the "representation" issue raised in the Capen memo and suggested that
"at least 1, and preferably 2 more enlisted men [be] represented" by their family
. 200 
members.
In his memorandum, Butterfield also expressed his concern about the three wives 
scheduled to speak after the President made his official remarks. Butterfield advised 
Hughes: "I personally would prefer that none of the women speak to the press [but that]
they merely stand by the President while he speaks." Once the President has completed
201
his comments, he wrote, the women would depart the Roosevelt Room with him.
Butterfield expressed specific concerns about one of the wives scheduled to 
address the press; that woman was Sybil Stockdale. "She has expressed in the past her
great disappointment over what she terms a lack of concern on the part o f the President,"
202
Butterfield wrote, "and in a recent phone call to me she sounded almost bitter."
200
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Alexander Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S ta ff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon , to 
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In another memo dated December 5, 1969, and sent to Special Assistant to the 
President, Stephen Bull, Butterfield discussed ways to create a "warmer and a little more 
personal" invitation telegram to the wives and family members. The memorandum 
discussed the wisdom of using of such terms as "plight," "predicament," and "tragic 
situation" to characterize the things that would be discussed during the meeting with the
_  . , 203President.
A briefing document, written for the President to prepare him for the meeting with 
the wives and family members, was part of the Butterfield memo. The briefing document 
was titled: "Talking Paper for the President: Meeting with Families o f Captured and 
Missing Serviceman," dated December 12, 1969, the day of the President's meeting with 
family members. The contents of the briefing paper indicate that at least some of the 
advice contained in Richard Capen's December 3 memo to Colonel Hughes had been 
heeded. Included in the briefing paper, for example, are questions the President might be 
asked during his meeting with family members along with suggested answers. The 
briefing document also informed the President that prisoners still were not receiving mail
204
on a regular basis and that MIA wives "do not even know if their loved ones are alive."
In his briefing paper, Butterfield also told the President that the women "have
Alexander Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon , to 
Stephen Bull, Special A ssistant to the President and Appointm ents Secretary, W ashington, DC, D ecem ber  
5, 1969; White House Central F iles, N D  18-3 C O /165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; 
National ^ .jchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
Alexander Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to  President N ixon , to 
Richard N ixon, President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, D ecem ber 12, 1969; W hite H ouse Central 
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carried on with dignity and respect for the cause for which their loved ones were 
fighting." The paper encouraged the President to discuss with the women the support and 
actions taken by various governmental agencies— including the White House. And, he 
advised the President to provide families with assurance that the POW and MIA matters 
have the "highest priority both in our negotiations with the enemy and in all our domestic
205
and diplomatic efforts."
On the day of the meeting, December 12, Alexander Butterfield also provided 
President Nixon with a "Fact Sheet" on POW and MIA matters. The Fact Sheet contains 
various data: 418 men listed as captured, 939 listed as missing, governmental initiatives 
and activities, acknowledgement o f the wives painful experiences, and the wives 
concerns about the men being abandoned by the government. Alexander Butterfield 
underlined one point that he clearly wanted to draw attention to in the document:
All of these ladies -  and their families -  are anxious for your personal support, 
and for your assurance that there is hope. They want more than anything to know 
that you are continuing to assign this matter the highest priority . . . both in our 
negotiations with the enemy and in our domestic and diplomatic efforts.206 
Within the Fact Sheet package Butterfield sent the President, he included a paper 
titled: "Corrected answer to one of the Questions which might be asked today during your 
meeting with POW wives and mothers.” The question dealt with why it took so long for 
the wives to obtain an appointment with the President. The response focused on the claim
205
206 I b i d '
A lexander Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S taff and Special A ssistant to the President, to 
Richard N ixon, President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, D ecem ber 12, 1969; W hite H ouse Special 
Files; Staff M embers and O ffice Files; A lexander B. Butterfield, Correspondence, File//January 1969 to 
June 1970//; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege  Park, MD.
246
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The United States Government Responds 
that the POW and MIA issue was a "two-edged sword." The concern, as echoed by 
Kissinger and others, was "that Hanoi might take reprisals against our captured men if  we
207
were to publicize their plight."
Prior to my interview with Alexander Butterfield, I mailed him copies of a 
number o f documents he had written including both the "Talking Paper" and "Fact Sheet" 
he drafted to prepare the President for his meeting with the wives and family members. 
During our interview, and in written comments he sent to me, Butterfield noted that both 
documents were designed to do more than simply transmit information to the President.
In fact, he told me that both documents were designed to encourage some spark in the 
President, to impress upon him that his message to the wives will be publicized, far and 
wide, and that he must convince them that every appropriate agency of the federal 
government will be working non-stop for the release of the prisoners and for a detailed 
accounting of those missing. He related the following to me:
The memo was for him, to bolster him, to remind him of the fact that this was an 
opportunity for him to shine. They are all appeals to the President to make his 
assurances to the ladies loud, clear and convincing. We, the aides, at Defense, 
State, the NSC [National Security Council] and the WH [White House] Staff are 
simply advising and guiding a President who, therefore, had not been on top of 
the POW and MIA issue at all.
207
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President Nixon Meets with POW  and MIA Wives and Mothers
The meeting between a select group of wives and mothers of POW and MIAs and 
President Nixon (as well as Mrs. Nixon) took place in the Library of the White House on 
December 12, 1969. President Nixon's daily dairy for that date noted that the meeting 
started at 10:06 a.m. and concluded at 10:30 a.m. During the Press Conference that 
followed the White House meeting, President Nixon made the following statement: 
Insofar as the treatment of prisoners is concerned, it would probably not be 
inaccurate to say that the record in this war is one o f the most unconscionable in 
the history of warfare. And there have been, of course, some very bad examples in 
past wars, as we know it. What I have assured these very courageous women, is 
that first, that in reaching a settlement o f the war, that an integral part of any 
settlement that is agreed to must be a settlement which is satisfactory on the 
prisoner issue and second, . . . this Government will do everything that it possibly 
can to separate out the prisoner issue and have it handled as it should be, as a 
separate issue on a humane basis.
Finally, I would simply add that while we all know that there is 
disagreement in this country about the war in Vietnam and while there is dissent 
about it on several points, that on this issue, the treatment o f prisoners of war, that 
there can be and there should be no disagreement.208
After the meeting with the wives and family members, Nixon went to his office
208
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and met with H. R. Haldeman from 11:01 a.m. to 11:08 a.m. Later that day, both 
President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman made diary entries regarding the meeting with the 
wives and mothers of POWs and MIAs. Nixon wrote in his Memoirs:
During the Christmas season o f 1969 Pat and I met with twenty-six wives and 
mothers of POWs and MIAs. . . .  we listened to them tell of the effect of the years 
of waiting on them and their children, and the terrible uncertainty of not knowing
whether their men were alive or dead. From that time on, each POW was an
210
individual to me, and obtaining their release became a burning cause.
In his diary, Haldeman clearly indicated the impression that the meeting had made 
on the President. He wrote:
Another breakfast—this time McCormack and Albert. Then a meeting w/ POW 
wives— who really impressed the P. He now has a great interest— amazing what a 
little personal exposure will do. He now wants all sorts o f action. All this got AM 
sched pretty screwed up & had to jiggle balance of appts. P. pretty upset that we 
let it get screwed up.2' 1
A week and a half after the event, President Nixon, responded to a letter from 
Mrs. Abbott, a POW wife who attended the December 12 meeting. He wrote, "Seldom 
have I been so moved as I was during our recent meeting at the White House." He then 
complimented her and said, "This indomitable courage which you and the other valiant
209
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women in your group demonstrated is a source of profound inspiration to all o f us who
2 12
had the honor o f being with you."
Alexander Butterfield’s recollections of the day provide context for Nixon's 
reaction and suggest the wisdom of Sybil Stockdale's continued embracing o f the 
personal visit strategy. During my interview with him, Butterfield told me that President 
"Nixon went to that meeting fairly kicking and screaming. It was an event he did not 
want to do, yet one he felt he must do." Butterfield then began reading and 
simultaneously commenting on a response he had written to one of the questions I had 
sent to him about the December 12 meeting before the interview:
He [Nixon] didn't want any part o f it. It was a big pain in the neck. Meet with a 
bunch of women? He looked at it like that. I mean we're interested in the prisoner 
thing . . .  it was in the news about these wives being up there [on Capital Hill] and 
talking to a Senator who might have been very sentimental toward their cause and 
might have responded with, "Have you talked to the President yet?" He was sort 
of forced into seeing them. It helped my cause a little bit. I can't take credit 
reminding him everyday that he should do this. Anyway, when it looked like a 
plan in motion and he might do it— he still didn't want to. I said in here 
somewhere he went kicking and screaming to that meeting. That's in the privacy 
of the Oval Office when no one is in there, just Haldeman or myself.
I'm not saying he said, "Oh the hell with those women!" He has big things 
going on! High priority political things going on! He was going to wind this war
down, get the ABM treaty—that was the first big thing on the Hill. He cared
212
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about the ABM treaty more than anything.. . .  Then, once with them [POW and 
MIA wives], he got into it. They invigorated h im .. . . once he got in a meeting he 
knows what he needs to do. But it was great for both sides. That is what gave him 
the impetus to do what he did.
Throughout the interview, Butterfield continued to emphasize that the influence 
the wives had on the President from the December 12 meeting "was major." He indicated 
that the wives and family members were a "major influence" on Nixon and Nixon's 
policies and he credited "the wives one hundred percent for arousing the President's 
interest— for getting him off the dime." The meeting, in short, got the POW and MIA 
issue on the White House's radar screen. Among other things, this meant that the White 
House staff began monitoring media reports on the POWs and MIAs, as well as the 
public's response to the reports.
White House Monitors Effect o f  Meeting
On December 15, three days after the meeting with the wives and mothers, 
Alexander Butterfield sent a memorandum to the President about his meeting with the 
wives and mothers. He told the President, "As you know by now, your meeting last 
Friday with wives and mothers of captured and missing U.S. servicemen received very 
good play nationwide." Furthermore, he attached a personal letter from Sybil Stockdale, 
who, he said, "was absolutely overwhelmed," and was highly appreciative for the "words 
of assurance that resolution o f the plight of the prisoners and missing persons will be
W ashington, DC; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3/CO  165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential 
Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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213
given the highest priority." During our interview, Butterfield discussed this 
memorandum and the "very good play nationwide" o f the December 12 meeting. In the 
process of telling me this, he once again provided important contextual information about 
how the Nixon White House operated:
We, several o f us on the staff, monitored very carefully, what news played on 
each major network and for how long— down to the second. We also monitored 
the one hundred largest newspapers— so we know when something we did played 
well. This event did, indeed. And I do remember that the President was very 
pleased and said so.
On the same day that Butterfield sent his memo containing his comments on the 
success of the White House meeting, he also responded to the President's request for a 
very detailed "summary of past, present and future activities relating to resolution of the 
plight of captured and missing U. S. servicemen . .  . and their families." The report, ten 
pages in length, reviewed initiatives by the government, private citizens (Six of the ten 
pages detailed activity by Ross Perot), corporations, civic groups, clubs, and professional 
organizations to support "some guarantee of humane treatment and accounting of those 
persons now listed as missing." On the report the President noted, "Good job." He also 
wrote "good" next to the section that discussed Fairchild-Hiller Corporation's "full-page
214
advertisements" designed to "focus attention on the prisoner problem."
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White House Motivations
Some o f the White House memoranda I reviewed and copied referred to President 
Nixon's "continued," "steadfast," or "special" interest to resolve the POW and MIA 
dilemma. After reviewing these documents, Alexander Butterfield told me he really did 
not think it was "all that 'continued' or 'steadfast.'" However, he quickly added, "it is true 
that the meeting on December 12 got him [Nixon] 'into the issue' and he'd mention it now 
and then." He also claimed "the POW and MIA priority— especially in '69 and '70— 
could not compare with issues the President considered much more politically important. 
In the back of the President's mind, it was always a matter of politics." Alexander 
emphasized, as he had earlier, that Nixon ultimately viewed events with a political eye.
When I asked Butterfield why the President decided to actively address and 
become involved in the plight of prisoners and support the wives of POWs and MIAs, he 
bluntly stated: "Politics, politics!" Butterfield told me that he considered "that little, if  
any, o f the President's motivation was for prisoners as individuals or as husbands." In 
spite o f that, however, he said, "Nixon was a caring soul and he had thoughts and feelings 
like everyone else." Nevertheless, Butterfield emphasized yet again that the President's 
"political considerations— 'Will this be a good move politically?'—trumped all others."
In my correspondence with A1 Haig, Jr. regarding the same question about 
Nixon's motives on the POW and MIA issue, he clearly indicated the President's 
motivation came from a moral imperative and not o f political necessity. Haig provided 
the following statement:
Having worked personally with the President, Henry Kissinger and those on the 
National Security Staff as well as many legislative leaders, there is no doubt in
253
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my mind that the moral imperative predominated throughout. From my 
perspective, many war opponents endeavored to seize the issue as one o f political 
expediency.215
The interviews and archive material indicate that White House staff, quite 
naturally, viewed events, activities, and actions o f the President from different 
perspectives. Whatever Nixon's motives may have been—humanitarian, political, or 
some complex amalgam of the two—he and his administration did attend to the POW and 
MIA after December 12, 1969, much more than they had before the President's December 
12 meeting with the wives and family members. The issue, in fact, was front and center 
in the negotiations to end the war, despite the precedent that the prisoner issue 
traditionally is handled after a peace settlement has been reached.
Nixon White House POW  and MIA Initiatives 
From Alexander Butterfield perspective, at least, Nixon was, at base, "a political 
animal.” Whether his comments after the meeting were simply a temporary foray into the 
sentimental or whether they were sincere and sustained over time cannot be determined. 
What the evidence does make clear, however, is that, after his meeting with the wives and 
family members, Nixon and his administration used the POW and MIA issue to support 
the administration's political agenda.
White House Develops Propaganda Offensive fo r  POW and MIA Issue
As was noted above, political and propaganda considerations were hardly absent 
from the internal debate about whether or not the President should meet with a 
representative group of family members. In fact, the archives contain many memos about
215
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the administration's propaganda offensive against North Vietnam, and the POW and MIA 
issue often played a prominent role in the strategies that memo writers proposed.
Three months before the President's December 12 meeting with the wives and 
family members, for example, Ken Cole raised the POW and MIA issue in a memo to 
Bob Haldeman. The memo was precipitated by a summary story Nixon read in an 
internal White House media memorandum. In his memo, Cole told Haldeman that the:
President noted the report regarding the wives of the captive pilots and the POWs 
who came forward and told their stories o f ill treatments and how these stories 
helped to keep the Administration on the propaganda offensive, painting the 
North Vietnamese into the corner of inhumane obstructionists of peace.
Cole also reminded Haldeman that the President had said he wanted more of this type of 
media attention and to possibly have one or two wives come to the White House, which 
would expose the issue even more.216
Bob Haldeman, in turn, informed three White House officials— Henry Kissinger, 
Herbert Klein, Director of Communications for the Executive Branch, and Ronald 
Ziegler, White House Press Secretary— about the story Nixon saw regarding POW wives. 
Haldeman told them that the President "feels this is the sort o f propaganda offensive that 
we need to keep generating toward the Vietnamese. Would you please follow up in 
generating more stories of this type?" Haldeman also told the three men that Nixon 
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Haldeman sent another memo to Dwight Chapin that directed him, Ron Ziegler, 
and Alexander Butterfield to develop a "game plan" for handling the White House visit o f 
two wives that had tentatively been agreed to at that time.2'8 (By the time the visit actually 
took place, of course, the initial two wives had grown to twenty-six wives and family 
members.) Haldeman made clear that the major focus of the game plan was to be on how 
to use the visit to support the President's desire for propaganda offensives against the 
North Vietnamese. A secondary strategy was for the President to convey sincere concern 
about the POW and MIA situation.
On September 24, 1969, two days before the Chapin/Ziegler/Butterfield "game 
plan" was due to the President, Ken Cole upped the ante, a bit, by sending, in essence, the 
same directive that Haldeman had sent. This time, however, the request for a document 
that responded to the "President's request for a plan o f action to generate a propaganda 
offensive toward the Vietnamese" was sent not only to Ziegler, who was also mentioned 
in the Haldeman memo, but also to Kissinger and Klein. The Cole memo also specified a 
time by which the memo was to be delivered to Nixon's staff secretary: 2:00 p.m. on the 
date that had also been stipulated in Haldeman's memo to Chapin; September 26, 1969.
I did not find a copy o f the requested report in the archived material I reviewed. I 
could not determine whether this is because it was not included in the material I 
reviewed, whether the report was written but never archived (either intentionally or
the President for National Security A ffairs, Herbert K lein, Director o f  C om m unications for the E xecutive  
Branch, and Ronald Ziegler, W hite H ouse Press Secretary, W ashington, DC, Septem ber 23 , 1969; White 
House Central Files, N D  18-3 C O /165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon Presidential M aterials; N ational 
A rch iv es^  C ollege Park, C ollege Park, MD.
Bob Haldeman, A ssistant to the President/C hief o f  Staff, to D w ight Chapin, President's 
Appointment Secretary, W ashington, DC, Septem ber 23, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3 
CO/165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege  
Park, MD.
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unintentionally), whether the report, for some reason, was never prepared, or whether it is 
classified. What I did find, however, was a memo Henry Kissinger sent to the President 
dated six days after the deadline for the report both Haldeman and Cole had requested. 
The memo summarized the administration's "POW Policy in Vietnam," and, among other 
things, discussed the President's goal to develop and sustain a POW and MIA propaganda 
offense against North Vietnam. Kissinger summarized the past activities of the 
Department o f State and Department of Defense in the POW and MIA matter, and 
indicated that both departments "are attempting to use every appropriate forum possible 
to keep the heat on." Kissinger added: "There is some tenuous evidence that Hanoi, on 
the defensive from our demands for an accounting of our prisoners, has shifted its policy 
somewhat and may be willing to provide the families, privately, with information on their
219
loved ones' status."
Six days prior to the wives and family members meeting with the President, the 
propaganda offensive was discussed again, this time a memo sent by John Brown III, 
White House Staff Assistant o f H. R. Haldeman to Alexander Butterfield. In the memo, 
dated December 6, 1969, Brown referred to a December 2 article in the Christian Science 
Monitor about "North Vietnam showing itself to be acutely sensitive to charges that it has 
ill-treated US POWs."220
Even though the administration had initiated a propaganda campaign focused, in 
part at least on the POW issue months earlier, Brown informed Butterfield the President
219
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now wanted "a massive campaign" because it was now apparent that Hanoi was noticing 
the international attention the POW issue was receiving. Specifically, Brown told 
Butterfield: "The President requests that we initiate a massive campaign on the inhumane
treatment o f US POWs by Hanoi" and that "you [Butterfield] submit the report to him on
221
what is planned." As he had done on other occasions, Ken Cole wrote a more formal,
"White House Action Memorandum," which repeated the request contained in the more
222
informal, less weighty memo from Brown.
During my interview with Alexander Butterfield, he confirmed that the POW and 
MIA issue, indeed, had been the key element in a concerted effort to embarrass Hanoi on 
the world stage while simultaneously bring pressure on the Communist government o f 
North Vietnam to change their treatment of the prisoners. "There was ammunition to 
embarrass Hanoi on an international scale," Butterfield said; "it was to Hanoi's 
disadvantage if we [i.e., the Nixon White House] could beat that drum around." 
Butterfield added, however, that, at the start of campaign, "nothing had been thought 
through."
What is clear, however, is that, even in its early stages, the POW and MIA issue 
was thought o f as the bedrock of the administration's propaganda initiative. The POW 
and MIA issue is so foundational to the propaganda campaign, in fact, that it is 
reasonable to assume that propaganda concerns led President Nixon to agree to meet with
W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3 C O/165; Beginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; N ational 
A r c h iv e s^  C ollege Park, C ollege Park, MD.
2 2 2  Ibid-
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Special A ssistant to President N ixon, W ashington, DC, D ecem ber 6, 1969; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  
18-3 C O/165; B eginning; 12/31/69; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, 
C ollege Park, M D .
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POW and MIA family members, despite the initial misgivings about holding such a 
meeting that were documented above.
Whether the somewhat improvisational issue was effective is difficult to gauge. 
There is a memo, declassified at my request, written by Colonel Robert E. Pursley, 
Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary o f Defense, and dated December 29,
1969 that expressed concern about what was gaining the attention o f the North 
Vietnamese delegation. Pursley indicated that he had been "reading closely" the cable 
traffic between Paris and the State Department on the POW issue. It was his opinion that 
"compliance with International Conventions and the trustworthiness -  or lack thereof -  of 
the NVN vis a vis such international agreements or protocol, seem to have been lost in 
our recent pronouncements." Furthermore, he indicated that Hanoi's response to other 
initiatives on POW and MIA matters would possibly benefit American strategy. He 
wrote: "The precedent of how the Hanoi government acts in conjunction with 
international agreements and conventions could be a major factor in the way we view any 
prospective NVN agreements in other areas and /or leverage against Hanoi to make them
223
more forthcoming on the POW issue."
O f course, the monitoring described in the Pursley memo, and the early response 
of North Vietnam, occurred relatively early in the propaganda offensive. Much happened 
in the between 1969 and the signing of the Peace Accord in January 1973. During this 
intervening period, National League members were knocking on the North Vietnamese 
delegation's door in Paris, Sybil Stockdale met face-to-face with members of the North
223
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Vietnamese delegates, wives and family members called on officials in Washington DC, 
and there were nearly constant letter-writing campaigns to international newspapers.
Most of these activities generated extensive international coverage o f National League 
members and their efforts to accentuate the POW and MIA issue. In short, over time, the 
administration acquired attention-getting allies in its propaganda campaign.
The relationship between the allies (Washington and National League members) 
remained an arms-length one, however. Administration officials did not prevent members 
of the National League from going to Paris, but they also did not officially encourage 
such visits. Some of the memos I read expressed concern about the visits; others readily 
acknowledged their propaganda potential. But there was always an implicit— and, at 
times, an explicit— acknowledgement that problems would be minimized and/or the 
propaganda potential was likely to be maximized if there was no official connection 
between League members and the government.
The National League also valued its independence. League members understood 
the importance of being seen as representing themselves and an independent organization 
rather than official Washington when they knocked on the door of the North Vietnam 
delegates in Paris.
This arms-length relationship played out in other areas, as well. National League 
members had come to understand the political milieu in which they were operating and 
the importance of retaining the option (and the threat) to be critics of, rather than taken- 
for-granted cheerleaders for the administration. To be sure, the relationship between the 
League and the government became considerably cozier after the Nixon administration 
embraced the POW and MIA issue, which Sybil Stockdale told me, was like "an
260
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afterburner" kicking in. Because of the government’s embrace o f the issue, the wives and 
family members gained considerable access to high-level officials along with growing 
support on Capital Hill. Organizationally, however, the League and its leadership retained 
their independence. A number of archived memos that I reviewed demonstrated that 
administration officials, in particular, not only respected Sybil Stockdale; they also, to 
some extent, feared the influence she could have on the public and League supporters.
The archival material also makes clear that the government and the National 
League had somewhat different agendas. It probably would not be inappropriate, in fact, 
to claim that, at times, at least, Nixon administration officials used the women and their 
cause for the administration's own purposes, i.e., to embarrass the North Vietnamese and, 
ultimately, to end the war.
Fortunately, for the National League and its members, the two groups' agendas 
were more complementary than conflicting. No matter what their reasons, officials in the 
Nixon White House ended up doing what the wives had asked the government to do all 
along: Put pressure on the North Vietnamese to treat their relatives humanely. In 
addition, there is some fairly convincing evidence that, after the family members' 
December 12 meeting with the President, the administration's actions on the POW and 
MIA issue reflected more than simply using the issue to serve another, grander end.
Much of this evidence relates to the stance the government took in negotiations to end to 
the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict.
White House Includes POW  and MIA Issue into War Settlement
Three days after the meeting with wives and mothers of POWs and MI As in the 
Oval Office, President Nixon addressed the nation; his topic: "Progress Toward Peace in
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Vietnam." In the television address, he spoke about Hanoi's inhumanity regarding POW 
and MIA matters and their failure to address POW and MIA issues at the Peace 
negotiations in Paris. He said:
Typical of [North Vietnam] is their absolute refusal to talk about the fate of the 
American prisoners they hold and their refusal even to supply their names so as to 
ease the anguish o f their loved ones in the United States. This cruel, indefensible 
action is a shocking demonstration of the inflexible attitude they have taken on all
. 224
issues at the negotiating table in Paris.
On December 29, 1969, Melvin Laird sent President Nixon a memo, which, in 
part, discussed Nixon's new interest in making the POW and MIA issue a part of the 
negotiated war settlement rather than follow the traditional strategy o f dealing with the 
issue after a peace treaty has been successfully negotiated. In this memo, which I 
managed to have declassified for this study, Laird acknowledged Nixon's intent: "Within 
the past few days you have reiterated your desire that the highest priority be assigned to 
the prisoner o f war question and that the prisoner problem should be considered
225
separately from other negotiable issues of the war itself."
Laird then recommended a strategy for "specific actions" that would "assist on­
going efforts to obtain the release of and a full accounting for all men who are identified 
as prisoners or missing in action." Laird codified his proposal to the President in five 
concise statements, which all sought to ensure the POW and MIA issue remained
224
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inextricably linked with the negotiations to end the war. Laird listed these as follows:
1. Designate a special presidential emissary . . . who could visit the capitals of 
selected countries which previously have expressed a concern for our 
prisoners of war.
2. An alternative to the above, you could designate a joint White House/National 
Security Council and Defense Team that could visit the same areas.
3. Our Delegation in Paris should develop a series o f hard-hitting statements on 
the prisoner issue. Such statements made during the negotiations could give 
emphasis both to the violations of the Geneva Agreement as well as violations 
to human standards on prisoner treatment.
4. You might wish to reconsider the proposal o f designating the Vice President 
as your personal representative on prisoner matters.
5. We would recommend that when appropriate, your speeches and statements 
continue to include prisoner of war references.226
Part of the effort to incorporate the POW and MIA issue into the Paris Peace 
negotiations was also referred to in a March 1970 memorandum from Alexander 
Butterfield to Margarita White, White House Communications. In it, he mentioned, 
among a number o f other issues, the development o f a POW task force, which, he said
227
was "in the making." He also noted plans to not only seek a strategy to force the North
226
i n  Ibid.
A lexander P. Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S ta ff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon , to 
Mrs. Margita W hite, A ssistant to Herbert G. Klein, W ashington, DC, March 10, 1970; W hite H ouse  
Special Files; S taff M em bers and O ffice F iles, A lexander B. Butterfield; Correspondence File//January 
1969 to June 1970//; N ixon  Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C o llege  Park, C ollege Park, M D. 
This m em o discussed a number o f  topics, one dealt w ith w hether or not a private visiting should be granted 
for a POW  w ife  w ith the President, the other addressed the pressure on the President by the organization  
"Fighting Home Folks o f  Fighting Men" for more overt dem onstration o f  his support for POWs and M IAs.
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Vietnamese to comply with the Geneva Convention, it also separated out the POW and 
MIA issue and make it a provision within the negotiations to end the war in Vietnam.228
Nixon's desire to make the POW and MIA issue a part of the peace settlement 
continued to be part of his mindset even at the war's end. In 1973, when nearly all as the 
POWs had been released, President Nixon spoke with Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs, and Ron Ziegler in the Oval Office about 
the Vietnam War settlement issue. Their conversation, which was taped by the secret 
Oval Office taping system, clearly indicated that, in the President's mind, the settlement 
to end the war included the release of all prisoners throughout all Indochina. During their 
conversation, Nixon seeks confirmation from Ziegler about the matter. He said, "You got 
across the point that we're conditioning that on a withdrawal of the, o f the Laotian ones 
too." Ziegler responded, "The agreement clearly states prisoners throughout Indochina." 
However, Scowcroft interjected that the agreement did not specifically state Indochina, 
though he tells the President that his (Nixon's) and Kissinger's separate press conferences 
established that all prisoners would be released. Ziegler then told the President, 
"Throughout Indochina. [Unintelligible portion] it's not written." At this point Nixon 
appeared to lecture both men, especially Ziegler, on the importance he placed on the 
POWs. It is important to read the comments of the President to understand how Nixon 
felt about the POW and MIA issue— even to the very end. Nixon said:
228
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You see, you see Ron, be sure that you don't let the press go off in some kick that 
failing withdrawal, we're, they're holding prisoners because the last nine 
[unintelligible portion] are as important as the first nine. I mean, people 
understand that, don't you agree? (Ziegler said, "Yes Sir).
Until every last prisoner is out, there will be Americans in and out of 
Indochina, we're gonna keep Americans, see, we don't, we won't have no military 
forces whatever in Indochina after we withdraw, you realize that, I have always 
said that until all of our prisoners are withdrawn, there will be American forces in 
South Vietnam. And I don't mean just from the North. That's the line. Play it very 
tough. [Unintelligible portion] see, to see that the Pentagon understands that and
229
the State Department [unintelligible portion]. Okay, fine.
White House Ability to Influence Support
During my interview with Alexander Butterfield, he drew specific attention to the 
power o f the White House to influence and gain support for their initiatives on any given 
issue. Assertively, he told me, "The White House has tentacles that you would not 
believe. Through Governors, State Party Chairman, various labor, civic, and veterans 
organizations, the White House can reach far and wide in a matter of hours." Moreover, 
Butterfield discussed that the ability to obtain support for the POW and MIA issue— as 
well as the National League—was just a phone call away. He said, "When you pick up 
the phone at the White House it is unbelievable what the response is out there. People 
jump through the hoops to want to help you."
229
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Melvin Laird also alluded to the extent to which the White House's could 
influence initiatives in a memo he sent to Henry Kissinger. At the President's request, he 
provided material to Kissinger that the President might incorporate into his 1971 State of 
the Union address, which specifically included POW and MIA matters. The December 1, 
1970, memorandum affirmed that the administration was "attempting new vigorous 
approaches in behalf of the release o f American prisoners o f war." Laird included a line 
about his action to go public but deferred to the administration as being the initiators. He 
wrote, "In May 1969, the Administration began to undertake new initiatives in order to
230
bring the issue of U.S. prisoners of war before the public eye, both here and aboard." A 
number o f the "new initiatives" came from White House Staff preparing "game plans" on 
the POW and MIA issue, which included the soliciting or support o f activities from 
individuals or organizations.
President Nixon continued, through various presidential and White House means, 
to address and keep the POW and MIA issue before the American public. This was 
evident in the Presidential Proclamation released on March 19, 1971, which designated 
March 21—27 as, "National Week of Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners of War
231
or Missing in Action." The House also passed Joint Resolution 16 o f the same title. The 
signing of the Proclamation and Resolution on March 19, in the Cabinet Room included 
co-sponsors of the Resolution, Executive Committee o f the National League of Families,
230
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representatives of Department o f State and Department o f Defense, and others related to 
the POW and MIA cause. The President's remarks, which Kissinger advised him on, 
reiterated the same message about the plight of the men but now included the initiatives
232
of South Vietnam to release North Vietnamese prisoners, which totaled around 250.
The President's Proclamation, however, acknowledged the length of captivity for the 
longest serving prisoners, now seven years, and indicated that the North Vietnamese had 
not abided by the Geneva Convention o f 1949 for humane treatment of prisoners. The 
second paragraph echoed the National League's long sought objectives and the 
administration's desire to embarrass North Vietnam. Nixon's Proclamation reiterated:
This Government has made and will continue to make strenuous efforts in behalf 
of these Americans who are prisoners of war or missing in action. In the face of 
the enemy's callous indifference to the plight of these men and their families, we 
have sought to focus the attention of the world on the barbaric attitude of North 
Vietnam and its agents throughout Indochina. We have conducted vigorous 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the prisoner o f war problem on a purely humane
233
basis for the prisoners we hold as well as for our brave men held prisoner.
The President concluded his Proclamation with a request to the American people 
to observe the week in prayer "and in ceremonies and activities appropriate to voice deep
M D. 232
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concern for the prisoners and missing men, to inspire their loved ones with new courage
234
and hope, and to hasten the day when their ordeal may end."
Attention Must be Paid! The Wives Interactions with the President and Other White
House Officials in the Early 1970s 
The Multiple Meanings o f  Meetings with White House Officials
During the years that followed the President's December 1969 meeting with the 
select group of wives and family members, the arduous experience o f being a POW or 
MIA wife or family member began taking a definite mental, emotional, and physical toll 
on many wives and other family members. Some began to limit their involvement in 
National League activities; others withdrew completely due to absolute exhaustion. Even 
among those who remained in the organization through the subsequent years, there was 
growing discontent and increasing frustration with the lack o f resolution of the POW and 
MIA issue and the war itself. White House documents indicate that the White House was 
quite aware of—and increasingly concerned about—this state o f affairs.
Because o f this concern, high-ranking White House officials continued to meet 
with groups of wives. Many of these meetings involved Henry Kissinger, the President's 
National Security Advisor and, in time, his Secretary of State. Documents indicate that 
these meetings occurred both in the White House and at the so-called Western White 
House in San Clemente, California.
The wives I interviewed had favorable recollections about Kissinger's 
involvement with them. Marty Halyburton and Phyllis Galanti, for instance, told me of a 
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wives were adamant that they needed to be given more information on the status of their 
husbands. Marty remembered Kissinger "beating his fists down on the table. . . .  He 
raised his voice and said, 'I give you my word—there's more happening than I can tell 
you—your men are our first priority.'" Phyllis indicated that she understood that 
Kissinger could not tell the wives the "more [that was] happening," but she was confident 
"he understood our frustration. . .  . even if we didn't get a whole lot of information." 
Phyllis also alluded to the wives having a sense of validation because o f the interest by 
Kissinger and the White House. "Our talking and his listening. . . . [were] valuable from 
that perspective, even if we didn't get a whole lot of information," Phyllis said.
Other wives also were positive about Kissinger and their meetings with him. For 
instance, Alice Stratton, who met with Kissinger on a number o f occasions, characterized 
Kissinger, during these meetings, as being "responsive . . . very honest. . . and open."
Sybil Stockdale also had a positive view of Kissinger and his interactions with 
family members. In a speech she wrote in the late 1970s for presentations to varied 
audiences, Sybil indicated that "Henry Kissinger has never received the public 
acknowledgement he deserves for those patient hours he spent with us explaining over 
and over how the North Vietnamese negotiate and always giving us his honest appraisal 
of the chances for peace in the next six months or a year. We weren't an easy or happy 
group to deal with in those days and to his great credit, he never ducked us or gave us less
235
than his honest opinion."
Sandy Dennison told a more personal story about meeting with Kissinger, a story 
that seems to suggest that Kissinger was a bit different from his image as a heady and
235
Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection .
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unemotional intellectual and policy strategist. Sandy told me that she had contacted 
Commander Boroughs and asked him to set up an appointment so she could speak with 
Kissinger. She wanted to question Dr. Kissinger about the fact that she had received 
information about her husband's situation from a peace activist who had gone to North 
Vietnam with Jane Fonda and members o f the Chicago Seven.236 Even decades later, her 
voice suggested her frustration with the fact that the American government could not 
obtain solid information on her husband, yet anti-war activist— with relative ease— 
traveled to Hanoi, returned with information on POWs, and even carried letters for POW 
families. Her frustration was fueled, in part, by the fact that the anti-war activist who had 
met with her to share information about her husband also had told her that her husband 
"got what he deserved."
Eventually, Sandy had her private meeting with Kissinger. She told me that, 
unlike the antiwar activist, "he [Kissinger] was very kind" and sympathetic to her 
predicament. He assured her that, in the future, he would give her as much information as 
he could but told her that America's information "sources are very limited and we don't 
want to hamper any of the sources." At that point, Sandy asked Kissinger if she was to 
believe the validity of the POW and MIA list anti-war activist had produced, which 
indicated her husband had died in prison. She said that Kissinger took her by the hand 
and said, with considerable compassion, "Sandy, I think you should start a new life."
Thus, the stories that the wives told suggest favorable treatment by White House 
officials during the early 1970s. White House documents, however, suggest that the story
236
The C hicago Seven  were a group o f  individuals charged w ith conspiracy, inciting to riot, along  
with other charges related to v iolent protesting that took p lace at the 1968 D em ocratic National Convention  
in Chicago, Illinois.
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may be a little more layered and the motives of Kissinger and others may have been more 
complex than simply wanting to express humanitarian concern and provide comfort.
One memorandum, dated May 3, 1971, from Dave Packard, Under Secretary of 
Defense, to Dr. Kissinger, suggest concern within the White House over the 
"understandable impatience and exasperation" of families was, indeed, genuine.
However, the memo also reveals a more Machiavellian agenda. Packard wrote:
They [the families] could easily, as they are urged by many, join with dissenting 
groups to make a satisfactory resolution of the conflict more difficult. It is 
important that these families continue to support US efforts.
I believe it is advisable that you meet with them [National League Board 
o f Directors] and discuss the hazards to their cause o f becoming involved in the 
political aspects of the problem, and attempt further to define US policy regarding 
our missing and captured men in terms that assure the families that all feasible
237
efforts are being made.
Other White House documents articulated concerns. In a memorandum to 
President Nixon, dated April 15, 1971, Brigadier General Hughes (formerly Colonel) 
referred to an early April meeting that Nixon had had with Senator Robert Dole regarding 
POW and MIA families. Hughes told the President that the meeting had been brought to 
his attention because it had left him (Nixon) "with great concern that the families of the 
POW and MIA are about to defect spontaneously and in large numbers from a position of
237
D avid Packard, Deputy Secretary o f  D efense, to Henry A . Kissinger, A ssistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, W ashington, DC, M ay 3, 1971; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3; 
Prisoners; 1 /1 /71-[1972]; N ixon  Presidential Materials; N ational A rch ives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, 
MD.
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at least tacit support of the administration to the peace groups and others who oppose our 
efforts in Southeast Asia."238
Because of the President's level of concern, Hughes assured the President that he 
would work with the National Coordinator o f the National League to determine the 
seriousness of the potential defection. He informed the President that his "preliminary 
survey. . . . indicates that there is no immediate move towards a mass defection." He did, 
however, let the President know there was "considerable frustration, disappointment and 
in some cases, despair." Hughes memo also discussed "morale remedies" that were 
designed to "prove to families how deeply he [Nixon] and the Administration 
[were]... interested in the welfare of their men and, o f course, the families." To provided 
further support to the families and demonstrate administration commitment to the matter, 
the Advertising Council agreed to conduct a nation-wide campaign on behalf o f POWs 
and MIAs. General Hughes, quite candidly, told the President that the initiatives are "of a 
cosmetic nature—but designed to provide an immediate uplift in the moral of the 
families."239
Thus, the motives that prompted White House officials to meet with members of 
the National League are nothing if not complex. The wives remember meeting with 
human beings who were genuinely concerned about their welfare and the welfare of their 
husbands. There is no reason to believe this interpretation is totally erroneous. After all, 
after years o f witnessing so-called Washington Road Shows, the wives had developed 
considerable skill in sniffing out disingenuous behavior.
238
Brigadier General James D. Hughes, Military A ssistant to the President, to Richard N ixon , 
President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, April 15, 1971; W hite H ouse Central Files, N D  18-3; 
Prisoners; 1 /1 /71-[1972]; N ixon Presidential Materials; N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, 
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But the human beings that worked in the White House were also, first and 
foremost, politicians. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the attention they 
paid to the wives and their cause had a great deal to do with the fact that White House 
officials greatly valued the tacit support (or, at least, the official neutrality) o f a group of 
women who had attracted national attention for their cause. White House documents tend 
to confirm this interpretation.
Nixon and Laird Speak at a National League Convention
One indicator of increasing political clout o f those associated with the National 
League in the early 1970s was the fact that both President Nixon and Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird spoke at National League's Annual Convention on September 28, 
1971. The mere fact that both of these government officials appeared at the convention 
speaks to the League's perceived importance within the administration. But the content of 
both speeches also speak to the success o f League members in overturning the earlier 
policy o f Quiet Diplomacy and making the POW and MIA issue an explicit part o f the 
national conversation. The speeches were the antithesis of the canned speeches politicians 
normally deliver on the "rubber chicken" circuit. Both speakers took note of the 
magnitude of the wives arduous journey and also assured audience members that the 
government was, indeed, continuing to address the POW and MIA issue at the highest 
levels. President Nixon, in fact, assured the group that the POW and MIA issue was his 
"presidential priority." He said:
As you can imagine, whoever holds the office of the Presidency cannot take upon 
himself all of the various assignments that come across his desk. Much must be
273
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delegated. I want each and every one of you to know, however, that from the time 
in the White House Library, at Christmas time, 1969,1 met a group of wives and 
one mother of some POW's and missing action, from that time . . .  I have 
considered the problem of obtaining the release of our POW's and missing in 
action as being one that has presidential priority.240
At the outset of his speech, Melvin Laird acknowledged how widespread the 
wives influence has been. He said, "You have won the admiration o f the nation and o f a 
great part of the civilized world because you have borne uncertainty and loneliness with 
dignity and courage."24’
In his speech, Melvin Laird also repeated a refrain well known to the POW and 
MIA wives and family members. It was a line they publicized in their letters, their 
speeches, and used in their conversations. It was simply: "The Geneva Convention 
requires . . . "  Laird repeated this phrase along with specific Geneva Convention 
requirements nine times in his speech. Each time, of course, he took note of North 
Vietnam's failure to comply with international law over the long course of the war.
Laird's acknowledged his own participation in the struggle as well as the 
significant contributions made by the wives and family members. He said, "If together we 
continue to persevere, to remain united in purpose, to continue to keep the question o f the 
prisoners and the missing high on the list o f international priorities, we will achieve the
240
Richard N ixon, President o f  the United States, to the Annual M eeting o f  the N ational L eague o f  
Fam ilies o f  American Prisoners and M issing in Southeast A sia, W ashington, DC, Septem ber 28 , 1971; 
W hite House Special Files; Ronald Ziegler; V ietnam  Prisoners o f  War, I, 02-19 , [2 o f  2]; N ixon  
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objective for which we have been working." (For transcripts of the speeches, see 
Appendices H and I.)
The National League Demands/the Administration Responds: The Formation o f  the Non- 
Partisan Political Action Committee
If the decision to have both the President and his Secretary o f Defense speak to 
the 1971 National League convention was made, in part, for political reasons and to 
placate an increasingly powerful interest group, the appearances did not completely 
accomplish this goal. After the two spoke, in fact, the National League's membership 
voted to send a series o f questions they wanted President Nixon to address.
The copy of the letter from the League to the White House that I reviewed had no 
date on it, but the Wliite House response, prepared by Dr. Kissinger and sent to Carol 
Hanson, Chairman of the National League o f Families, dated December 22, 1971. The 
response's bottom-line message was clear and simple: providing answers to the questions
243
that had been posed would not serve either "national interests or interests of the men."
By early 1972, as was alluded to in an earlier chapter, the POW and MIA wives 
and families had become even more dissatisfied with the seemingly endless war and the 
continuing uncertainty about a resolution on the POW and MIA issue. In part to respond 
to the rising level of dissatisfaction, but also because of the presidential election 
scheduled for November of 1972, the League formed the Non-Partisan Political Action 
Committee. The Committee's somewhat cumbersome name is reflective of an attempt to 
respond to the growing dissatisfaction with the Nixon administration's handling of the
242
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war in Vietnam while not totally abandoning the group's commitment to nonpartisanship, 
a commitment that had served the group well during its earlier years.
Phyllis Galanti, who was on the National League's Board of Directors, wrote a 
letter to League members about Board's January 22-23, 1972, meeting that discussed the 
formation of the Non-Partisan Political Action Committee. She wrote that the members 
on this committee "will ensure that the candidates throughout the country are asked key 
questions on the prisoner-missing issue either by newsmen or by family members 
themselves." And, as previously mention, she told members: "No part o f this
244
Committee’s activities will involve the endorsement or opposition of any candidates."
A sense of how the Committee's balancing act would actually play out can be 
found in a February 28, 1972, letter that Mrs. Joan Vinson, National League Board o f 
Directors Chairman, sent to President Nixon. In her letter, Mrs. Vinson informed Nixon 
of the establishment o f a "Non-Partisan Political Action Committee" within the National 
League of Families. The committee, she told the President, was comprised of families 
and friends o f POWs and MI As who were charged with keeping the POW and MIA issue 
before the public during the 1972 presidential election. The letter informed the President 
that the National League would expect all presidential candidates "to state what they 
would do, if  elected, to settle the war and achieve the release o f prisoners and an 
accounting of the missing." Specific questions related to this expectation also were 
included in the letter.
National ^ jch iv e s  at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
In the letter, Phyllis Galanti also informed them o f  several other com m ittees the Board "set up 
w hich w ill deal at the national level w ith specific areas o f  effort." The com m ittees included (a) M IA/POW  
Readjustment and Rehabilitation, (b) Finances, Public A ction  and Publicity, (c) L egislative, National 
Organization, and (d) Foreign N ations. Phyllis Galanti, unpublished data, private collection.
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Mrs. Vinson also explicitly stated, in her letter, that the women did not want to 
hear arguing and bickering among the candidates about the POW and MIA issue. Rather, 
their goal was "to elicit a plan for the future." She concluded her letter by reminding the 
President, one more time, that the Non-Partisan Political Action Committee's request was 
for specific information about future actions and that his response to their request was
245
"part of the democratic decision-making process."
The White House did not respond to Mrs. Vinson's request, but White House 
documents indicate that the memo— and the League's Non-Partisan Political Action 
Committee, in general— did not go unnoticed. Indeed, it would have been difficult for the 
White House to ignore the actions of the League's Non-Partisan Political Action 
Committee because members of the committee were both persistent and omni-present 
during the course o f the election year.
For instance, when there was no official reply to her first letter to the White 
House, Mrs. Vinson wrote again. In a letter dated March 17, she informed the President 
there had been no response to their previous letter. She also noted that the National 
League's Non-Partisan Political Action Committee would conduct a press conference on
246
March 21 to discuss the candidate's answers to their questions. The press conference
247
was held, however, on March 27.
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To date, I have not been able to locate a transcript o f  the m eeting.
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The White House did respond to Mrs. Vinson. In a letter dated March 27, 1972, 
General Scowcroft, provided Mrs. Vinson with two enclosures with answers to the 
committee's questions. Scowcroft told her: "There are no easy answers to the questions 
you have asked, but as you requested I am forwarding statements which set forth the 
Administration's views and efforts on these issues."248
In May of 1972, additional pressure was applied. Chairman of the National 
League's non-partisan political action committee, Joan Vinson, sent another letter to the 
President, in which the Committee requested— or, to be more precise, demanded— a
249
meeting with him. The letter indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
the President's plans in Southeast Asia, the negotiations in Pairs at the Peace Talks to 
release the prisoners, and what measures were being taken to account for the missing.
The letter was signed by so many wives that the signatures cover two pages.
As has already been suggested, the letter's tone was quite demanding. The 
committee, the letter stated, considered it "imperative that we be given the opportunity to 
discuss with you. . . .  imperative that you understand the feelings of the families.. . .  we 
feel justified in making this demand upon your time and invoking the presidential
..2 5 0
priority.
Accompanying the letter was a resolution from the National League of Families 
that stated the families' demands on the administration. The resolution stated that it was
248
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the League's purpose to "make known and reaffirm its extreme distress at the failure o f 
this administration's policy to resolve the POW-MIA issue . . . and expect the government 
to immediately adopt a policy which will ensure an accounting of the missing men and
251
the release of the prisoners of war." In a bold statement, the National League informed 
the administration it would elect three members at the May 5-7 annual National League 
convention, who in turn, would— within ten days— meet with the President and
252
immediate report back to the National League membership.
Phyllis Galanti told me of other actions by the Non-Partisan Political Action 
Committee. She noted, for example, that some members of the League who attended the 
May, 1972, convention protested, in front of the White House, what they believed was 
the government's mediocre response to the POW and MIA issue. She read to me the 
following statement she had written in May 1972 for the National League o f Families 
newsletter:
During our day in Washington, some of the wives wanted to display their feelings 
by forcefully picketing in front of the White House. While I am not ready to do 
that; yet \sic\ I am much more tolerant of others' views than I was before the 
meeting. Each of us has her own cross to bear and each circumstance is different.
Although the President's appearance before our group was encouraging, 
that 10 minute appearance will not carry me through another year. This is not just 
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continue to do everything possible to get our men home and I trust that the
253
President and the Congress will do likewise. Our men deserve no less.
Phyllis also noted that she and other members of the Non-Partisan Political Action 
Committee "roamed around and buttonholed people" at both the Republican and the 
Democrat national conventions as part o f their non-partisan yet highly political activities 
during the presidential year. Like other conventioneers, they wore hats, but instead of 
candidate's name, they had a bumper sticker that said, "POWs-MIAs dying to vote in 
'72." At the Republican Convention, Phyllis told me that when President Nixon appeared 
on the platform the audience began chanting, "Four more years! Four more years!"
Phyllis said the person next to her was joining in the chorus. Phyllis, however, shouted: 
"Heck no! Not four more years of what we've had. My husband's been a POW for six 
years and I don’t want four more years o f the same stuff."
When I asked Phyllis if she thought the political action committee strained 
relationships within the National League or between the National League and the 
administration, Phyllis reminded me by back to the requirement that the committee was 
to preserve itself as a nonpartisan group. She told me, "Even though some of us had 
personal feelings, they were never part of the effort. Any disagreement certainly wasn't 
voiced publicly. We were trying to bring pressure on all the candidates." Later in the 
interview, she framed the National League's desire to contain direct public criticism of 
the administration, even while the League was putting considerable pressure on the 
administration privately. She said, "We all realized there was too much at stake for any of 
that to become public."
253
Phyllis Galanti, unpublished data, private collection.
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None o f this went unnoticed by members of the administration. Government 
documents indicate that administration officials continued to appreciate the Leagues non­
partisan stance, were aware of pressures within the organization to abandon its non­
partisan strategy, and were fearful of the consequences for the administration and its 
policies should this happen, especially in an election year. General A1 Haig, for example, 
in an undated memorandum, provided a nine-page response for General Scowcroft, 
Military Assistant to the President to the questions the League had asked the President to
254
answer. General Haig indicated that, at one level, he did not believe that providing 
specific answers to the League's questions was a good idea. He noted that "the issues are 
complex and other senior Administration officials . . .  have addressed them in 
considerable detail." However, he acknowledged that he and others in the administration 
who had maintained contact with the National League had a strong sense that the 
"League's candidate project and their current mood makes it absolutely essential to
255
provide specific answers."
Interestingly, the President of the United States also acquiesced to the demand 
that he meet with League representatives. The details of the meeting will be discussed in 
the next section. Here, it is sufficient to note that the files suggest that, this time, the 
White House staff did not play Hamlet with the question of whether or not to hold the 
meeting. Undoubtedly, election year politics made the decision relatively easy to make. 
And, almost certainly, the somewhat radical element that had emerged within the League 
influenced the decision to acquiesce to the League's demand for another meeting with the
254
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President. Even Sybil Stockdale, who had always argued that the National League refrain 
from engaging in partisan politics, seems to appreciate the positive role that the more 
radical element within the League played prior to the election.
O f course, there is another part to the story. It is unlikely that the League's 
demands would have been accommodated had the organization not remained officially 
neutral and non-partisan. As long as criticism of the administration came from 
individuals within the League rather than from the official organization, itself, there was 
an incentive for administration officials to attend to the League's concerns, if  only to keep 
the organization from aligning with the administration's critics on the Vietnam War. The 
notion of a non-partisan political action committee may be a bit of an oxymoron, but the 
League's decision to form such an odd-sounding committee and the administration's 
response to it suggest that, in politics, oxymorons can be exceedingly functional. 
President Nixon Meets with National League Leadership
On May 15, 1972, Sybil Stockdale, Maureen Dunn, and Phyllis Galanti met with 
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the White House. I was not able to find any 
archival material related to the meeting (other than Kissinger's May 13, memo to the 
President, which included "Talking Points"), though the White House taping system 
might have recorded it.256
What is currently available is a transcript o f the press conference that the women 
held in the Rose Garden after the meeting. Sybil told me that the White House had made
255
m I b i d -
Sybil revealed she had interjected som e humor into the m eeting with a recomm endation that 
the M arines go ashore in N orth Vietnam and "claim it as U .S . territory .. .  . until all Am ericans are released 
and accounted for." Reporters asked what the President said and Sybil told them , "He lau gh ed .. . .  He 
sm iled handsomely."
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meeting with the press optional; but she said she had learned, by this point, that unless the 
press documented an event, the event, for all intents and purposes, never happened.
The White House transcript of the press conference revealed the women were 
knowledgeable and in command of the POW and MIA issues. They articulated the 
complexities o f the government's policies well and exhibited confidence. The transcript 
also suggested that the White House decision to acquiesce to the League's demand for a 
meeting had an exceedingly positive payoff in an election year.
Maureen Dunn, for example, told the reporters that she felt that the President 
"answered even the questions for the dissident factors [i.e. factions] in our League." 
Maureen, the only MIA wife present at the meeting, also expressed confidence about the 
President's commitment to accounting for the missing, not only in South Vietnam, but
257
also in Laos and Cambodia.
Phyllis Galanti told the reporters that she had been "very, very critical of the 
Administration in recent months; she added, "I wanted with all my heart to be convinced 
that everything possible was being done. . . .  the meeting today has given me assurance." 
One reporter asked if the President had given them pny "optimism." Phyllis responded 
and told the reporters that as they left the Oval Office the President had said, "Our long 
vigil would end." She added, "He felt confident that that day [the return of the POW and
258
an accounting o f the MI As] was coming."
Just before their meeting with the President and White House staff members, 
President Nixon had made the decision to mine Haiphong Harbor. In her press conference
257
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comments, Sybil Stockdale referred to this decision and told the reporters that Nixon
259
gave his assurances "that the harbor would stay mined until the prisoners are released."
Thus, the women said positive things about the President and his administration 
during the press conference that followed their meeting with the President and high- 
ranking White House staff. They also were quite critical of one of the White House's 
major critics on the Nixon administration's handling of the Vietnam War, Senator 
William Fulbright (D-AR), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.260
The women, however, stuck to their well-established game plan and did not to 
take sides on the war, itself. Sybil Stockdale, in fact, explicitly stated the following 
during the press conference: "Our organization, as you know, takes no position on any 
political issues at all." Thus, the leadership within the League still understood that taking 
a stand on the war would limit support for them and their cause and distract from their 
central concern, bringing their husbands home. In addition, at this point, publicly 
supporting— or opposing—the administration's continuation of the war would, almost 
certainly, has created internal problems within the League itself. Sybil also mentioned 
this point during the press conference. "We have, within our organization, probably every 
political point of view that you could imagine in this country." At another point during 
the press conference, Maureen Dunn articulated this same idea, albeit in a somewhat 
more colorful way. She stated that the League was made up o f "doves and hawks" as well 
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Thus, instead of criticizing Senator Fulbright's position on the war itself, the 
wives expressed a more focused criticism about the Foreign Relations Committee's 
failure to hold a single hearing on the prisoner issue since the first prisoner was taken 
captive in 1964. During her press conference remarks, in fact, Sybil took note of "a 
strongly worded resolution condemning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee" that 
had recently been adopted by the league, and then she stated: "We [the National League 
of Families] consider the committee derelict in its responsibilities, and we said so."262
Nixon's Support o f  the POW  and MIA Issue in the Early 1970s 
The White House files I reviewed indicate that once the POW and MIA issue got 
on the White House radar screen, the issue continued to be a significant concern to the 
President and members of his staff. In a memorandum dated April 19, 1971, for example, 
Kissinger recommended the President address, in his April 20 meeting with International 
Red Cross (IRC) President Marcel Naville, the POW issue by focusing on Hanoi's refusal 
to afford our men the protection of the Geneva Convention.263 He admonished the 
President to impress on Naville the importance o f the POW issue while expressing hope 
that prison camps in North Vietnam would be inspected by the IRC. The President was 
encouraged to urge the IRC would do all it could on behalf of the prisoners and to "press 
Communist authorities in Laos and South Vietnam for information on our POW's 
there."264
262
263 I b l d -
Henry A . Kissinger, A ssistant to the President for N ational Security A ffairs, to Richard N ixon , 
President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, April 19, 1971; W hite H ouse Central F iles N D  18-3; 
Prisoners; 1/1 /7 1 -[ 1972]; N ixon Presidential Materials; N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park,
M D '  264
Ibid.
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I also found a comprehensive document sent by A1 Haig to John Erlichman on 
December 16, 1971; the document was titled, "Preparation of National Security Issues 
Papers." The section that focused on the administrations' policies to end the war and 
"win" the peace highlighted the initiatives taken by the President on POW and MIA 
matters. The unnamed author(s) o f the report wrote, "Unlike the previous administration, 
President Nixon brought the plight of our prisoners o f war to the attention o f the world. 
He has tirelessly and unceasingly pursued every possible avenue to secure their release or 
at least the humane treatment to which they are entitled by the Geneva Convention."265
On February 9, 1972, President Nixon sent "A Report to Congress" on POW 
matters, February 9, 1972. The document stated, "No single issue has received greater 
attention or been the subject of more intense efforts . . . than the plight o f our prisoners of 
war in Indochina." In the report, the President summarizes his initiatives since July 1970 
and his administration's ongoing efforts to secure POWs "proper treatment and prompt 
release."266
In addition, on March 10, 1972, President Nixon signed his second Presidential 
Proclamation on the POW and MIA issue at the request of S. J. Resolution 189, "National 
Week of Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners of War or Missing in Action" 
(Appendix J). The tone o f this Proclamation was a bit different from the tone o f earlier 
documents on the POW and MIA issue. The report's language was forthright, and the
265
A1 Haig, Jr., Senior M ilitary A ssistant to the President, to John Ehrlichman, C ounsel to the 
President and A ssistant to the President for D om estic A ffairs, W ashington, D C , D ecem ber 16, 1971; 
National Security C ouncil Files; Henry A . K issinger O ffice F iles, H A K  A dm inistrative and S taff Files; 
Subject Chron, A ugust 1969— A ugust 1974; N ixon  Presidential Materials, N ational A rchives at C ollege  
Park, Colj^ge Park, M D.
Richard N ixon , President o f  the United States, to Congress, W ashington, DC, February. 9,
1972; White H ouse Special Files; Ronald Ziegler; Vietnam  Prisoner o f  War, I, 02-19; N ixon  Presidential 
Materials, National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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report expressed harsh criticisms o f the North Vietnamese. The report noted, for instance, 
that several men were beginning their ninth year in captivity and that 1,623 American 
servicemen were listed as POW or MIA. Nixon's Proclamation stated, "The POW and 
MIA story of this long and difficult war is a tragic one. . . . This is the longest internment 
ever endured by American fighting men; it is also one o f the most brutal.""67
Arguably the most convincing evidence that the POW and MIA issue remained on 
the President's mind and on the Administration's policy agenda comes from a source that 
was not intended to be a public document, i.e., a tape from the secret taping system that 
Nixon had installed in the Oval Office.268 Of the 312 tapes that the National Archives 
index refers to the POW and MIA issue, only three had been transcribed at the time of 
this study. One of these transcripts was from April 11, 1973. The transcript includes a 
record o f a conversation between President Nixon and Roger Shields, Head of the 
Department of Defense POW and MIA Task Force. The twenty-three minute
269
conversation took place a month after the last POW was released. During the 
conversation, President Nixon asked Shields if he was working on the MIA issue. When 
Shields told him he was, Nixon replied by saying that he "consider[ed] it [accounting for 
MI As] of highest importance . . . t ha t . . .  we go to every effort possible, [every effort] is 
made on the MIA. . . . leaving no stone unturned." The President added: "I can think of 
those families that have waited so long, always hoping, and, o f course, always
267
Richard N ixon , President o f  the United States, to Proclam ation 4 1 1 5 , W ashington, DC, March 
10, 1972; W hite H ouse Special Files; Ronald Ziegler; Vietnam  Prisoner o f  War, I, 02-19; N ixon  
President]^ Materials, N ational A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D .
A s noted earlier, N A R A  W hite H ouse tape logs indicate 312 Oval O ffice  conversations related 
to POW  cjj l̂ M IA matters.
Conversation 893-13; Portion o f  a conversation betw een The President and Roger Shields 
[Electronic Records]; Transcript (p. 18); The Oval Office; April 11, 1973; N ix o n  W hite H ouse Tapes; 
Records o f  the N ational A rchives and Records Administration, Cassette N um ber E 5 0 1 ; National A rchives 
at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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wondering, you know, when they get this first list, well, maybe, maybe somebody's 
alive." Later in the conversation he told Shields he wanted him to write the MIA families, 
as the President, himself, had done earlier, and tell the families that the "President. . .  
does not consider the peace . . . won until we get an absolute, complete, satisfactory
270
account o f all MI As." Nixon said he considered this his "highest priority."
During their conversation, Nixon and Shields also discussed the December 1972 
bombing campaign by American bombers that targeted positions in and around Hanoi. 
During this portion of the conversation, Nixon brought up the POW issue. He told 
Shields that, in late 1972, "the North Vietnamese had reneged on the [Paris Peace] 
agreement" by attaching conditions to the return of POWs. Nixon told Shields how the 
United States had responded to the North Vietnamese: "We said no conditions." Nixon 
then added: "That's why we had to bomb. One of the major reasons we had to bomb. And 
it worked."271
Thus, the evidence suggests that, after the 1969 meeting between the President 
and the POW and MIA family members, the POW and MIA issue continued to influence 
United States policy. The impact may have had something to do with the compelling 
story that the women told the President and the Presidents seemingly empathic response 
to it. However, as Alexander Butterfield told me, the President was first and foremost a
270
27,Ibid-
During one o f  m y interviews with Sybil Stockdale, she told m e that after her husband returned 
from prison he had a one-hour private m eeting with President N ixon . A fter the m eeting, Sybil's husband  
told her that the President had asked him  a question that he did not understand, w hich, he said, had to do 
with a renewed bom bing campaign in North Vietnam . Sybil told m e that she told her husband, "Kissinger 
said [that] w as the plan all along. They knew the North V ietnam ese w ere not go ing  to abide by the terms o f  
the treaty, so they signed it to get the prisoners out. Then after they got the prisoners out, they were going  
to go back in and bom b the North V ietnam ese into abiding by the treaty." But, they couldn't do it, she told 
me, because the next w eek John Dean w ent to the Prosecutor about W atergate.
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political animal, and White House documents provide ample evidence of political 
pressure being applied from a wide range of sources on the POW and MIA issue.
Pressure to Keep the POW  and MIA Issue on the Agenda 
There is considerable documentation, in fact, that White House staff kept the 
President current on POW and MIA initiatives by American citizens and companies. 
These updates included information about Perot's "United We Stand," and activities 
conducted by civic clubs and groups, committees, and professional organizations.
The President, for instance, was briefed on a whole range of initiatives—  
everything from the National Football League's and National Basketball Association 
Commissioner's "10 Tons of Mail" campaign which enlisted sports fans to write letters
272
supporting the prisoners to the Longshoreman's Association's willingness to end its 
eighteen-year boycott of Soviet cargo and passenger ships if  Moscow was able to 
convince Hanoi to release five American POWs in return for each vessel serviced in
273
United States Atlantic or Gulf Coast port.
The files also contained copies of letters from the President to groups focused on 
the POW and MIA issue. In a letter to the Scabbard and Blade Society of Murray State 
University, for example, President Nixon expressed his appreciation to the "public- 
spirited members" of the Society because of their "Pen Power" initiative for POWs. He 
stated that such concern "offers fresh hope for those brave Americans whose well-being
272
Jeb S. Magruder, Special A ssistant to the President, to D w ight Chapin, W ashington, D C , D ec.
8, 1970; W hite H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3; Prisoner; [1969-1970]; N ixon  Presidential Materials,
N ational ^ jch iv es  at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
Alexander P. Butterfield, A ssistant C h ief o f  S ta ff and Special A ssistant to President N ixon , to 
Richard N ixon , President o f  the United States, W ashington, DC, D ec. 15, 1969; President's O ffice Files; 
President's Handwriting; Decem ber 1969— January 15, 1969, D ecem ber 1-15, 1969; N ixon Presidential 
Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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is of primary importance to all of us." It was his opinion, he said, that such groups were a
274
support to the government's "unceasing efforts" on the POW issue.
The files I reviewed also documented lobbying efforts within the White House 
staffers to keep the POW and MIA issue on the Administration's policy agenda. In one 
memo I read from White House staff member, George Bell, to Jim Keogh, Chief of the 
White House research and writing staff, for instance, Bell argued for the inclusion of a 
"complete sentence or so on the POWs" in the Veterans Day Proclamation by the 
President. Bell even acknowledge in his memo that he had "held up release" o f the
275
Proclamation in order to obtain the additional statement.
As was the case with other actions that occurred in the White House, however, it 
is clear that Bell's was motivated more by political than humanitarian concerns, for after 
Bell requested that a sentence about the POWs be included in the Proclamation, he 
provided a rationale for doing this. His rationale emphasized that such a statement would 
"satisfy our pressures."276
Data from Harris Poll conducted in 1972 provides quantitative evidence of the 
"pressures" to which Bell's memo alludes. Throughout 1971 and the first half o f 1972, 
poll figures indicated that three-quarters of the American public wanted American troops 
withdrawn from Vietnam. On June 12, 1972, the Harris polling company asked a 
somewhat different question: "Suppose you had to choose between the U.S. ending all
274
Richard N ixon, President o f  the U nited States, to Scabbard and B lade Society, W ashington,
DC, D ec. 5, 1970; White H ouse Central F iles, N D  18-3; Prisoner; [1969-1970]; N ixon  Presidential 
M ateria ls^ation al A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
George T. B ell, W hite H ouse Staff, to Jim K eogh, C h ief o f  the W hite H ouse research and 
writing staff, W ashington, DC, Oct. 28 , 1970; W hite H ouse Central Files, N D  18-3; Prisoner; [1969-1970]; 
N ixon P ru d en tia l Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
George T. B ell, W hite H ouse Staff, to Jim K eogh, C h ief o f  the W hite H ouse research and 
writing staff, W ashington, DC, Oct. 28 , 1970; W hite H ouse Central Files, N D  18-3; Prisoner; [1969-1970]; 
N ixon Presidential Materials; National A rchives at C ollege Park, C ollege Park, M D.
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our involvement in Vietnam with assurances o f the return o f our men who are prisoners 
of war, or continuing our involvement in Vietnam until the prisoners are released?" 
Seventy-five percent thought the United States should remain in Vietnam until the 
prisoners were released. This strong support for the POW was a radical reversal o f the 
ignorance and indifference the wives had encountered when they first began their public 
education efforts in the mid to late 1960s.
The Bottom Line Question: What Difference Did the Wives Make?
The surviving POWs finally came home in February and March of 1973. The 
final section of this chapter confronts what must be considered a bottom line question in 
this dissertation: What difference did the wives' and other family members' political 
lobbying on behalf of their husbands and family members really make?
Questions o f causality are always difficult to answer simply and definitively in 
historical research. A closer look at the information presented in the prior section 
provides one reason why this is so. This information clearly indicates that a wide rage of 
individuals and groups were putting pressure on the White House to keep the POW and 
MIA issue on the administration's agenda in negotiations with the North Vietnamese. In 
the absence of such broad-based support, it is doubtful that a small group o f women and 
family members armed with only a compelling story and an improvised lobbying 
organization would have had the sort o f clout to influence the White House. On the other 
hand, it is also unlikely that the POW and MIA issue would have gotten the attention of 
the public without the compelling story the women told and their dogged efforts to tell 
that story to anyone who would listen.
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Much the same thing could be said about the impact o f key officials within the 
government. On the face o f things, it certainly seems as if those with more direct access 
to power— e.g., Melvin Laird, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Butterfield, Richard Capen, 
Bob Dole, A1 Haig— had much more influence on the POW and MIA issue than the 
National League did. Even Sybil Stockdale, while reflecting on the growing public 
support and eventual resolution of the POW issue, told me: "Most o f the wives and 
mothers did not realize that White House influence was doing all of this. They thought 
they were doing it all by themselves." From Sybil's perspective, however, "Once they put 
their shoulders to the wheel, things began to happen."
Sybil, in fact, had a name for what happened once key government officials "put 
their shoulders to the wheel" for action: "That afterburner," she called it. Sybil's 
terminology is intriguing since afterburner is a technical term derived from military 
aviation that refers to a device incorporated into the je t engine's tail pipe that injects fuel 
into the exhaust gases, which in turn augments the thrust of the je t with greater power. 
When I asked Sybil to explain the term so I could understand clearly the meaning of her 
afterburner metaphor, she said: "You're taking off and then kick in the afterburner. The 
afterburner is the government backing."
Sybil indicated that she believed the "afterburner . . . kicked in when Mr. Melvin 
Laird made his announcement" about the treatment of the prisoners. This announcement, 
in turn, forced the White House to hold North Vietnam accountable for the well-being of 
the POWs and MIAs, "the power" of the White House, according to Sybil, "is incredible. 
It's mind boggling." She added: "Until you see that and feel it with your own eyes and 
heart you can't imagine what it is .... If you ever have the power of the White House
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either against or for you . . .  if they ever decide to dump you . . . "  Sybil did not complete 
the sentence, but her meaning is quite clear.
Yet, once again, the story is a bit more complicated. Even Sybil's afterburner 
metaphor implies that some burning must occur before the afterburner kicks in, and it is 
obvious, in this case, that the wives and family members set the initial fire. As earlier 
chapters have noted, even before there was a National League, the members of the 
reluctant sorority were lobbying members of Congress, one o f whom was Melvin Laird, 
who later became Nixon's Secretary of Defense. Earlier chapters also documented that 
Richard Capen, who lived in San Diego prior to moving to Washington DC to assume a 
high ranking position in Nixon's Defense Department, acknowledged to me that he first 
became aware o f the POW and MIA issue through the actions of the POW and MIA 
wives in San Diego, and that Alexander Butterfield, the informal point person on POW 
and MIA issues within the White House staff, had ongoing interactions with the San 
Diego wives and, eventually, the formal leadership o f the National League.
Lurthermore, even once the afterburner kicked in because of Secretary Laird's 
very public reversal of the government's quiet diplomacy policy, the wives played what 
must be considered an essential supporting role in keeping the POW and MIA issue alive 
both in the government and within the public's consciousness. It may, indeed, have been 
the case, as Sybil Stockdale believes, that Laird's going public forced the White House to 
confront the North Vietnamese on the POW and MIA issue, but it also is the case that the 
wives and family members put a very personal face on the issue during their December, 
1969 meeting with the President. And even if the President's seemingly sincere response 
to seeing this personal dimension of the issue was not enough to sustain a consummate
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politician's interest in the issue through the many years until it was resolved, the personal 
face was also visible to the public and helped generate the sort of public support that no 
consummated politician could ignore. Even Alexander Butterfield— who was relatively 
circumspect about the impact of the League's efforts and who argued that the League's 
efforts must be viewed in conjunction with many other groups' efforts— acknowledged 
that President Nixon knew the National League "could stir up or arouse interest here on 
the home-front by talking to Congressional reps, the media, etc."
Yet, the storyline about whether and how the wives impacted the POW and MIA 
issue is even more complex than the League applying political pressure, either directly or 
indirectly, and the government responding to this pressure. Over time, a sort o f symbiotic 
relationship between government officials and the League's leadership developed out o f a 
complex mix of motives. Richard Capen provided one of the more obvious examples of 
this symbiotic relationship: He noted that, after he was reassigned to the position of 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, he traveled around the country to 
speak to joint sessions of State Legislatures. When he spoke at these various venues he 
"encourage[d] the wives to show up" to publicize the POW and MIA issue. (He noted 
that he and the wives also encouraged state legislatures to pass legislation that would 
waive tuition for children of POWs and MIAs at state institutions.)
Thus, the answer to the question about the wives' (and, eventually, the National 
League's) impact on the government's POW and MIA policy is as layered and complex as 
virtually all other answers to questions in historical research. Nevertheless, it seems 
certain that things would have played out differently had the wives not publicized their 
"compelling story"; had they not conducted their personal visits with government and
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military officials; had they not maintained their nonpartisan stance; had they not 
maintained media support through a conscious effort to avoid public relations slickness; 
and had they not maintained the sort o f symbiotic relationship with the White House that 
resulted in the White House both using them for the White House's own political 
purposes yet also fearing them.
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in the Absence of Power
"I don't think the work took a toll. The situation took a toll."
Jenny Connell Robertson 
"It is a difficult task indeed to take up your pen and write a letter to someone you love 
when you know not whether he is dead or alive."
Sybil Sockdale 
The Psychological Toll 
"New Year's Resolutions: (1) Survive every day."
Sybil Stockdale Diary Entry, January 1, 1973 
The story told in the preceding chapters has been, more often than not, a story 
about performing in the public arena (and, also, in the early chapters, about learning how 
to act effectively in this arena). Every wife I interviewed, however, also spoke about a 
psychological and emotional toll exacted by their ordeal, and it quickly became apparent 
that the personal pain these women spoke of must become at least a postscript in the story 
I would tell about how a group of women, without political power, exercised leadership 
in the public arena.
I should add that all the women told me about the personal dimensions of their 
ordeal matter-of-factly: no one wallowed in self-pity. Phyllis Galanti, for example, told 
me she did not "remember it [the ordeal] being overwhelming" but she "definitely had 
[her] ups and downs." She credited a supportive community, the city of Richmond, her 
employer, a close family, and a strong faith for helping her through the ordeal.
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Some o f the women even put a positive spin on their experiences. Jenny Connell 
Robertson, of example, characterized her ideal as a process o f growing. She told me,
"You don't have any strength at all when you're first in this situation. So to go from 
isolationist, no confidence, weakness, to finally feeling like your standing on your feet— 
that you can function in life . . .  Yes, that was monumental!"
Mary Winn, still quite prudent, posed a rhetorical question: "Don't all experiences 
have psychological fallouts?"
As mentioned before, the toll on Sybil Stockdale resulted in hospitalization and 
therapy. During my interview, she was quite honest and candid, and said she "was 
exhausted physically and emotionally and [that she] went right into a clinical depression. 
. . .  It was like I was swimming under water." One of the youngest wives, Bonnie 
Singleton, told me that the experience "was not glorious . . .  every moment o f every day 
[it] was excruciating. . . . That kind of emotional pain is just indescribable."
Three o f the wives I interviewed spoke about the toll the ordeal had taken on their 
children. Sandy Dennison, for instance, noted "that war just did terrible things to 
families." More specifically, she said, "It was really very difficult. . . hard for the 
children, very hard, very, very hardl"
During my interview with her, Sandy indicated that she was one o f the wives who 
had kept her children informed of her activities and the reasons she gave speeches and 
interviews. She said she felt the children needed to understand what they would see and 
hear from the television or read about her. Unfortunately, Sandy also had to prepare her 
children for the possibility that their father might not be coming home. Such preparation 
turned out to be appropriate since Sandy's husband did, in fact, die in captivity. Like
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millions of Americans in February and March of 1973, she watched as the prisoners 
returned to America. "Until all the POWs walked off the plane," she told me, "then I 
knew he wasn't coming back. . . .  you know, you live on hope a long time."
In the personal files o f Sybil Stockdale, I came across a letter she wrote to a 
"new" POW wife, named Rene, dated February 12, 1967. The letter revealed the depth of 
emotional pain and heart wrenching agony associated with being a POW or MIA wife 
attempting to cope with the ordinary events of daily life. Sybil told Rene:
Children are a tremendous comfort in our circumstance but their guidance often 
seems beset with problems when there is no one to help with the decisions which 
invariably have to be made and cannot be postponed. It can be a dark hour when 
mother alone has to decide whether or not Johnny's educational problems really 
require the services of a professional psychiatrist or whether the orthodontist 
should be given the green light for an extensive and expensive program. Usually 
however, the tears come over the little things which are almost impossible to 
avoid. Having Johnny, age 6, come to you with tears in his eyes and ask "Is my 
daddy in jail because he did something wrong?" is enough to tear out a mother's 
heart but if the washing machine overflowed that morning and had to be bailed 
out with a pail and if the mail brought nothing but a letter from the bank saying 
your account was overdrawn and if you had just read an article in TIME saying 
the war would last another five to ten years, the world turns very dark indeed. So 
you splash a few tears into dinner that has to go onto the table anyway and into 
the tub of water for the baths which have to be taken and seek an elusive blessed 
sleep on a soggy pillow. The mood can come upon you as quickly as turning out a
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light bulb and unfortunately there is no way to predict how long it will last or 
when it will lift. But it does left [.sic] and once again things seem to return to an 
acceptable level. Time itself \sic\, is both your friend and your enemy. The longer 
you have been alone the more accustomed you are to your circumstance and 
although nothing gets any better, at least you are used to the way things are and 
know better what to expect. Once you have lived through every holiday, every 
birth, every anniversary and every endless Sunday afternoon, you are better able 
to do it the next time because you have been there before.
Those of us, like myself, have much more reason to hope and believe that 
someday we may enjoy the reunion to which we look forward with all our hearts. 
We have several who have every reason to believe that their husbands are 
prisoners and who are on the captured list but have never had any word from them 
at all since the last May Day was relayed by air. But we also have several from 
whom not even a May Day was heard and who just disappeared in darkness. I 
take off my hat to these girls who are so valiantly courageous and who know that 
the day reckoning may hold still another blow for them. It is a difficult task 
indeed to take up your pen and write a letter to someone you love when you know
277
not whether he is dead or alive.
Before concluding this discussion of the personal, psychological toll associated 
with being the wife of a prisoner of war or someone who classified as missing in action, I 
must reiterate that none of the women wished to nor did they dwell on this topic or 
wallow in the memories of the pain they had experienced. Sybil Stockdale's response is
277
Sybil B. Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection .
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symbolic o f the way all the wives I interviewed approached this issue. After reflecting 
and commenting on my question about the personal aspects o f being a POW wife, she 
stopped abruptly, looked directly at me, and said: "Anyhow, that's enough of that."
Some Closing Comments
Sybil Stockdale closed her story, and our formal interviews, with reminiscences 
about the return of the men in 1973. She spoke about the celebrations that erupted across 
the nation and the White House gala for the prisoners and their families. For her, at least, 
the celebratory spirit was tempered by the knowledge that several husbands of dear 
friends remained unaccounted for. As she reflected on her contradictory feelings, she told 
me an interesting story about an encounter she had had with a member of the National 
League who hailed from a small town in Iowa. The woman, Mrs. Spencer, was the 
mother o f LTjg Larry Spencer. Larry had spent seven years in captivity in Hanoi. Since 
Mrs. Spencer's son and Sybil's husband were both recovering at the same military 
hospital, she tracked Sybil down so they could talk.
Sybil recalled Mrs. Spencer asked her, "Mrs. Stockdale, what are you going to do 
now?" Sybil told her, "I don't know, Mrs. Spencer. I don't think anything is going to seem 
very grave, pressing, or worthwhile." Mrs. Spencer then told Sybil that she had "become 
quite famous . . .  because [she had] been on television." Forthrightly, she told Sybil, "I'm 
not sure I can get along without this." Graciously, Sybil said, "Well, I think you just have 
to choose another cause and throw yourself into it. But, there will never be anything like 
this again."
300
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Nine: Discussion and Recommendations
It is customary in the final chapter of a dissertation to accomplish three things: 
first, to link dissertation findings to existing research and theory in the field; second, to 
discuss implications for practice; and third, to describe implications for further research. 
This chapter is organized around these three tasks. Additionally, and due to the historical 
nature of this dissertation and the uniqueness o f the wives situation, this section will also 
address what obstacles the women had to overcome to influence policy makers and what 
their experience can teach about democratic participation.
Linkages to Theory
Before agreeing to participate in the study, several wives wanted assurances that 
their work—and their lives— would not simply be used to support or illustrate some 
academic theory. I provided the requested assurances, and, consequently, I have written 
this section (and complied with a traditional expectation of dissertation writing) with 
considerable caution and more than a little ambivalence.
In fact, the historical data reported in the previous five chapters are consistent 
with a number of prominent theories in Leadership Studies field, as well as with certain 
theoretical work emerging from the field of Public Policy. Consequently, this dissertation 
can be viewed as providing empirical support for a number of already well-established 
theories. This study, however, also extends and expands on this earlier work. Three 
particularly relevant theoretical works— two from the Leadership Studies field and one 
from the field of Public Policy— are discussed in this section.
Before proceeding with this largely theoretical discussion, however, I need to note 
that the material in the previous five chapters also provides the kind of understanding that
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theoretical abstraction can never provide and that only the “thick description”278 of 
historical research can offer. Consequently, readers are urged not to lose sight o f the 
pragmatic, improvisational, innovative, and fluid activity that was described in previous 
chapters as they read the more theoretically oriented discussion below. Ultimately, this 
dissertation is about complex human beings who should never be transformed into social 
scientists' ideal types and whose remarkable accomplishments should never be merely 
subsumed under (and obscured by) theoretical constructs.
Linkages to Ronald Heifetz's Leadership Without Easy Answers
This research focused on how a group of women without formal positional power 
influenced government officials within the United States and, also, internationally. This 
focus is certainly consistent with the view of leadership articulated by Ronald Heifetz in 
Leadership Without Easy Answers. In this book, Heifetz defines leadership as an activity 
by anyone to mobilize people; the book emphasizes that the concept o f leadership should 
not be associated only with those who have acquired formal positional power.
This study certainly speaks to the utility o f Heifetz's theoretical efforts to 
decouple the concepts of leadership and positional power. It demonstrates that even 
within the large-scale national (and international) policy arena, those without formal 
positional power can mobilize people and have a major impact on public policy. They 
can exercise leadership, as Heifetz defines the concept, and can do so quite effectively.
In the process o f demonstrating that "anyone" has the potential to exercise 
leadership, even on a national and international policy level, the study also expands our 
understanding of the sources of a leader's authority. The historical data reported in this
278
Geertz, In terpreta tion  o f  Culture, 3-31.
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dissertation, in other words, not only gives flesh and blood reality to Heifetz’s theoretical 
notion that authority is not merely a synonym for formal positional power. It also 
demonstrates that authority also can, at times, be rooted in personal relationships and the 
"compelling stories" a potential leader tells about these relationships. At least at an 
intuitive level, the leaders of the National League of Families seemed to understand this 
point. Their decision to keep the National League organization small by restricting 
membership to POW and MIA family members is evidence of this understanding.
Finally, this study also suggests the need for those whose authority is rooted in 
something other than formal positional power to recognize that they, in fact, have 
legitimate authority before they can act in ways that will lead others to recognize the 
legitimacy of their authority. Sybil Stockdale, for instance, advocated early on that the 
wives not transfer their authority on the POW and MIA issue to military and government 
officials by acquiescing to the government’s so-called "keep quiet" policy. As was 
documented in the earlier chapters, Sybil unequivocally stated: "For the government to 
have the authority, the sole authority— heaven help us— no way!" Sybil— and the other 
wives I interviewed— knew that the men who were imprisoned in North Vietnam were 
their husbands, and they believed that this fact gave them a legitimate reason to have a 
say on the POW and MIA policy. To state this point another way: the wives understood 
that they were the ones operating from the front lines of the POW and MIA conflict, and 
their front-line status assured them of their right to tell their stories and become major 
players in the policy process.
In time, the wives felt sufficiently empowered to demand a meeting with the 
individual who held the ultimate positional-power job, i.e., President o f the United States,
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within a specified period. By then, of course, many others had recognized the women's 
authority to exercise leadership on the POW and MIA issue, and, consequently, the “most 
powerful man in the world" acquiesced to the demand of a group of women whose 
authority was, to the end, much more personal and relational than positional.
To summarize, this study certainly provides empirical support for the utility of 
Heifetz's efforts to decouple the concepts o f leadership and positional power and 
authority. But the study also extends Heifetz’s theory of leadership by demonstrating 
both that personal relationships can be a source o f non-positional authority and that those 
who wish to lead in the absence of formal positional power and authority must first 
recognize that they have authority and a right to speak on the issue. Thus, this study both 
supports and expands on the theory of leadership that Heifetz articulates in Leadership 
Without Easy Answers.
Linkages to Heifetz and Linsky's Leadership on the Line
Because it deals directly with the policy process, a more recent book by Heifetz 
and his co-author Marty Linsky, Leadership on the Line, is even more closely aligned 
with the findings o f this study. Once again, the study reported here both provides 
empirical support for Heifetz and Linsky's largely theoretical (and quite prescriptive) 
discussion and extends many of Heifetz and Linsky's points.
In Leadership on the Line, Heifetz and Linsky discussed six aspects of thinking 
politically: find partners, keep the opposition close, accept responsibility for your part of 
the mess, acknowledge loss, model appropriate behavior, and accept casualties. Each of 
these six notions can be layered onto the data presented in the previous five chapters 
relatively comfortably, and, consequently, the historical data from this study suggest that
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Heifetz and Linsky have gotten things more-or-less right (or at least not dreadfully 
wrong). These data, however, also remind us that Heifetz and Linsky’s six aspects of 
thinking politically can get a bit more complicated than the theorists indicate.
For example, according to Heifetz and Linsky the first directive for "thinking 
politically" is to find partners. The wives certainly found a large number of partners— 
everyone from the very rich (and very generous Ross Perot), who financed many o f the 
wives trips to the Paris peace talks; to the San Diego YMCA that offered free office space 
to the group before it became a national organization with a Washington DC office; to 
First Lady Pat Nixon, who invited Sybil Stockdale to ride on the first lady's plane (if 
Sybil chose to do so) when she flew between Washington DC and the Western White 
House in Southern California—and the wives’ success most certainly had a lot to do with 
the partnerships that were formed.
But this study also suggests that partnerships can be a double-edged sword. 
Partners' agendas may overlap, but the overlap is seldom perfect. Thus, when partnership 
relationships are established, there is always the potential of being used to serve an 
agenda other than one’s own.
In this study, for example, a review of government documents demonstrates that 
even when the government embraced the wives' agenda and, in a sense, became the 
women's partners, some government officials were not above using the wives and family 
members to build support for their Vietnam War policies, which some members o f the 
National League did not personally support. To their credit, the wives were aware of 
efforts to use them and their public relations cachet, and they managed their relationship 
with the Nixon administration accordingly. For example, they were careful to keep their
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organization, the National League, officially non-partisan, but leaders of the organization 
also intentionally played a kind of Cheshire cat role that, in turn, kept administration 
officials guessing about what the members o f the National League would do. In short, the 
wives allowed themselves to be used by the administration when it served their purpose, 
but they made it clear that their support could not be taken for granted.
The wives recognition of the potential downsides of partnerships also was evident 
in their parsing of the fund-raising issue. To this day, the wives insist that they did not 
engage in fund raising; they simply accepted donations. To some, this may sound like a 
meaningless distinction. To the women, however, the distinction is highly significant. It 
allowed them to retain a sense o f independence and to stay disengaged from the need to 
accommodate the requirements of others, even while receiving the sort o f financial 
support that was necessary to accomplishing their objectives.
There is little in the Heifetz and Linsky book about the potential complications 
that can arise when people embrace Heifetz and Linsky's first component o f "thinking 
politically," i.e., finding partners. There is even less about how these complications might 
be managed. Thus, the material in the previous five chapters extends Heifetz and Linsky's 
theoretical discussion of what it means to think politically, even as it supports the claim 
that the Heifetz and Linsky book is generally on target. Much the same thing could be 
said about the other five components of the theory about political participation that 
Heifetz and Linsky articulate in Leadership on the Line.
Linkages to John Kingdon's Policy Entrepreneurs
In his book, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, John Kingdon wrote 
about policy entrepreneurs who, whether out of self-interest or altruism, sense problems
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and then seek a solution to solve the problem. These entrepreneurs, Kingdon argued, 
have the ability to "soften up" the problem using speeches or other activities to focus 
attention on the issue that concerns them. Kingdon's theory proposes that policy 
entrepreneurs could influence the government's agenda if three conditions are met: first, 
the individual must has some claim to a hearing; second, the person must have political 
connections or negotiating skills that get the attention of policymakers; and third, and
probably most important, successful entrepreneurs are persistent— their tenacity pays
~ ~ 2 8 0
off.
Once again, there is consistency between an existing theory and the historical data 
presented in the prior chapters. Thus, the data presented in this dissertation can be used to 
empirically support a theory, in this case, a theory from the public policy field. As was 
noted above, the women had a clear claim to be heard, and it was this claim that was a 
primary source of their authority and influence.
In addition, some of the wives husbands were senior ranking military officers in 
prison, which created ready-made access to political and, especially, military leaders. To 
be sure, this access could be a bit o f a mixed blessing because there was a tendency, 
especially in the military, for wives of officers to be perceived in certain ways. This not- 
so-subtle bias, could be overcome, however, because of many of the women were well 
educated and had high social intelligence. Their decision never to cry in front o f a public 
or military official is but one indication that they knew who they were dealing with and 
what needed to be done (or, in this case, not done) to be effective with these people.
279
280 K ingdon, Agendas, A lternatives, P ublic P o lic ies, 122. 
Ibid., 180-181.
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Finally, the wives were nothing if not persistent. Sybil Stockdale’s ongoing 
attempts to arrange family members' first face-to-face meeting with the President—a 
meeting that appears to have resulted in a major shift in attitude on the POW and MIA 
issue within the White House— is one indication of this persistence. She simply did not 
take no for an answer.
Thus, this study supports the theoretical points articulated in the John Kingdon's 
book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, just as it supported the thinking on 
display in the two Leadership Studies texts discussed above. Once again, however, the 
story told here is much richer than the theory to which it so closely corresponds. Two 
examples of this richness should suffice.
First, with respect to persistence, it makes little sense to persist in doing things 
that are ineffective, and part of the women’s success had to do with their shift in strategy 
in response to negative feedback. For instance, the wives' failure to interest the editors 
and writers o f Look magazine in telling their personal stories became a valuable learning 
experience when the wives noted that the editors were at least somewhat interested in the 
fact that they had formed a formal organization. This observation was the impetus for 
Sybil Stockdale to (as she said) "wave [her] magic wand" and create a national 
organization.
The women also made adjustments in response to changes in the larger context. 
As the war dragged on and the prisoners did not return, Leaders o f the National League 
recognized the need to adjust somewhat the League's longstanding commitment to 
nonpartisanship on the war issue. They allowed individual members to take sides as 
individuals. They also formed the Nonpartisan Political Action Committee, a group
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whose oxymoronic name signified both a shift in strategy but, also, that the group’s 
nonpartisan stance had not been completely reversed. These compromises had two 
positive effects: first, they effectively managed disagreements about the Nixon 
administration’s policies within the organization and, second, they signaled the White 
House that it really could not take the National League's neutrality for granted.
In short, the POW and MIA wives were nothing if not persistent. But they were 
also flexible. This leavening of persistence with flexibility allowed the wives to learn 
from their failures and permitted them to adjust to changes in both the external 
environment and the environment within their organization.
Linkages Conclusion
In this section, I focused on three major theoretical works—two from the field of 
Leadership Studies and one from the field of Public Policy— that appear to be highly 
consistent with the findings of this study. The study, in fact, provides considerable 
empirical support for each of the theories. But the study also extends all three of the 
theories. Furthermore, even when extended and expanded, the theories discussed here—  
or any other theories, for that matter— can never completely accommodate the richness 
and complexity of the historical data presented in Chapters 4 through 8.
Implications fo r  Practice 
The problem alluded to in the final sentence o f the previous section is also a 
problem that writers of historical dissertations must manage when doing another task that 
dissertation writers are expected to accomplish in their final chapter: articulate a 
relatively clear and straightforward set of implications for practice. It is not that history 
has no practical implications. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is just that the
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practical implications that can be gleaned from reading history can become rather 
superficial and prosaic when separated from the contextual data that gave rise to them. It 
is the details of the historical story that tend to produce new understandings and suggest 
new possibilities for practice, much as the details of day-to-day experience lead us to 
learn new things and new ways o f working. Indeed, good histories provide virtual 
experiences in places and times that we cannot encounter in our every day lives, and, as a 
result, they provide opportunities for "experiential" learning that extend beyond the direct 
experiences o f learning of day-to-day life.
Nevertheless, my task, in this section, is to reduce the rich historical data that took 
four chapters to present to a list of relatively simple and straightforward implications for 
practice. I have reframed this task as providing a list of "lessons learned" from this study 
about how to provide leadership in the policy arena when one lacks both positional power 
and the sorts of resources that groups like big business and big labor have available. As 
readers review the list of lessons learned below, I urge them to recall the rich historical 
data from which the lessons were abstracted.
Lesson # 1: Do Your Homework
The wives in this study were well educated and continued to educate themselves 
throughout the process on a number o f pertinent issues. They also were astute observers 
who could figure out quickly what worked and what needed to be modified.
The women, for instance, actually read and studied the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, as well as books about and related to 
Vietnam. Consequently, when they interacted with military and government officials, 
they could not be easily dismissed, even in an era when women— and especially military
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officers' wives—were cast in stereotypical roles, roles that did not include the role of 
political activist.
Lesson # 2: Size Matters; Resist the Organizational Urge to be Big
There is a tendency to assume that, organizationally, bigger is better, especially 
when a group is attempting to influence national policy. But it is clear that the wives 
would have never been able to form an organization that would have had the resources 
and political clout of, say, a major labor union. The women in this study needed to play a 
different sort o f political game, and to "win" that game, the women needed a small, 
tightly knit organization. Thus, the decision to limit membership in the National League 
to family members of POWs or MIAs was obviously important.
Keeping the organization small meant that the organization required very little 
bureaucracy. Also, by staying small, the organization could continue to be held together 
by personal relationships rather than organizational structures. As a result, flexibility was 
maintained and morale remained, for the most part, high. The national organization, it 
might be argued, was merely an extension o f Sybil Stockdale’s dining room table writ 
large, and that was a good thing. Limiting membership in the organization to family 
members made this personal organizational environment possible.
Lesson # 3: Tell a Compelling Story
Limiting the organization to family members of POWs and MIAs also was 
important because it meant that the organization and all of its members were able to tell a 
compelling personal story. As noted above, the women’s authority ultimately was rooted 
in the personal story they were able to tell and the personal relationships in which their 
story was grounded.
311
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Nine
Lesson # 4: Nothing is More Important than a Personal Visit
This fourth lesson was actually one of Sybil Stockdale’s dictums and was a 
strategy that the wives and the national organization they formed used throughout the 
process they engaged in to lobby for the humane treatment of their husbands. The 
personal visit strategy was highly effective. It helped build a level o f congressional 
support that the executive branch could not ignore, and Sybil Stockdale even used the 
strategy with the President of the United States. The family members meeting with the 
President, in fact, seems to have been an important turning point in garnering the 
administration's support for the issues the women had been championing.
Lesson # 5: Stay Focused/Remain Non-Partisan
Another key to the women's success was that they remained focus on their 
objective: to promote the humane treatment of their husbands. At the organizational level, 
they did not allow themselves to lose focus by taking a position on the Vietnam War or 
on the administration’s handling of the war. This non-partisan stance not only allowed the 
women to "stay on message"; it also meant that they were able to develop allies within 
both parties and among both hawks and doves.
As noted, the National League did modify its commitment to nonpartisanship as 
the war dragged on and frustrations within the organization continued to rise. But the 
group never totally abandoned its commitment to nonpartisanship, and, thus, the 
organization, at least, never lost sight of its objective and never obscured its central 
message.
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Lesson # 6: Form Partnerships, but Keep Partners at Arms-Length
The members o f the National League had generous and powerful allies, including 
the Nixon administration. But they were careful to maintain an arms length relationship 
with allies. They refused to solicit funds and would only accept donations with no strings 
attached. In addition, the women did not allow themselves to be taken for granted.
Indeed, one benefit o f the National League's softening o f its commitment to 
nonpartisanship in the latter years is that the organization kept the Nixon administration 
guessing about what the National League might do and ensured that the Nixon 
administration officials would continue to attend to and attempt to accommodate the 
women’s concerns.
Lesson # 7: D on’t get Slick/Avoid Public Relations Professionals
Undoubtedly one of the best pieces of advice the women received—and which 
they followed to the end—was to avoid hiring a public relations professional to plead 
their case with the media and the public. Their very lack o f public relations savvy turned 
out to be a highly effective public relations "strategy." The media loved them precisely 
because they were not slick. Indeed, as has already been noted, their authority was rooted 
in personal relationships and the compelling story they told of these relationships. Any 
hint of slickness would have undermined this authority at least with the somewhat jaded 
Washington press corps and probably with the general public, as well.
Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on the research and what it has revealed, three types o f studies are 
recommended.
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Studies o f  Other Influential Individuals or Groups on the POW/MIA Issue
All research studies—and certainly all-historical research which, by design, 
sacrifices breadth for depth—can only tell a part of the story. The focus here has been on 
a group of wives. There was certainly good reason to focus on this group since members 
of this group formed and became leaders in the National League. But there were other 
actors— other wives from other parts o f the country, as well as mothers, fathers, sisters, 
and brothers of POWs and MIAs—who played an important role in keeping the POW 
and MIA issue before the public. There is a need to document their stories, as well. 
Studies o f  Other Groups That Have Exercised Leadership on Other Public Policy Issues 
in the Absence o f  Positional Power/Constructing Grounded Theory
There is also the need to conduct studies of other groups and individuals who 
lacked formal positional power or the sorts o f resources normally associated with being 
able to influence the policy making process yet still provided leadership on a range of 
public policy issues. Once a number of studies on a wide range of policy issues have been 
completed, an effort to should be made to compare and contrast the findings of different 
studies with an eye toward building grounded theory about exercising leadership in the 
policy domain in the absence of either positional power or a rich resource base.
Oral History Project
In order to preserve the wives' and family members' experience in a relatively 
unmediated form, an oral history project should be undertaken by the either the Richard 
M. Nixon Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, or a prominent university or college. This 
project should also involve the children of POWs and MIAs, who, undoubtedly, have 
their own unique stories to tell.
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Conclusion
Today it can seem as if  special interest groups, political action committees, 
lobbyist, and financial contributors muffled the voice of the American citizen. Indeed, 
many Americans feel powerless and marginalized, unable to influence their government 
despite the country's continuing rhetoric about democratic participation.
This dissertation has presented a narrative to counter the current malaise. It 
suggests that, at least under certain circumstances, citizens without the trappings of power 
can have a significant influence on government policy and world events. The story of 
how a group of wives who first gathered around a table in San Diego, California, got the 
attention o f the President and other world leaders is a story about persistence, the exercise 
of intelligence, and learning through experience. It is also a story about the power that a 
compelling narrative can have, especially when those telling the story are, themselves, 
the very embodiment of the story’s message.
Though written about men, the words o f Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas are 
most apropos for concluding this dissertation about a stalwart group of women who 
managed to exercise national leadership in the absence o f formal positional power: "For 
better or worse, they were positioned by the chance o f history to have consequence far 
beyond their individual identities. Secure in their common outlook, empowered by the 
bonds of trust, they met the challenge of a demanding new age. In their sense of duty and 
shared wisdom, they found the force to shape the world."281
281
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Appendix A Participant Consent Form
1. The interview being granted is for Steven Lee Smith’s doctoral dissertation at the 
University of San Diego, San Diego, California. The purpose of this form is to grant 
consent to being interviewed as it relates to:
a. The experience of being the spouse of a Vietnam Prisoner o f War (POW) or 
Missing in Action (MIA) and the personal actions taken to influence 
American policy.
b. The experience of being associated with or knowing the activities o f the wives 
of POWs or MIAs to change national policy related to the treatment of POW 
and MIAs in North Vietnam.
c. The experience of being associated with or knowing the activities within the 
Nixon Administration’s involvement with POW and MIA matters and 
activities related to the wives of POW and MIAs and the National League of 
Families.
2. Participation does not involve any physical or legal risk. Social or professional risks 
are minimal since participants can choose what to disclose.
3. Some participants might experience a degree of anxiety in being asked to recall 
personal events and are always free to move away from any topic, terminate the 
interview at anytime, or be referred to a counselor.
4. The project seeks to increase understanding about leadership without authority and 
power as it relates to the influencing of national policy. The participant, therefore, is 
able to engage in self-reflection and dialogue via an oral history about personal and 
historical events from 1965 to 1973 .
5. Participation is voluntary. The participant can discontinue the interview at any point 
without prejudice. If  a participant decides to withdraw from the study, data collected 
prior to withdrawal will not be used.
6. The participant will have the opportunity, prior to the interview, to review the content 
of the questions. Participants will be provided the opportunity to review the transcript 
and note material “off the record.”
7. Participants will be asked to take part in an interview that will last approximately 1 to 
3 hours. If necessary, for clarification or additional information, phone calls will be 
made to the participant.
8. Due to the historical nature of this research, participant names will be used in the 
dissertation. However, if a participant determines certain statements are best kept 
confidential, confidentiality of participants and responses will be granted and the 
researcher will do his best to disguise the identity of the speaker.
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Participant Consent Form
9. The interview will be tape-recorded, with the tape and transcript kept in a locked 
filing cabinet located in the researcher’s home.
I understand the above explanation and I give consent to my voluntary participation in 
this study.
Signature of Subject Date
Signature of Principal Investigator Date
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Appendix B Survey Questionnaire: POW and MIA Wives
1. Would you tell me what is was like being the wife o f a POW and MIA?
2. Would you tell me about your involvement with the National League of Families? Or, 
How would you describe your involvement with the National League o f Families?
3. What National League activities or events did you plan or participate in?
4. What type o f strategy did the National League use to influence national policy on 
POW and MIA issues? Did you help formulate strategy?
5. What events or activities o f National League do you consider having the most 
influence on governmental officials?
6. Were there any specific factors influential in the choice o f strategies?
7. Do you remember encountering obstacles from the government or military officials? 
How did you deal with them?
8. Did you ever feel the experience was taking a psychological on you? How was that 
handled?
9. What specific and important events do you recall chronologically?
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Appendix C Survey Questionnaire: Government or Military Officials
1. What was your position within the Nixon Administration?
2. Would you tell me what you knew about the activities of the wives of POW and MIAs 
and the National League of Families?
3. What was the level o f your involvement with the wives of POWs or MIAs?
4. To your knowledge how influential were the wives of POWs or MIAs within the 
Nixon Administration?
5. To your knowledge how influential was the National League of Families of Prisoners 
of War and Missing in Action?
6. Did the strategy of the National League influence national policy toward POW and 
MIA issues?
7. Were there any specific actions or events from the wives or the National League that 
you remember as being most influential within the Administration?
8. In your professional opinion and based on your recollection do you feel the support of 
the Nixon Administration for the wives and National League was based on a moral 
imperative or one of political necessity?
9. What specific and important events do you recall chronologically?
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Appendix D Geneva Convention Articles Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners Cited by
Wives
Article 2— In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace 
time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases o f declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one o f them.
—Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual 
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said 
Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
— The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee o f the Red Cross or any other 
impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the 
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of the prisoners of war and for their 
relief.
Article 10— If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power 
shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions o f this Article, the offer of the 
services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee o f the Red 
Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the 
present Convention.
Article 13—Prisoners o f war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful 
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health 
of a prisoner o f war in it custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach o f 
the present Convention.
—Prisoners o f war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts 
of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Article 15—The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free 
of charge for their maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of 
health.
Article 17— No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may 
be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. 
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any 
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Article 18—At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents.
The Detaining Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.
Article 25—The premises provided for the use o f prisoners of war individually or 
collectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and 
lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against 
the danger of fire.
Article 26—The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality 
and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health to prevent loss of weight or the 
development o f nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet 
o f the prisoners.
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Article 29— The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures 
necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Article 125—The special position of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in this field [humanitarian aide] shall be recognized and respected at all times.
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Subject: Advice to potential prisoner of war families
From: Public Information Officer, ComNavAir Pac Staff
By: Sybil B. Stockdale
A. Method o f Notification
1. Every effort will be made to notify the next of kin personally. If this is not 
possible next of kin will receive a telegram. This telegram will give the name of someone 
in the State Department who can be referred to for further information concerning the 
prisoner, etc.
2. In some cases, in order to "beat the press" the next of kin will be notified by 
telephone. It is considered the better method than having next o f kin hear the news via 
public address medium.
B. Immediate recommended action by next o f kin
1. Parents of the prisoner and parents-in-law of the prisoner should be notified by 
telephone. They should be warned not to release any information about the prisoner and 
not to be interviewed by the press concerning his background, etc.
2. Next of kin should engage someone to act as her telephone operator. This 
person should be instructed to accept no calls from foreign cities outside the limits of the 
United States. No information of any kind should be released about the prisoner or his 
family. All such inquiries should be referred to the Public Information Officer at AirPac 
headquarters.
3. The standard answer to all news agencies should be "M rs. has no
comment for the press at this time".
(A) The reasons for maintaining press silence are in the best interests o f the 
prisoner. Any information other than name, rank, serial number and age can be skillfully 
used in psychological warfare to coerce the prisoner to aid the Communist propaganda 
program.
(B) Pictures of the family of the prisoner can also be used as coercion and thus be 
detrimental to the welfare o f the prisoner.
C. Treatment of the Prisoner
1. Prisoners at present are being well treated and authorities have every reason to 
believe that this condition will continue. If  present conditions do continue the prisoner 
will probably not have to undergo brutal torture.
2. The family o f the prisoner can expect that eventually the Communists will 
announce that the prisoner has signed some paper which he would not sign under normal 
circumstances. The family should not comment on this announcement as the information 
is probably correct. All prisoners to date have signed some paper which they would not
be expected to do unless victims of psychological warfare.
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3. Any medals awarded the prisoner in his absence should be accepted by the 
family of the prisoner when they are offered.
4. The family may expect to see pictures of the prisoner in various compromising 
roles released by the Communists for propaganda purposes. Comments about such 
pictures only help serve the purposes of the enemy.
D. Communication with the prisoner
1. The family will be given an address through which they can write to the 
prisoner.
(A) All letters should be of a very general nature. Children or friends should not 
be mentioned or referred to other than in general terms.
(B) Families are warned to delete terms of endearment from their mail as these an 
be used to the prisoner's detriment.
(C) No letter sjpi;d be wrotten [sic] that one would not be able to tolerate if 
printed on the front page o f any newspaper.
2. Mail may eventually be received from the prisoner and will probably be 
forwarded through the International Red Cross. These letters will also be o f a very 
general nature and will not contain any of the usual terms of endearment used by the 
prisoner.
3. Packages may be mailed to the prisoner but there will be no assurances of 
delivery.
E. General expectations for the captivity period.
1. The Casualty Assistance Officer will call on the family and give aid and advice 
regarding the financial status of the next of kin. It is most strongly urged that all next of 
kin have an adequate allotment made out to her before the officer departs the continental 
limits of the United States.
2. The family can stay best informed about the welfare of the prisoner of they live 
in the home port of the prisoner.
3. News agencies may from time to time have information about U. S. prisoners. 
It is advisable to watch major news programs on television regularly, to read the daily 
paper and such news magazines as TIME, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, etc.
4. There is little chance that the prisoner will be able to escape. His release should 
be expect only through negotiation or through peaceful settlement of differences with 
enemy forces.
(A) Families are strongly urged not to intercede on behalf o f the prisoner without 
State Department approval.
(B) Independent intercession on the part of the individual could seriously damage 
negotiation being conducted in behalf of the prisoner by the State Department.
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Appendix F Additional References on Inhumane Treatment of the Prisoners
Additional references regarding inhumane treatment o f the prisoners after 1966 
include the following:
• Sybil Stockdale, under the guidance of Naval Intelligence, participated in covert 
communications with her husband. In a letter she received from her husband, 
dated January 2, 1967, and later deciphered by naval authorities, she was made 
privy to its full contents. In coded form her husband had written: "Experts in 
Torture Hand and Leg Irons 16 hours a day." In Love and War, James B. and 
Sybil Stockdale (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 207.
• In a Department of State publication (referred to as a White Paper), Viet-Nam 
Information Notes, Number 9, August 1967, confirms "there are increasing 
indications o f the deliberate mistreatment of prisoners" and that the record of 
humane treatment to American POWs by the North Vietnamese government "has 
been deplorable." Department of State, Viet-Nam Information Notes, Number 9, 
August 1967. Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection.
• In a letter to Sybil Stockdale from Congressman Olin E. Teague (D-TX), Mr. 
Teague informs her about his trip to Vietnam and subsequent letters he has 
written to the Secretaries of Defense and State "to find out just what is being done 
for our boys who are captured by the North Vietnamese." He also told her "that 
until the North Vietnamese are willing to abide by the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention, we cannot learn the real truth about the treatment of these prisoners. 
From Olin Teague, Congressman, to Mrs. James Bond Stockdale, October 10, 
1967. Sybil Stockdale, unpublished data, private collection.
• Washington Post, columnist George C. Wilson wrote about the "brutal treatment 
and torture of American prisoners." George C. Wilson, "Freed Prisoners of War 
Tell Of Hanoi Brutality, Torture," New York Times, September 3, 1969.
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HOW TO HANDLE YOUR CONTACTS 
WITH THE NEWS MEDIA
A basic "primer" of information 
and suggestions, prepared by:
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES 
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
1 Constitutional Ave., N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
INTERVIEWS
Generally speaking, there are two basic situations in which you may be 
interviewed by the news-media:
1 -  A reporter has contacted you to ask for an interview, or
2 -  You have contacted a reporter or editor, on your own, to suggest an interview.
If  either of these contacts is a telephone-contact, you should comment that you
would be happy to meet with the newsman either in your own home or at his office — by 
try to arrange for a personal meeting — this is much more satisfactory than a telephone 
interview where the reporter cannot see or relate to you as an individual.
Most interviews probably will focus initially on your personal circumstances, but 
regardless of whether the reporter asked for the interview or you asked for the interview, 
remember that you are not limited by the questions the reporter asks.
You should think of every interview as an opportunity to discuss all facets o f the 
prisoner-issue. In other words, this is your opportunity to help inform and educate the 
public and to stir some form of public response.
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During the interview, for example, even though the reporter has not asked you 
about mail-delivery (or if  he has discussed the subject only in a limited context), don't 
hesitate to bear-in on the issue. Try to make the reporter understand that he has a 
responsibility to bring the mail-issue into sharp focus. You can say to him, for instance: 
"Nothing you write will tell the whole story unless you make your readers understand the 
terrible communications problem." This, or some similar statement, should open the 
subject to detailed discussion.
The same is true o f all other aspects of the overall problem. You can open 
discussion on anything you feel a strong need to talk about.
Here are some further examples of the kind of statements you can make to the 
reporter to further stimulate his interest after the interview begins to warm-up a little and 
you are both more relaxed and comfortable with each other:
. "I suppose you want to know some o f the facts and figures about the number of 
men who are missing or captured."
. "You probably wonder how we've been able to identify the men who are listed 
as prisoners."
. "I imagine you're aware o f the way the prisoners have been used for propaganda 
purposes."
. "Have you heard about some of the experiences that have been related by the 
few men who have been released or escaped?"
Don't hesitate to appeal to the reporter to highlight certain facts. Frequently, if  you 
make such an appeal, the reporter may feel obligated to discuss the specific matter you 
consider so important.
One example already has been cited, concerning mail-delivery. When you say to 
the reporter, "Nothing you write will tell the whole story unless. . . ", you are, in effect, 
demanding something of him, but in a nice way.
The same approach can be taken on a number of other topics, in a variety o f ways. 
Examples:
. "I certainly hope you will stress such-and-such."
. "Frequently, this information doesn't get printed, so please try to include some 
discussion of it in your story."
. "It's so important for the public to understand such-and-such. If you could just 
help educate them to this fact, you really would be performing an invaluable service to 
the families of these men."
The variety of appeals is almost infinite. Don't over-use them, but don't hesitate to 
make four or five such pitches to the newsman, threading them her and there throughout 
the interview. And you may want to summarize them near the end of the interview by 
saying something like this:
"I've mentioned how important I think it is for the press to inform the public about 
the truth of the letters-situation, the horrible conditions o f captivity, the heartless way the 
prisoners have been used as propaganda hostages (etc). Whatever else you write, please 
try to help your readers understand these points."
Attached are a number o f "information sheets" the League believes will be helpful 
to you in conducting interviews. These will be supplemented or up-dated from time to 
time as the need arises.
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Appendix H Remarks of the President at the Annual Meeting of the National League of
284Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE SEPTEMBER 28, 1971
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
the white house 
remarks of the president 
at the annual meeting of the 
national league of families 
of American prisoners and 
missing in southeast asia
statler-hilton hotel 
AT 7:15 P.M . EDT
Mrs. North, Mr. Secretary, all o f the distinguished guest who are at the head table 
and all of those who are in this audience.
I have spoken in this room many times over the past, believe it or not, 24 years, 
starting as a Congressman. I can assure all of you that this brief remark that I will now 
address to you is spoken more from the heart, I think, than anything I have ever said 
before.
The Secretary of Defense -  and I have had an opportunity to read his remarks and 
endorse them -  will address you later. He will tell you what we have been doing, what we 
are doing, what we hope to do with regard to the great objective in which all of you and 
all of us are interested, and that is obtaining the release of all of our POW's and missing 
in action wherever they may be in Southeast Asia.
But I wish to underline what the Secretary will tell you by indicating the personal 
commitment of the President of the United States. As you can imagine, whoever holds 
the office of the Presidency cannot take upon himself all of the various assignments that 
come across his desk. Much must be delegated.
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I want each and every one of you to know, however, that from the time in the 
White House Library, at Christmas time, 1969,1 met a group o f wives and one mother of 
some POW's and missing in action, from that time, as the Secretary o f Defense can tell 
you, and the Secretary of State can tell you, I have considered the problem of obtaining 
the release o f our POW's and missing in action as being one that has presidential priority.
I can assure you that every negotiating channel -  and now I say something here 
that I am sure all of you will understand -  including many private channels that have not 
yet been disclosed, have been pursued, are being pursued and will be pursued.
I can assure you that with regard to this problem, that whenever any matter comes 
to the attention of the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary o f State, from a Senator or 
Congressman or the rest, it is brought to my desk and we run out the lead, whatever it 
may be.
You know the tragedy we have found so often -  hopes are raised and then dashed, 
because we are dealing here with a savage enemy, one who has no concern for 
humanitarian ideals.
But on the other hand, we believe that it is essential to check every possible lead; 
we don't care where it comes from. We are doing that.
I have personally ordered that and we will continue to do so, and I believe that we 
will eventually succeed in our goal. That is my commitment that I make to all o f you.
Now, I have delayed your dinner too long, but I would like to add one other rather 
personal note. Many times when I travel around the country, people -  particularly young 
people in school -  will say, "You know, Mr. President, that must be a terribly awesome 
responsibility to serve as President of the United States." And people sometimes feel that 
all of the great burdens o f the world are on the shoulders o f the President and that the 
responsibilities are indeed awesome. I would be less than candid if  I were not to say that 
the responsibilities are heavy.
But let me tell you something: Any day that I sometimes feel that it has been a 
rather hard day and that I have had to make some real tough decisions, and I haven't' had 
very much support, and any time I begin to feel a bit sorry for myself, I think back to that 
day just before Christmas in 1969.
I think of airports where children have come up and said, "My daddy is missing in 
action." I think of the wives who I have seen and the mothers and the rest. I think of their 
courage and what they have done and what they have given for their country, and then I 
realize my job isn't all that hard.
I am just so proud of how great you have been and I am not going to let you
down.
END (AT 7:22 P.M. EDT.)
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HOLD FOR RELEASE No. 828-71
UNTIL 7:00 PM (EDT) OXford 7-3189 (Copies)
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1971 OXford 5-0192 (Info)
Address by The Honorable Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense at the 
annual dinner o f the National League of Families O f American Prisoners and Missing in 
Southeast Asia, Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 28, 1971.
In my many meetings with the wives, parents and other family members of our 
Prisoners of War and missing in action around the country, I have come to know many of 
your personally. To be with you here this evening is again an inspiring and humbling 
experience.
You have won the admiration of the nation and of a great part o f the civilized 
world because you have borne uncertainty and loneliness with dignity and courage.
I pray that you will continue to have the inner resources to maintain that dignity 
and that courage until the day on which uncertainty ends and on which those who are 
prisoners are reunited with their loved ones. I want tonight to reaffirm my pledge to you 
that we will not forget your husbands, your sons, your fathers -  and, we will not forget 
you.
Each of you is aware that the U.S. Government was following a policy of virtual 
silence on the issue o f prisoners of war and the missing until early in 1969. This former 
approach was followed, I know, not because of lack o f concern for the men who were in 
prison or whose fate was unknown. On the contrary, it was assumed that the welfare of 
the prisoners would be best served by public silence.
A change of policy was effected after President Nixon entered the White House. 
We felt that the enemy's violation of the Geneva Convention should not continue to pass 
unnoticed. We were disturbed by Hanoi's failure to account for our servicemen whom 
they held and for those who they knew had died in territory under their control in North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. We were incensed by reports of inhumane treatment 
of Americans.
And so I recommended that a different policy be pursued and that we discuss the 
humanitarian issue of prisoners of war and missing in action, openly, candidly, forcefully, 
and repeatedly.
As you know, I have made it a point on my trips to Europe and even on my last 
trip to Vietnam, to make a stop in Paris for the exclusive purpose o f meeting with our 
delegation on this issue. Also, I have sought, whenever possible, in any meeting with my 
fellow Defense Ministers or other foreign government officials to discuss it and to seek 
the active support of other governments for our efforts to return theses men to their 
families. I will continue to do so every chance I get.
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The President of the United States, our Commander-in-Chief, similarly has made 
this topic a priority item on the agenda in his discussions with leaders around the world, 
and he will continue to do so.
I need not remind you that President Nixon has made far-reaching proposals at the 
negotiating table in Paris, including specifically the immediate and unconditional release 
of all prisoners of war. That proposal was perhaps the most forthcoming ever made on 
prisoners of war in history. Yet, the other side has refused even to address it.
I believe that whatever the frustrations, whatever the uncertainties, we jointly 
should continue our policy of focusing world attention on our prisoners of war and the 
missing in action.
As long as Americans are held prisoners in Southeast Asia, as long as Americans 
missing in action have not been properly accounted for, our efforts must continue to keep 
this issue before the public in our own country and in the rest of the civilized world and 
to reinforce the demand for justice for these men.
We must continue unceasingly to demand that the rights o f prisoners of war under 
the Geneva Convention be respected. We must continue to call attention to Hanoi's 
violation of those rights.
The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be humanely treated and 
protected. This provision has been consistently violated. Among other things, the enemy 
paraded prisoners in the streets, forced them to make statements, and used them for 
purposes of propaganda.
The Geneva Convention requires that neutral inspection of prisoner camps be 
permitted, including interviews of the prisoners without witnesses in attendance. The 
enemy has never permitted such inspection or such interviews.
The Geneva Convention requires that the names o f all prisoners be released 
promptly. Such names as the enemy has released have not been released promptly nor 
through regular channels. And its lists have not been complete. No list of prisoners held 
in South Vietnam and Laos has been furnished.
The Geneva Convention requires notification of deaths in captivity and full 
information on the circumstances and place of burial. The enemy has not furnished any 
information about circumstances of death and place of burial. There is strong ground for 
doubt that its list of the deceased is accurate or complete.
The Geneva Convention requires that prisoner of war camps be marked clearly 
and their location be made public. The enemy has not marked its camps nor divulged 
their location.
The Geneva Convention requires that the seriously sick and wounded be 
repatriated or interned in a neutral country. The enemy has refused to comply with this 
provision.
The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be permitted to send at least 2 
letters and 4 cards a month. The average has been 2 or 3 letters a year and none at all 
from some prisoners. Only one letter has been received from a prisoner held in South 
Vietnam, and none from prisoners in Laos. I am deeply disturbed that after a marked 
increase in the mail received from prisoners last year, this year's trend has gone down.
We have worked through international postal contacts to try to establish special channels 
for prisoner mail to no avail. In every instance, North Vietnam has rebuffed the efforts of
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our intermediaries. Most recently, earlier this month, the North Vietnamese stated they 
prefer the present arrangements.
The Geneva Convention requires that sufficient food must be given to prisoners. 
Yet, all of the released prisoners have been found to be underweight and suffering from 
malnutrition.
The Geneva Convention requires that prisoners not be held in close confinement. 
Yet, the enemy has held some men in solitary confinement for years.
The list o f continuing injustices impels us to persist in our efforts to see that 
Americans who are prisoners anywhere in Southeast Asia are accorded all the rights they 
possess by the Geneva Convention. We will persist in our efforts to obtain full 
information about the missing. We are not satisfied that any list so far released of those 
held prisoner and of the deceased is complete.
We stand by all the proposals we have made relating to exchange and release of 
prisoners. We urge particularly that the sick and the wounded be released immediately.
At this convention, you have wisely given careful attention to the problems of 
readjustment which will be faced when these men return home. It is important to plan 
now to meet these problems. I want to assure you that the Department of Defense and 
other agencies of government want to do everything we can to help you meet this 
challenge.
Let me deal briefly with the varying interpretations o f the enemy's Seven Points 
presented at the Paris negotiations on July 1 o f this year. There are many Americans who 
have claimed on the basis of some direct or indirect contact with North Vietnamese that 
Hanoi is prepared to be flexible on the issue o f separating the release of the prisoners 
from the other issues. Yet, whenever our delegation I Paris has pressed Hanoi's 
representatives for a clear-cut explanation of Hanoi's stand, they have received no 
response or a response veiled in ambiguity.
Among the questions o f particular concern to you which Hanoi's representatives 
refuse to answer are these:
• Does the release of prisoners mean all prisoners -  or only those whom Hanoi has 
admitted it hold in North Vietnam? What about the other American prisoners 
including those held in South Vietnam, Laos, or elsewhere? When and how and 
where will release take place?
• What about the missing? Will they be accounted for? Without such an accounting, 
we cannot know whether any list of prisoners is complete.
At the time of the 120th plenary session o f the formal talks, the North Vietnamese 
had met about 130 times with various unofficial [sic] American delegations. These 
meetings have produced in our own society much misleading speculation about the war, 
the Paris talks, and the prisoners of war issue. In fact, Hanoi has never said to any one 
authorized to negotiate for the United States that the prisoners will be released if 
American troops withdraw, and, of course, there are other conditions which they want 
fulfilled.
On September 16 the North Vietnamese restated their seven point peace plan in 
the hardest terms, apparently repudiating the reports made by some Americans who see 
flexibility in Hanoi's propaganda.
Hanoi's inflexibility and changing signals, coupled with its failure to abide by the 
most rudimentary humanitarian standards, have led to unproductive results. We shall
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continue to press urgently for a full explanation of Hanoi's position, but we will not 
accept any proposition which is not clearly in the interests of this nation or of the 
prisoners themselves.
I wish I could say that I fully appreciate the anguish that each of you has 
undergone and continues to bear. Yet I realize that no one but you who are separated 
from your loved ones can know how hard it is to wait without knowing when the waiting 
will end. As I said at the outset, you and your loved ones are in our thoughts and in our 
prayers. We pray that you will continue to have the strength to hold fast to the conviction 
that the waiting will end -  and it will.
Every resource of you government will be employed to speed the day when the 
waiting ends. Our efforts on behalf o f the prisoners and the missing and on your behalf 
will not flag.
If  together we continue to persevere, to remain united in purpose, to continue to 
keep the question of the prisoners and the missing high on the list o f international 
priorities, we will achieve the objective for which we have been working. We will learn 
what has happened to the missing. And together we will welcome back our men.
332
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Appendix J National Week o f Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners o f War or
Missing in Action286
National Week o f Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners o f War or Missing in 
Action
Proclamation 4115. March 10, 1972
By the President o f  the United States o f  America a Proclamation
1,623 American servicemen and some 50 U.S. civilians are now either missing in 
action or being held captive by North Vietnam and its allies. At the end of this month, the 
first men to be taken prisoner will begin their ninth year in captivity. This is the longest 
internment ever endured by American fighting me; it is also one of the most brutal.
The POW and MIA story of this long and difficult war is a tragic one:
The enemy continues adamant in his refusal even to identify all the Americans 
being held. He continues to flout the Geneva Prisoner o f War Convention which 
establishes minimum humane standards for treatment of prisoners— a treaty to which 
North Vietnam is a signatory, just as are South Vietnam and the United States and 128 
other nations. He continues to block impartial inspection o f the prison camps. He 
continues to deny repatriation for seriously sick and wounded prisoners. He continues to 
ignore the prisoners' right to regular correspondence with their families.
And so those families suffer in spirit hardly less than their men suffer in the flesh. 
They live in a nightmare of unremitting anguish and gnawing concern. Many cannot even 
know whether their loved ones are still alive; those who do know this much, must live 
with their additional knowledge of the cruel conditions in which the prisoners exist.
Each new chapter in this outrage has stiffened the American people's 
determination to see justice done. We have stood and will continue to stand united as a 
nation in our concern and compassion for the prisoners and missing men. We mean to see 
this matter through.
Concern for the prisoners' plight, moreover, has spread to the people o f goodwill 
around the world— and we may be confident that their humanitarian efforts, though so far 
rebuffed as callously as our own, will still continue as steadfastly as our own.
The United States has spared no effort—by diplomacy, by negotiation, by every 
other means—to secure fair treatment of our captive sons and brothers and to obtain their 
ultimate freedom.
As we set aside a special week of national concern for this continuing tragedy, 
and a special day of prayer for its resolution, we do so with a determination to persist in 
this effort—for principle, for peace, for the sake of these brave men and their parents and 
brothers and sisters and wives and the children some have never seen.
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Now, Therefore, I, Richard N ixon, President of the United States of America, 
as requested by the Congress in Senate Joint Resolution 189, do hereby designate the 
period of March 26 through April 1, 1972, as National Week o f Concern for Prisoners of 
War/Missing in Action, and Sunday, March 26, 1972, as a National Day of Prayer for the 
lives and safety o f these men.
I call upon all the people o f the United States to observe this week with such 
appropriate ceremonies and activities as will stir and sustain widespread concern for the 
missing men and prisoners, nourish the patient courage o f their loved ones, and— above 
all—hasten the day of their safe return to home and freedom.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of March, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two, and of the Independence o f the 
United States of American the one hundred ninety-sixth.
Richard Nixon.
[Filed with the Office o f the Federal Register, 11:52 a.m., March 13, 1972]
N ote: The proclamation was signed in a ceremony at the White House
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Let's not allow having been a POW or a member of a POW's family 
to become equated with Motherhood to the extent that we become exponents 
of the policy which proposes that no amount of money is too much to spend for research 
to prevent future family chaos and heartache if we have future American POW's.
The two conditions are inseparable. Keep what can realistically be accomplished in its 
proper perspective. Continue the medical follow-up for those who were POW's, assist the 
MIA families by giving supportive help in the areas they find supportive, put all the 
information that has already been collected onto microfilm, put it in a drawer, 
close the drawer, and hope to God we never have to open it again.
Sybil Stockdale 
"My Philosophy about the Center for Prisoner of War Studies"
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